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 “What you learn in Labour Students and what you learn in a trade union are different things. 
It’s the Denis Healey dictum: In academia you argue towards a conclusion; 
 in politics you argue towards a decision.” 
 







This thesis, by undertaking a detailed, empirical analysis of the role youth and student wings play in 
the recruitment of national legislators of the German Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands and 
the British Labour Party, contributes to our understanding of how the social democratic party family 
has changed in the decades since the early 1980s. It does so by utilising three research questions. 
Firstly, it investigates the changing role of the youth and student wings in the recruitment of social 
democratic legislators. Second, it explores the dynamics of this process. Finally, the thesis unpacks the 
manner in which this shift has led to a ‘gentrification’ of centre-left Parliamentarians and thus changed 
the nature of social democratic parties. The study engenders new insights via the combined use of a 
large, new quantitative dataset and qualitative elite interviews.  
The study demonstrates that the recruiting ground for Parliamentarians for these parties has shifted. 
The quantitative date shows that as the trade union movement declined in influence the parties faced 
a functional need to replace them as a source of qualified electoral standard bearers and the vacuum 
was filled by affiliated party youth and student organisations. The evidence presented here suggests 
this means that most individuals are now politicised into the parties at university, not in the workplace. 
This has coincided with a rise in a political ecosystem of party employees, representatives’ staffers, 
NGOs, journalists, charities and think-tanks and a wider sphere of politics-facilitating professions, both 
of which recruit out of these youth wings. Individuals working in those fields have an advantage in 
developing the political capital required to push for selection as a Parliamentary candidate. The 
qualitative data provides prima facie evidence that these two factors lead to a gentrification effect, 
resulting in a shift in the balance between the working class and middle class within social democratic 
parties in favour of the latter and that this changes the culture and the nature of these parties. This is 
ripe for further research. 
The results of this study contribute in particular to the literature on political recruitment and the 
professionalisation of politics. Both of these fields have often dealt with the class nature of 
Parliamentarians but have hitherto lacked the empirical evidence to place the party’s youth and 
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Chapter 1: Introduction. 
 
1.1: Introduction.  
The question of legislative recruitment, that is who becomes a parliamentarian and therefore makes 
decisions on government policy and the allocation of public resources, plays a key role in the lives of 
citizens in modern democracies. Accusations of a gentrified and/or professional class of legislators out 
of touch with ordinary citizens have formed a key component of much of the populist rhetoric seen in 
the second decade of the 21st century.1 The distinction between gentrified and professionalised 
parties is crucial in this thesis, with the former being more affluent individuals crowding out their less 
well-off comrades in the halls of power2 and the second being an increasing sophistication in the way 
in which politics and political campaigning are performed.3 Both of these processes have been present 
in political parties in recent decades.4 This has been particularly acute for the centre-left, the 
traditional bastion of working-class political representation and has formed part of both academic 
discussion5 and the public debate.6   
Strangely however despite this there has been comparatively little investigation into the actual 
mechanisms by which this has come about. We therefore do not have a fine-grained understanding 
of how more middle-class individuals are out-competing their less-affluent comrades. One of the 
processes by which this happens, and with which this study concerns itself, is the role youth and 
student organisations associated with social democratic parties play in recruiting activists, providing 
them with a political education and giving middle-class individuals advantages which carry on through 
their political career to the point of selection. What little research there has been has focused on their 
role in allowing for youth political participation and activism.7 Literature focusing on the youth wings 
and the individuals within them as individual party units is comparatively rare.8 Most individuals come 
to politics in their teens and twenties and as such party youth wings shape much of their early 
 
1 See for example Muller J. 2017. What is populism? London, Penguin Books; Moffitt B. 2016. The Global Rise of 
Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation. Stanford CA, Stanford University Press and 
Goodhart D. 2017. The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics. London, Hurst & Co.  
2 Cairney P. 2007. The professionalisation of MPs: Refining the ‘politics-facilitating’ explanation. Parliamentary 
Affairs. Vol. 60 No. 2, pp 212 – 233. 
3 Black G. S. 1970. A Theory of Professionalisation in Politics. The American Political Science Review. Vol. 64 No. 
3. pp 865 – 878. 
4 Norris P. and Lovenduski J. 1995. Political Recruitment: Gender, Race and Class in the British Parliament. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.  
5 O’Grady T. 2019. Careerists versus Coal-Miners: Welfare Reforms and the Substantive Representation of 
Social Groups in the British Labour Party. Comparative Political Studies. Vol. 52 No. 4, pp 544-578. 
6 See for example ‘Bagehot’. 2018. Labour is no longer the party of the traditional working class. The 
Economist. 16.07.2018. available at: https://www.economist.com/bagehots-notebook/2018/07/06/labour-is-
no-longer-the-party-of-the-traditional-working-class accessed 26.06.2019 12:20 and Rutherford J. 2018. How 
the decline of the working class made Labour a party of the bourgeois left. The New Statesman. 19.09.2018. 
available at https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2018/09/how-decline-working-class-made-labour-
party-bourgeois-left accessed on 26.06.2019 12:22.  
7 See for example Rainsford, E. 2013. What makes young people politically active? Comparing activists in 
political parties youth factions, youth councils and at demonstrations. Research Working Paper presented at 
PSA General Conference, Cardiff, Centre for Citizenship Globalisation and Governance, University of 
Southampton. 
8 One notable exception is Rainford E. 2018. UK political parties youth factions: A glance at the future of 




formation as activists. They often provide activists with their first key training in the skills required to 
achieve political outcomes and offer unparalleled opportunities to network with existing legislators 
and party elites. It would be strange indeed if those experiences did not have an impact on the journey 
an individual undertakes to be in contention to be selected as an election candidate.  
But what role exactly do these youth wings play in that process and in what context? Social democratic 
politicians, at least in Western Europe, used to do their apprenticeships in the trade union movement.9 
It is beyond doubt that the trade unions have been in decline;10 If youth wings bear some responsibility 
for an increase in ‘career politicians’ on the centre left, then did they do so by replacing the unions as 
training grounds and if so how did that process happen? How and why does this affect the individuals 
moving through the political parties to the point of becoming a Parliamentarian? Crucially, what does 
all this mean for our understanding of the nature of contemporary social democratic parties? 
These are the key questions which this study seeks to answer. It will do so via a comparative 
investigation of the youth organisations associated with the German Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany, SPD) and the British Labour Party (Labour).  
This introductory chapter will first introduce the topics definitions, concepts and the categorisation 
used in the research. Secondly it will detail the research questions and their linked hypotheses which 
will then be used to frame the research throughout this study. It will then detail the background to 
the study, in particular explaining the relevance of this research. Finally, the chapter will give a detailed 
outline of how the thesis will proceed.  
1.2: Topic definition, concepts and categorisation.  
This study is an investigation of social democratic party youth wings, and their influence on their 
mother parties via the process of selection. It asserts that the youth wings engage in the politicisation 
of individuals – that is they inculcate a political culture into those individuals who undertook their 
political apprenticeship in those youth wings. This culture is then imported into the main party as 
those individuals become national legislators.  These terms – youth wings, party culture and 
politicisation – therefore require defining. Since the thesis also asserts that the specific cultural 
differences between the cultures of the youth wings and the trade union movements are based on 
class it also requires a discussion of what is meant by working and middle class.  
Further the thesis tests the assumption that this is a driver of the professionalisation and gentrification 
of the social democratic party family. It argues that these are two separate – if interlinked – conceptual 
categories despite being conflated in the existing literature. As such an explanation is needed of how 
 
9 See for example Allern E.H., Aylott N. and Christiansen F.J. 2007. Social Democrats and trade unions in 
Scandinavia: The decline and persistence of institutional relationships. European Journal of Political Research. 
Vol. 46 No. 5, pp 607-635; Howell C. 2001. The end of the relationship between social democratic parties and 
trade unions? Studies in Political Economy. Vol 65 No. 1, pp. 7 – 37; Taylor A. J. 1993. Trade unions and the 
politics of social democratic renewal. West European Politics. Vol. 16 No. 1, pp 133 – 155 and Minkin L. 1992. 
The Contentious Alliance: Trade Unions and the Labour Party. Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press.  
10 See for example Visser J. 2007. Trade Union decline and what next: is Germany a special case? Industrielle 
Beziehungen : Zeitschrift für Arbeit, Organisation und Management, Vol. 14 No. 2, pp 97-117; Martin R., Sunley 
P. and Wills J. 1993. The Geography of Trade Union Decline: Spatial Dispersal or Regional Resilience? 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp 36 – 62; Bell B. D. and Pitt M. K. 1998. 
Trade Union decline and the distribution of wages in the UK: Evidence from kernel density estimation. Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics. Vol. 60 No. 4, pp 509 – 528 and Machin S. 2000. Union decline in Britain. 




this study will categorise professionalisation and gentrification, the differences between them and 
why they matter for this study and more broadly. 
Youth wings.  
This study is concerned above all with party youth wings, their role and their impact. In consequence 
perhaps the most important concepts to define is what precisely is meant by a youth wing. Although 
this might seem obvious it still requires categorisation.  
This study will classify the term as relating to either those formally constituted subsidiaries of the party 
in question, or an independent organisation that has had a sustained affiliation - either formal or 
informal - with the party in question whose rules state that individuals must be below a specified age 
to be eligible for membership.  
As well as the formal youth wings this definition covers those organisations outside of its structures 
but affiliated with them on a sustained basis. In order to wield influence within the parties these youth 
organisations need to build institutional links to them. This needs to be maintained for some time in 
order for members to be able to leverage service in the youth organisations into political capital that 
can impact on the selection process. This definition therefore includes organisation such as the Young 
Fabians, formally affiliated through their parent Fabian Society to the Labour Party since their 
founding in 1960,11 and the Sozialistische Jugend Deutschlands – Die Falken (Socialist Youth of 
Germany – The Falcons, SJD – Die Falken) who are not formally linked to the SPD but have many 
informal links.12 However the lack of a sustained link disqualifies organisations which were only 
affiliated briefly such as Compass Youth.13  
In addition this study will treat student wings, that is party subsidiaries which require as a condition 
of membership enrolment in a course of education, usually but not exclusively at tertiary level, as 
within the typology of youth wings. Student wings do not specifically have an age requirement. 
However the majority of those enrolled in education and therefore eligible to be members are in the 
same age brackets as party youth wings and the two are often treated similarly, indeed in the case of 
the German SPD the youth and student wings are combined, with student organisations being treated 
as branches of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft der JungsozialistInnen in der SPD (Working Group of the 
Young Socialists in the SPD, the JUSOS). As such this study will encompass student wings within its 
purview and references in the text to youth wings should be taken to include student wings unless 
specified otherwise. 
A full explanation of which organisations formed part of this research can be found in the section on 
case study selection in chapter three. 
Party Culture and Politicisation.  
This study makes the argument that the youth wings inculcate in those who participate in them a 
concept of how to do politics, and that they bring this with them in the fulness of time to the ranks of 
the Party’s legislators. Further this study contends that the political cultures of the youth wings are 
 
11 For more details see chapter five. 
12 For more details see chapter four. 
13 Compass Youth is the youth wing of the think-tank Compass, founded in 2003 as an internal group within the 
Labour Party before disaffiliating in 2011 and becoming independent, since when it has declined greatly in 





different to that of other routes into the party, in particular that of the trade union movement. This 
notion is referred to in this thesis as political culture.  
The concept of culture is highly contested in the literature. This is in large part due to the fact that it 
is a difficult concept to pin down, being tangible yet difficult to measure. Culture is more commonly 
discussed by sociology than political science, although it has been utilised in political science, in 
particular by Bale,14 which is discussed further below. Keesing15 argued that culture is an ideational 
code of what an individual believes others in their society know, believe and mean about the rules of 
society’s game. Elkins and Simeon16 argued culture consists of assumptions about the political world 
which when shared will allow an individual to be identified as a group insider, the notion of culture as 
shibboleth. Shi17 in his study of political trust argues for a limiting effect of political culture. First 
however he sets out how the Culturalist strand of sociology conceptualises political culture as “values, 
norms, attitudes, and beliefs as a unified system of control”18 before taking issue with this definition 
and arguing that values and norms are different to attitudes and beliefs, as the former are internal to 
the individual and the latter are means by which the individual regards some external thing.19 He 
therefore defined political culture as only the values and norms of a given society.  
Duffield20 also noted the many varied and differing definitions of culture but opined that there are 
common features. Firstly, they involve some pattern of thought or perception common to the group, 
but this is internal to the individual and thus distinct from behaviour.21 It is also distinct from 
institutions (including political parties).22 Culture belongs to the group not just its constituent 
individuals, and each culture is distinctive from other cultures and evolves only slowly.23 Bale24 
touched upon these concepts within a political science framework, stating that “each social unit will 
have its own common-sense, its own ‘take’ on reality, its own belief system about what is and what 
ought to be (both ethically and organisationally), its own inextricable blend of what are commonly 
thought of as conceptions of authority and conceptions of purpose”.25  
 
14 See for example Bale T. 1997. Towards a ‘cultural theory’ of parliamentary party groups. The Journal of 
Legislative Studies. Vol. 3 No. 4, pp. 25 – 43; Bale T. 1999. Broad churches, big theory and one small example: 
cultural theory and intra-party politics. In Thompson M., Grendstad G. and Selle P. (eds) Cultural Theory as 
Political Science. London, Routledge and Bale T. 1999. Sacred Cows and Common Sense: The symbolic 
statecraft and political culture of the British Labour Party. Aldershot, Ashgate. 
15 Keesing R. M. 1974. Theories of Culture. Annual Review of Anthropology. Vol. 3, pp 73 – 97. 
16 Elkins D. J. and Simeon R. E. B. 1979. A cause in search of its effect, or what does political culture explain? 
Comparative Politics. Vol. 11 No. 2, pp 127 – 145.  
17 Shi T. 2001. Cultural values and political trust: A comparison of the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan. 
Comparative Politics. Vol. 33 No. 4, pp 401 – 419.  
18 Ibid. p402. 
19 Ibid. p402. 
20 Duffield J. S. 1999. Political culture and state behaviour: Why Germany confounds Neorealism. International 
Organisation. Vol. 53 No. 4, 00 765 – 803. 
21 Ibid. p769. 
22 Ibid. p769. 
23 Ibid. p770. 
24 Bale T. 1997. Towards a ‘cultural theory’ of parliamentary party groups. The Journal of Legislative Studies. 
Vol. 3 No. 4, pp. 25 – 43. 




Bale26 posited cultural theory as a possible method of understanding the factions within the 
Parliamentary Labour Party,27 building upon the work of Rose28 on factions, and that of Rayner,29 
Douglas and Wildavsky30 and Gross and Rayner31 on cultural theory. It is Bale’s contention that “ways 
of seeing and ways of organising are inextricably and reciprocally linked”32 and that individuals within 
a social unit hold a “cultural bias (shared fundamental beliefs and values)”.33 It is these shared 
fundamental beliefs and values which define a difference between groups, and which it is the 
argument of this thesis that differs those legislators who emerge from a youth wing background, and 
those who come from a background in the trade union movement.  
However, we can also draw a distinction between ‘ways of seeing’ – the political perspective – and 
‘ways of organising’ – the political practices that result. These are inextricably linked in a symbiotic 
relationship as Bale contends34 but there is a difference as discussed by Shi35. The distinction is that 
ways of seeing are internal to the individual, whereas ways of organising are by definition external 
and communal; as Duffield36 noted culture belongs to a collective, it is a social phenomenon. These 
communally held political practices are how those ways of seeing are spread and signalled to others 
to diffuse that way of seeing through the group, they signal what ways of seeing are considered 
appropriate within that group. They are therefore a key mechanism for signalling how to belong, which 
is as true for participants within a group as for academic observers. As such they must be performative. 
This demonstrates belonging and also informs potential new recruits of what patterns of thought and 
behaviour they must adopt to become a member of the in-group. Such performative actions will 
include internal markers of in/out status, how insiders think of and describe themselves, what they 
believe to be the group’s objectives and how members of the group should and do behave around 
each other and with outsiders. 
This is important, because in political science or any other field it is difficult to tell or measure what 
another individual truly thinks or feels. But the symbiotic nature of the political practices – the ways 
of organising – of a group tell us what the political perspectives – the ways of seeing – are. 
Consequently, by observing these performative political practices in action we can analyse the political 
perspectives they are signalling. 
This also means that these two factors, whilst distinct, cannot exist without each other. Without 
performative political practices the culture’s political perspectives cannot be signalled to new 
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members of the group and the culture cannot be sustained. The distinction between internal and 
external aspects of culture then is valid, but in practical terms any meaningful definition of party 
culture must be defined in such a way as to take into account both political perspectives and political 
practices to be of value.  
For the purposes of this study then political culture is defined as those assumptions, ideas, norms, 
customs and beliefs found within a certain group or sub-group which has political aims or effects, 
maintained and evidenced in group shibboleths, self-perceptions, espoused priorities and principles 
of right action and interaction which govern social behaviour both within the group and towards 
outsiders. The first part of the definition breaks down political perspectives, the second refers to the 
inextricably linked political practices which evidence and reinforce them. 
An important point to note is that political culture, both political perspectives and political practices, 
are a series of learned behaviours. Individuals do not for the most part join a political party or their 
youth wings with fully formed understanding of that party’s or group’s culture, unless they are raised 
by highly involved parents and learn it through childhood. Either way, in childhood or adulthood, an 
individual undergoes a process of learning and absorbing these assumptions, ideas, norms, customs 
and beliefs and the corresponding shibboleths, self-perceptions and principles of right action and 
interaction. As these are performative and adopted from others around them this learning process is 
a form of socialisation into the group, whereby adopting more of the culture of the group is rewarded 
by further acceptance. This process of learning the relevant political culture and being socialised into 
the group to which it corresponds is referred to in this thesis as politicisation.  
Class and class sensibilities.  
Class is a concept that runs as the central thread through this thesis. It is something which every 
individual will have a conceptualisation of, but which people often struggle to put into exact words. 
That is, people might not be able to say exactly what class is, but they know it when they see it. 
Academics have also struggled to provide a concrete definition of class, nevertheless this thesis 
requires a definition of class in order to be able to understand the concept of class sensibilities. It is a 
contention of this thesis that the process of politicisation, the adoption of the political cultures of the 
youth wings and political parties, is easier for those from a more affluent, middle-class background. 
Further the perspectives and practices which are adopted during that process are those which 
characterise the dominant middle-class, meaning that in order to be accepted into the group working-
class individuals have to adopt middle-class sensibilities.  
For Karl Marx37 an individual’s class is entirely defined by their relationship to the ownership of the 
means of production. This thesis, along with many other theorists, rejects that narrow definition as 
far too blunt an assessment to be useful. Evans and Tilley38 argue that there is no one definitive 
characterisation of class but use an adaptation of the Goldthorpe Schema, created by Eriksen and 
Goldthorpe39 and then further developed by Goldthorpe,40 which groups occupations together and 
also takes into account levels of job security.  
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This however does not take into account the cultural aspects of class. Even as far back as 1928 
Stevenson41 was referring to cultural divisions as more important than wealth divisions when 
discussing class. For Thompson42 class is not an objective category, but rather an active cultural 
construct created by its participants. Ainsley43 also argues that class is not a fixed concept but based 
on cultural context. Both Standing44 and Goodhart45 define class in the modern era as more cultural 
than linked to occupation. Savage46 argues that class is based on levels of three forms of capital – 
economic, social and cultural. This builds on Bourdieu47 who argues that class is acquired or inherited 
socio-cultural capital, passed down via behaviour and language – in particular via the education 
system – to reinforce social structures.  
A definition of class then must take into account cultural aspects as well as income or occupation. This 
cultural aspect is important, and links to the concepts of political culture and politicisation discussed 
above, because cultures can shift or new ones can be learnt, whether they be political cultures or class 
ones. However, an additional level of complexity for this thesis is that the definition needs to apply 
across the entire time frame from the late 1970s, during which the working class had a common 
economic experience and linked cultural identity48 and to the modern era of the 21st century when 
that no longer holds true.49  
This thesis will therefore define class as the cultural grouping to which an individual belongs based on 
their perceived socio-economic position within society. This acknowledges that those groupings can 
and have shifted, whether across society or within the life and experience of an individual, that they 
are based on beliefs and perceptions – of the individual and others – and that classes are relative to 
each other. Further, it recognises that class is as much a cultural grouping as an economic one, and 
that social and cultural capital are as relevant as economic capital when deciding on an individual’s 
class association. It should also be born in mind that higher education often has a large impact on 
defining an individual’s cultural grouping.  
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There are two other aspects of class which are agreed upon by many theorists, including Ainsley,50 
Evans and Tilley,51 Goodhart,52 Savage53 and Standing54 and which need to be born in mind. The first 
is that class structures are still vital to an accurate understanding of both society and politics, but that 
have shifted from the mid to late 1980s onwards and indeed are still in the process of shifting. The 
mid-19th to mid-20th Century binary of blue-collar working class and white-collar middle class no longer 
holds true.  
This leads to a question as to the applicability of the terms ‘working-class’ and ‘middle-class’ in the 
contemporary era. Standing55 discusses not the working-class but the Precariat, which he describes as 
a ‘class-in-the-making’.56 Evans and Tilley57 divide occupations up into seven groups – old middle-class, 
new middle-class, junior middle-class, own account (the self-employed), personal service, foreman 
and working class. This thesis does not need to go into this level of detail, as it is interested not in 
specific occupations but with the cultural aspects of class and how they relate to politics. The old, new 
and junior middle-classes all have a middle-class culture, regardless of whether their occupation is 
barrister, law lecturer or legal assistant – three of the examples given for those respective classes.  
Further the class structure at the beginning of the time period in this thesis was the traditional class 
division of manual workers – skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled – and management. The new forms of 
working- and middle-class, although differing in occupation greatly, still fall into the rough umbrella 
groups of those who are paid for their labour and those who are paid for their knowledge. Therefore, 
this thesis will continue to utilise the terms working-class and middle-class, to avoid confusion.  
The second point of agreement is that although the new class structures in the industrialised West are 
more fluid in terms of their occupational typologies in social mobility terms they are more rigidly 
stratified – it is harder to move up the class ladder.58 Those who do move up do so via tertiary 
education, and specifically university education.59  
This point is important for this thesis. It has to be admitted that national representatives in any country 
are no longer members of the working class when it comes to their income and occupation. In the 
past social democratic parliamentarians who came up through the trade union movement kept their 
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working-class culture, embodied in the trade union movement – which evoked a strong sense of 
working-class identity.60 The party youth wings however are dominated by graduates.61  
Research by Brynner and Egerton62 and Reay, Crozier and Clayton63 demonstrated that attending 
university forces working-class individuals to adopt the positions, priorities and opinions of their 
middle-class peers to ‘blend in’ – they are thereby socialised into the middle-classes. Just as 
politicisation is adopting a political culture, defined as those assumptions, ideas, norms, customs and 
beliefs found within a certain group or sub-group, maintained and evidenced in group shibboleths, 
self-perceptions, espoused priorities and principles of right action and interaction which govern social 
behaviour both within the group and towards outsiders, so class socialisation is the adoption of their 
social and cultural equivalents, which also includes political aspects. Those positions, priorities and 
opinions which are learnt by middle-class individuals as children, and adopted by those working-class 
individuals who attend university, are referred to collectively by this thesis as ‘middle-class 
sensibilities.’ Hanley describes the process of how working-class individuals adapt, at least outwardly, 
to the middle-class milieu they find themselves in64 at university or in the professions – including 
politics – by adopting those middle-class sensibilities via responding to the ‘silent signals’65 of how to 
behave of their new, middle-class peers.   
This means that the rise of the youth wings as the preeminent route into national legislatures on the 
left not only has less barriers for middle-class individuals, but also even those who grew up in 
straitened circumstances with a working-class culture, by taking this route, have adopted middle-class 
sensibilities by the time they are in a position to push for selection for national parliaments.  
The situation however is more complex than this. Most individuals from a less affluent background 
retain some of their working-class culture, often large parts. Hanley66 refers to this as the ‘wall in the 
mind’ – the same term used in Germany to describe the struggles of former East Germans to adapt 
following reunification. Some interviewees, in particular GB01, raised this as an issue, as being neither 
one class nor the other. This does go some way towards proving the point that adopting at least some 
middle-class sensibilities was required to push for selection, but it should be born in mind.  
Further the social democratic parties, and even more the trade unions, have long been proponents of 
a strong working-class culture.67 This is particularly the case in Great Britain, where the Conservative 
Party of the 1950s, 60s and 70s laid claim to the ‘respectable’ middle-class by contrasting it with the 
Labour supporting working-class.68 This can lead to a social desirability bias amongst even middle-class 
members, who then look to appropriate what they perceive to be markers of working-class culture for 
selectoral advantage.69 This activity can further muddy the waters around class and selection in social 
democratic parties. When reading the discussions around class and selection in this thesis then, it 
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must be considered that these divisions are messy and shade into each other, there are not clear-cut 
and simple binary divisions. 
Professionalisation and gentrificati on.  
The broader context for this study is the ongoing discussion around the professionalisation of politics 
and political parties. The idea that politics has become more professionalised and that this has meant 
that full time ‘career politicians’ are on the increase is commonplace as seen in the work of researchers 
such as Cairney,70 Norris,71 O’Grady72 and Saalfield.73 The notion is also barely contested, with the 
occasional notable exception such as Beckman.74 Nevertheless there is some confusion because the 
concept of politics professionalising and the notion of an increase in career politicians are in fact two 
interlinked but separate concepts, both described in the literature under the name 
professionalisation.  The distinction between these two is not acknowledged in the literature on the 
subject but forms an important framework for this study. This section will define both terms and 
indicate why it treats them as separate concepts. 
The professionalisation of politics in this study is defined as the process of increasing levels of 
qualification, education, professional identity and professional cultural markers required by those 
working in the political field resulting from the increased sophistication in the manner in which politics 
and political campaigning are organised and performed. 
Democratic politics is a continual arms race between the parties. This results in an increasing 
sophistication in how politics is done as one or other party gains an electoral advantage which the 
others then scramble to adopt, such as the Social Media strategies of the Conservative Party in the 
2015 General Election being adopted by the Labour Party in the 2017 election.75 This brings greater 
levels of specialisation in the techniques and methods required for political parties to successfully 
pursue their electoral aims, and consequently a functional need for specialists, marked as such by their 
qualifications, education and experience as full-time practitioners. This can be seen in increases in the 
numbers and qualifications of party staff,76 an imposition of a professional code to those working in 
the political field77 and the revolution in political communication techniques.78 As with any other 
profession this brings with it a professional identity which then requires markers and characteristics 
which help define it as such to those both in and out of the identity group.79 This is professionalisation 
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in its true sense, the process of giving a certain activity professional status and qualities by requiring 
greater qualifications to achieve the required rising level of specialisation.  
In the literature however researchers such as Norris,80 Saalfield81 and Best and Cotta82 conceptualise 
professionalisation not as increasing specialisation but as a rise in middle-class ‘career’ politicians. 
These career politicians are defined as coming from certain professional backgrounds, termed by 
Cairney83 ‘politics-facilitating’ and defined by Mellors84 as ‘communication professions’ such as law, 
education and journalism.  
There have always been professional politicians in national legislatures,85 and the presence of less 
affluent individuals is a phenomenon only seen since the very end of the 19th Century. Nevertheless, 
there is in the contemporary debate a sense that those from a more affluent background are now 
better able to navigate the professionalised world of politics to the point of becoming a legislator. 
These may not be individuals who have been born into the middle class, although many are, but that 
they need to be at least socialised into it before pursuing a political career. Brynner and Egerton86 have 
shown that individuals who go through higher education undergo a process of adapting to and 
adopting middle class sensibilities. It is the contention of this study that the same is happening within 
the youth wings of the political party. In previous eras many on the centre-left gained the necessary 
skills for politics by undertaking an apprenticeship in the trade union movement, leading to figures 
entering Parliament such as the Labour MP Roy Mason who began working in a coal mine at 1487 or 
the former postman Alan Johnson who left school at 16.88 The assumption that less affluent individuals 
have been crowded out of Parliament is one of the questions which will be tested by this thesis,89 and 
the research does support the claim that more affluent individuals are coming to dominate centre-left 
politics to a far greater extent, disrupting the previous balance.  
There is a word that can be applied to more affluent individuals crowding out the less well off from a 
space which they previously occupied which can be borrowed from the field of urban studies: 
gentrification.90 This concept describes how those with greater levels of capital – whether economic 
or social – have been moving into spaces – whether geographic or conceptual – which were previously 
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at least in part the domain of those with less capital.91 Therefore this study will import this concept 
into political science in order to differentiate the second conceptualisation of professionalisation 
found in the literature from the first. In the conceptualisation of this study then the gentrification of 
politics is the process by which more affluent individuals supplant and crowd out less affluent 
individuals from a political or legislative space by virtue of greater social or economic capital.  
It is important to provide this distinction, because it is important for this research. It is the contention 
of this thesis that the greater influx of career politicians is not an inevitable effect of 
professionalisation. There are still some examples in national legislatures, such as Angela Rayner92 in 
the UK, Ulrich Freese93 in Germany and Stefan Löfven94 in Sweden, who have come through the trade 
union route into politics and have reached high political status – the highest in Löfven’s case – from a 
less affluent background in very recent history.  Consequently, it is still possible for individuals to 
become legislators without first undergoing this process of gentrification. Whilst the 
professionalisation process is likely to have had an impact on and increased the contextual likelihood 
of gentrification, and there will likely be some concomitant interlinking of the two, the need for 
additional specialisation is not the sole cause of the shift towards more middle-class legislators. It is 
the gentrification dynamic which is of primary interest in this research. 
As the examples in this section demonstrate, the existing literature has conflated these two concepts 
as one, in part because increasing professionalisation and increasing gentrification have occurred at 
the same time. But correlation is not causality and these two processes may not be inextricably linked. 
As the remorseless logic of electoral politics is responsible for the professionalisation process it is the 
contention of this thesis that a shift in legislator’s apprenticeships is responsible for gentrification.  
Selection as a zero-sum game.  
This conception of gentrification however poses a question, which is to what extent is the selection 
process a zero-sum game? Is it a zero-sum between the institutional players in the form of the trade 
unions and the youth wings, and is it a zero-sum game between working- and middle-class individuals? 
The simple answer to these questions is yes, this is a zero-sum game, only one individual can be 
selected to be the candidate in each seat or list place. There are however some caveats to this. 
There are some individuals who have both service in the senior ranks of a youth wing and employment 
by a trade union on their CV. These are however rare birds in both the UK Labour Party and the German 
SPD. Of the 929 individuals to have served as a UK Labour MP between the 1979 and 2019 General 
Elections only 45 had both been in a senior role in a youth wing and been employed by a trade union. 
In the SPD just 22 individuals had both served in a senior youth wing role and been employed by a 
trade union, out of a total of 848 individuals to have served in the Bundestag. Such individuals do exist 
however and further are on the rise, as trade unions become more intermediate stages than origin 
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points.95 These individuals are not ignored in this thesis but they are unusual enough at 4.74% and 
2.59% respectively to be discussed as exceptions in their own section rather than included as part of 
the norms of selection.  
Further, as discussed in the empirical chapters, the increase in individuals from both a youth wing and 
trade unionist background is in large part down to the union’s increasing tendency to send graduates 
in the form of former industrial tribunal lawyers and political officers to the national legislatures rather 
than shop stewards and those who have come up from the factory floors.  
As discussed above the concept of class is a complex, shifting dynamic and can even be so within an 
individual.96 There are unlikely to be significant numbers of ideal types who could resolutely be said 
to be working-class in order to push them for selection97 although there may well be greater numbers 
of ideal-type middle-class MPs. This is caused, at least in part, by the need to adopt at least some 
middle-class sensibilities to push for selection, and in part by other factors, such as political ambition.  
Candidates for selection are, by definition, office-seeking and therefore act accordingly,98 with the 
structural framework of political opportunities encouraging ambition in those who see a prospective 
path.99 This can be influenced by factors such as gender, for example Hilde and Davidson-Schmich100 
found in their analysis of Germany and New Zealand that in mixed-member electoral systems women 
will focus on the party list side of the equation, and Schwindt-Bayer finding that women needed to 
display the same characteristics and play the same game as men to get selected, something which can 
be difficult due to gendered expectations around life circumstances.101 Life circumstances around 
family and professional commitments also influences political ambition more broadly for both men 
and women.102 In part this is because of the importance of individuals who want to push themselves 
forward for selection signalling this to gatekeepers,103 as part of their talent-spotting role, and the 
manner in which gendered expectations lead to this happening less often amongst potential female 
candidates.104  
For reasons discussed in more depth in chapter three however this thesis doesn’t consider gender in 
detail, but it does have to be acknowledged here as a factor. With regards to issues of class Robbins105 
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found that privilege plays a key role in determining levels of political ambition. Peterson and Palmer106 
in their study of personality traits and political ambition, found that political ambition is found across 
the class spectrum but is lower amongst the working class than average - 8% of working class 
individuals had considered standing for public office, compared to a national average of 10%. As 
Black107 found, political ambition increases when individuals feel they have the opportunity to pursue 
it successfully. Since this has been demonstrated to be a barrier to women’s political ambition108 there 
is no reason to suppose it is different for those from a working-class background. Indeed other 
researchers, such as Norris and Lovenduski,109 Borchert and Golsch110  and Wigbers111 have also shown 
the issue of working-class candidates is with the supply side of the equation not the demand side.  
In other words, it is not that the gatekeepers in the SPD and Labour parties have changed their criteria 
for selection in a manner which excludes working-class individuals but that there are fewer and fewer 
working-class individuals who are able to accumulate enough political capital to push for selection. 
Working-class candidates are not turning up to selection contests and losing out, they’re just not 
turning up at all. Most contemporary selection contests are not therefore a zero-sum game between 
working-class and middle-class alternatives but a zero-sum game between several middle-class 
individuals. 
This thesis then explores the issue of gentrification of the social democratic parties by seeking to 
understand why potential working-class candidates are being squeezed out before they can even get 
to the starting line. The manner in which this question was unpacked and explored is detailed in the 
next section. 
1.3: Research questions and hypotheses.  
In order to explore the role that youth wings play in the legislative recruitment processes of the SPD 
and the Labour Party this study employs three research questions. It will then propose for each an 
hypotheses, which then frame the research. It will proceed in a comparative manner, taking a mixed 
approach employing both quantitative and qualitative methods.112 Prior to this it will examine the 
existing literature in the fields of elite theory, legislative recruitment, factionalism and the 
professionalisation of social democratic parties and politics more widely.113 This section therefore will 
set out and explore the research questions and the hypotheses which guide the rest of the study, as 
set out in the table below.  
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Research Questions Hypotheses 
RQ1: How have the youth wings of social 
democratic political parties impacted on the 
selection of national representatives since the 
elections of 1979/80? 
 
H1: Youth organisations have grown in 
prominence as sources of social democratic 
parliamentarian recruitment since the 1980s, 
filling a vacuum created by the decline of the 
trade unions. 
RQ2: What are the dynamics of social 
democratic party youth wings in relation to the 
recruitment of national representatives?  
 
H2: The youth organisations present significant 
practical barriers to entry which wealthier, 
middle class individuals are better able to 
negotiate. 
RQ3: What is the impact of any change in the 
role of youth wings on social democratic parties’ 
legislative recruitment upon the nature of those 
parties? 
H3: The shift in recruitment patterns contributes 
to the gentrification of social democratic parties 
by creating a shift in the political culture of the 
party representatives and therefore a shift in the 
nature of the parties in question. 
 
Research question 1 and hypothesis 1.  
Before we can consider what the impact on the parties of a potential increase in the number of 
legislators who were socialised into politics in the youth wings we first need to measure whether in 
fact this is the case and if so to what extent. The first research question therefore explores the role 
that youth wings have played in recent decades when it comes to the selection process in terms of 
the numbers of national legislators who have come from a background in those organisations.  
It is clear that this cannot be done by a snapshot in time and must be looked at over an extended 
period. It is widely acknowledged that up until the 1970s the trade union movement was the main – 
though by no means only – source of legislative recruitment but that in the decades since this has 
declined.114 This question therefore takes as its starting point the general elections at the end of those 
decades, 1980 in the case of Germany and 1979 in the case of the United Kingdom. Both conclude 
with the 2017 general elections in both countries. This will give the study a view from a time when it 
is recognised that trade union legislators were significant until a time when it is believed that ‘career 
politicians’ have taken over.115 If there has been a significant increase in the number of legislators 
being drawn from a youth wing background at the same time this will be suggestive. Correlation will 
not prove causality, but it is a necessary precondition to the rest of the research questions. 
This gives the context within which youth wings were operating at the outset of the timeframe 
investigated by this study. If youth wings were to rise as sources of it can be theorised that it would 
be by supplementing or supplanting the trade union movement. The study will test this by looking at 
trade union backgrounds as well as youth wing ones. It will operate on an initial hypothesis that the 
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trade unions declined as a source of recruitment, as membership numbers and therefore financial and 
organisational influence declined and that the youth wings therefore filled a vacuum created by this 
decline. The thesis does not contend that this was a deliberate attempt to gain influence on the part 
of the youth wings but rather an unplanned drift to fulfil a functional need of the parties. 
Research question 2 and hypothesis 2.  
The second research question is an investigation into the dynamics surrounding youth wings and the 
selection process. It will look to explore what is it about service in a youth wing that puts an individual 
in the place to be considered for selection. One possibility is that being in the youth wings gives an 
individual the opportunity to develop the kind of skills required to achieve political objectives. A 
further potential possibility is that the youth wings give their members unparalleled access to network 
with party insiders. These are also not mutually exclusive, it may be that both are contributary factors. 
By developing these skills and networking opportunities individuals can gain entry to the political 
ecosystem and proceed from there to selection as a candidate.116 
As well as a discussion of the process there is a deeper question as to what type of individual is best 
equipped to navigate the processes identified to the point of selection, and what factors might 
influence, limit or prevent that. Consequently, this research question will also investigate the barriers 
to entry which the youth wings present, examine who is best able to overcome those and by what 
mechanisms.  
Largely for reasons of time and resource this thesis will analyse these barriers from a class basis and 
not investigate the specific impact of race or gender. Whilst those are important aspects they require 
dedicated research. This thesis is intended as a starting point for the exploration of the role of youth 
wings on legislative recruitment and the specific impact of race and gender are obvious examples of 
potential further research. This is discussed in more depth in chapter three and in the concluding 
chapter. 
The research will take an initial hypothesis that the barriers to entry are predominantly practical, that 
is time and money, and conceptual rather than any attempt by the parties or the youth wings 
themselves to limit who can be an actively involved member. It follows from this that the individuals 
who are better able to overcome those practical issues are those with significant resources, financial, 
time and social, to expend on activity within the youth wings. This it is hypothesised is a key driver of 
gentrification, by excluding those without the initial capital to take advantage of the opportunities for 
a political apprenticeship offered by the youth wings.  
Research question 3 and hypothesis 3.  
The third research question explores how shifts in the recruiting grounds for legislators towards youth 
wings has changed the nature of the parties in question. Specifically, it is looking at what impact the 
youth wings have had, via the mechanism of selection, on the political culture of the parties. This in 
turn would indicate changes in the nature of the party. 
By exploring how the youth wings have impacted on the parties the study will seek to understand the 
link between any identified changes in the recruitment patterns of the party and the gentrification 
process identified in the literature. By increasing the number of individuals who have been socialised 
into politics by the youth wings we would expect to see an importing of the culture of the youth wings 
into the parliamentary parties who provide a leading role in defining the nature of the parties.  
 




The hypothesis in response to research question 3 is that this has indeed happened, and that this has 
been a self-reinforcing phenomenon leading to the gentrification of the parties. By shifting the party 
culture these individuals also shift not only the direction and therefore the public perception of the 
parties but also on which individuals are more likely to be attracted to the party and look to become 
active members of it, who then eventually become the legislators in the fullness of time.  
If this is indeed the case and the traditional bastions of working class individuals getting into politics 
have gentrified then this contributes not only to the debate on the nature of social democratic parties 
but also about their alienation from less affluent members of the general public, leading to the 
electoral collapse of social democratic parties .117 It also speaks to the discussion of the rise of populist 
parties on the back of the disenchantment and alienation from politics of less affluent members of 
Western European societies.  
1.4: Thesis outline. 
This thesis will proceed by first outlining in chapter two the existing state of the literature in the fields 
of power elites and political parties, the recruitment and selection journeys of electoral candidates, 
the impact of factionalism both on the party culture but also on the selection process and look at the 
existing state of the literature on the professionalisation of political parties. In this last section it will 
go into more depth on the conceptual split between professionalisation and gentrification. Chapter 
two will draw conclusions from this literature which explain where this study sits in the existing canon.  
Chapter three will detail the methodology that was used for the study. It will explain why a mixed 
methods approach was chosen and go into detail on both the quantitative and qualitative methods 
used to collect data for the empirical studies. It will give details on the chosen case studies and justify 
their selection. A discussion will follow on the issues that arose with the data collection, what the 
researcher did to circumvent the issues and how the research proceeded. Finally, it will outline the 
potential ethical issues which were involved with the research and detail what steps were taken to 
ensure that ethical guidelines were met, in particular as the researcher was previously involved in one 
of the youth wing organisations studied.  
The thesis will then proceed over the next three chapters to discuss the empirical case studies of the 
SPD and the Labour Party. Chapters four and five will introduce the case studies of the SPD and the 
Labour Party respectively, detailing the party structures and their affiliated youth wings. Both chapters 
will then go on to discuss the selection processes within the parties including the roles of the relevant 
gatekeepers and the power dynamics of the contest. The two chapters will then present the empirical 
data answering research question 1, looking at the changing role of the youth wings in legislative 
recruitment for the parties before comparing that to shifts in the role of the trade union movement 
across the same time. Both chapters will then draw conclusions from that empirical data.  
Chapter six will also be an empirical chapter, exploring and discussing research questions 2 and 3. This 
chapter will explore the dynamics of the youth wings and their relationship to the selection process in 
the two case studies. It will explore the barriers to entry and which individuals are best able to 
surmount them in the two respective parties. Further it will explore the culture of the parties. This will 
be done to determine whether this dynamic has been a driving factor in the gentrification of the two 
parties. The chapter will end by drawing related conclusions from the empirical data.  
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The final chapter, chapter seven, will discuss the conclusions that can then be reached from the 
empirical chapters and what they tell us about social democratic parties, their youth wings and the 
selection process. It will discuss what this means for our understanding of contemporary social 
democratic political parties and explore the broader implications of this study for academia as well as 
for politics and the social democratic parties. It will also discuss the limitations of this study and 






Chapter 2: Legislative recruitment in the previous research agenda. 
 
2.1: Introduction. 
In order to correctly place the following research within the existing canon of knowledge in the field 
there are several particularly relevant bodies of theory which need to be discussed. The first is the 
academic discussion on elite theory, the second is that literature which pertains to the manner in 
which political parties conduct legislative recruitment, the third that which looks at factional conflict 
within the parties and the fourth those studies concerned with the professionalisation of politics and 
political parties. This chapter will explore each in turn, proceeding from the broader brushstrokes of 
elite theory down to the nitty gritty of selection and factionalism and then to the ways in which this 
connects to professionalisation.  
The academic study of how elites, including political elites, perpetuate control of power and resources 
has a long history. In the 1950s the topic was dominated first by the work of C. Wright Mills118 and 
reactions to it before then moving into the debates between Pluralists119 and Marxists120 which still 
provide the backdrop to the state of the discipline now, though with more nuance and detail. This 
debate is largely focused on whether the different typologies of elites, predominantly political or 
economic – although media, military, administrative (civil service) and other elites have also been 
suggested – compete against each other (pluralism) or are dominated by the economic elite 
(Marxism). Broadly therefore these forms of elite theory argue that the political elite – that is, 
politicians – are drawn from these existing forms of elites121 who socialise, intermarry and act in 
overlapping ‘higher circles’ and focus on the competition between forms of elites. In more recent 
years however the field has evolved and studies are emerging to highlight the importance of internal 
intra-elite competition between individual organisations of elites such as between major companies 
or political parties. This addresses the key weakness of elite theory’s tendency to describe ‘political 
elites’ as a homogenous whole interacting with other typologies of elite actors without going into the 
finer depth of ideological differences or electoral competition. 
 
This matters for this study because it pertains to how to characterise the role of youth wings. Are they 
what they say on the tin, simply groups of young people of a similar ideological disposition looking to 
engage in political activity? Do they function as a kind of 21st Century country club, an exclusive arena 
for young members of the elites to network and socialise? Alternatively are they a ladder of social 
mobility, allowing individuals from lower social backgrounds to access the political elite? The truth is 
likely to be somewhere in between all three, a semi-exclusive organisation of engaged, ideologically 
similar young people with real but permeable barriers to entry based on logistical cost and geographic 
reasons rather than parentage. Elite theory can provide an overarching framework within which to 
explore these questions since it is one aspect of the elites – the political elites – and who gains 
admittance to it which is the primary concern of legislative recruitment studies.  
 
Scholars in this field of legislative recruitment also investigate these key questions of who becomes a 
parliamentarian, from which routes and overcoming which obstacles. Often however these studies 
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are framed around how the demography of political representatives impacts on legislation or on which 
issues are given prominence in the political arena. Researchers such as Ashe and Stewart,122 Childs,123 
Chiva,124 Eliassen and Pederson,125 Kittilson,126 Norris and Lovenduski127 and Sanbonmatsu128 for 
example approach the study of political recruitment from this angle. This approach is based on the 
concept that the sociocultural demographics of elected representatives defines the nature of the 
party, its policy focus and character.129 Much of the literature regarding underrepresentation of 
certain demographic groups – such as women130 or ethnic minorities131 – is based on the linked notion 
that the inclusion of such groups in the legislature is vital for the promotion of policies beneficial to 
those groups.  
This is an assumption but one which is widely held both within academia and in the general public, 
including members of political parties, which helps to explain why the selection of candidates – who 
if successful form the core of the party and potentially of the government – is not only the most 
important132 but also the most contested133 function of a political party. One subtle but key difference 
between the scholars quoted above and this study is that the current literature focuses on inherent 
characteristics often present at birth – sex/gender, ethnicity, sexuality, religious grouping or class 
background. Membership of a youth wing however is something proactively chosen by the individual 
rather than being an inherent characteristic. It is likely that the choice to exercise agency in the fashion 
of joining a youth wing is affected by these inherent characteristics – in particular class background – 
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but there is still a qualitative difference between an inherent characteristic and an expression of 
agency which will be discussed throughout this study.  
 
Further it follows from this point that youth wings provide not only a potential actor in the legislative 
recruitment of social democratic parties, but also an arena in which other actors participate and 
compete. Just as elites are not homogenous units nor are political parties134 and no discussion of an 
arena of political competition can be valid without some consideration of the action and interaction 
of political factions, whether ideological, geographic, ethnic or personality-based. Simply put, 
‘factionalism is a fact of life within most political parties’135 and must be accounted for. In some 
instances, such as the German JUSOS,136 the youth wings of political parties are considered as factions 
themselves. Others, such as Labour Students,137 are considered to be organisations dominated by a 
particular faction. In other instances, such as the 1958 conference of the Sveriges Socialdemokratiska 
Ungdomsförbund (the youth wing of the Swedish social democrats) factional conflicts split the youth 
wings as much as the main parties.138  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter one of the hypotheses of this study is that a shift towards 
legislative recruitment from youth wings will contribute towards a gentrification of the political parties 
and the professionalisation of politics. Therefore a discussion of the existing literature on this is 
necessary. As discussed in chapter one the existing literature conflates gentrification and 
professionalisation and this thesis treats these as different concepts. This must be borne in mind 
during this section of this chapter.  
 
Following the discussion of these research fields this chapter will finish with a discussion of the 
relevance of these debates for the present study going forward.  
 
2.2: Power elites and parties. 
This study is looking at the recruitment of Parliamentarians, which is to say it is looking at the 
recruitment of individuals into a political power elite. A political elite is a minority of a particular polity 
which exercises disproportionate power over political decision making in a significant, organised and 
sustained manner by virtue of either control of resources or a strategic position within powerful 
organisations of vested interests. This definition has several key aspects. An elite is a minority. This is 
generally accepted throughout the literature and is found in the early twentieth Century work of 
Michels139 and his Iron Law of Oligarchy, building on Mosca's140 assertion that in any polity 'two classes 
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of people appear – a class that rules and a class that is ruled'. An elite is distinguished from other 
minorities in that it wields power. That is to say the elite exerts a high degree of influence over political 
decision-making – defined as government policy outcomes and the distribution of public resources - 
and that influence is significant, organised and sustained. This means that an elite has sway over 
political decision-making that greatly shapes which decision is taken or the form it takes, that this is 
done with deliberate agency organised in advance with the intention of influencing those policy 
outcomes or resource distribution and that they are able to exert such influence over multiple 
decisions in multiple areas of policy and multiple decision makers, sustained across a significant time 
frame. 
For late 19th and early 20th Century thinkers the formation of an elite governing class was seen as being 
both inevitable and beneficial.141 Since the Second World War however this view has been largely 
supplanted by scholars who believe a political elite to be anti-democratic and dangerous.142. C. Wright 
Mills143 was a key thinker in the 1950s and much of the literature since has been in response to his 
work. Two key schools of thought emerged in the early days of the discussion – pluralism, espoused 
in the earlier works of Robert Dahl,144 who saw elites as essentially competing groups of political 
actors, and Marxist thinkers such as Ralph Miliband145 and Nicos Poulantzas146 who saw elites as 
primarily economic in nature with politics and the state subordinate to economic imperatives. Over 
the course of the Twentieth century both Marxists and Pluralists revised their positions, with 
NeoMarxists such as Jessop147 and NeoPluralists such as Linblom148 becoming less simplistic and seeing 
some convergence towards each other’s perspectives.  
Historical debates in elite theory.  
C. Wright Mills149 seminal work, The Power Elite, published in 1954, has been recognised as a 
cornerstone of the thinking of Sociologists and Political Scientists since its publication.150 Mills's central 
argument was that the belief in a balance of power was erroneous,151 or at least less applicable than 
it had been prior to the war. He argued for the existence of a power elite who had come to dominate 
three interlinked fields – politics,152 the economy153 and the military.154 Mills argued that the 
hierarchies of these three fields had become centralised and concentrated power into the hands of a 
smaller and smaller group. He concluded that this was down to a social structure which resulted in an 
elite drawn from the same upper strata of society,155 attending the same schools, universities, social 
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events and often intermarrying and moving between the three different types of hierarchy156 and that 
this resulted in a co-ordination of the elites and a structural tightening of the three hierarchies. He 
also argued that being drawn from such similar backgrounds was used by the elites as a source of 
unity. 
Mills's work was not without criticism, within four years of its publication Bell157 argued that the book 
had loose terminology, failed to define power other than as coercive violence and failed to offer a 
definition of interests or a discussion on the nature of policies produced. It has been argued158 that in 
The Power Elite Mills is perhaps two-thirds social analyst and one-third social polemicist and for 
contemporary critics such as Bell Mills was a better critic than scientist.159 That view has reversed over 
time, with Wolfe in his afterword160 to the 2000 reprinting of The Power Elite and Domhoff161 paying 
tribute to Mills as social scientist. With the benefit of twenty-first century hindsight however 
Domhoff162 noted that although Mills was accurate in his interpretations of the upper echelons of the 
power elite he was wrong to ascribe the military as having an equal role with political and economic 
hierarchies and underestimated the middle strata, in particular congress and the political parties. This 
is part of a new turn towards the importance of political parties to Elite Theory to which the present 
study will also contribute. 
Marxist thinkers also took issue with aspects of The Power Elite. Mills believed that the power elite 
was best understood as an alliance of the three sectors – political, economic and military. In one 
footnote163 he argues that the term power elite is preferable to ruling class because 'ruling' is a political 
term and 'class' an economic one, and that therefore the phrase 'ruling class' implies that an economic 
group rules politically, which denies the autonomy of the political order.  
Ralph Miliband, who dedicated his work The State in Capitalist Society164 to Mills' memory, asserted 
that Mills is wrong to consider the corporate community to be one section of a trio of groups within 
the power elite, but rather considers the economic elite as the single dominant sector of society. 
Furthermore he concludes that the state system is dedicated to the maintenance of the status quo. 
Like Mills he emphasises the similar backgrounds of the individuals making up the power elites, and 
highlights the importance of networking, but Miliband draws a distinction between the government 
and the state,165 arguing that the government is just one part of the state, alongside the judiciary, civil 
service bureaucracy and local councils. According to Miliband the conflict within these groups enables 
for a semblance of democratic debate but is kept within certain parameters to ensure it never 
threatens the primacy of economic domination,166 somewhat similar to Mills's view of the U.S. 
Congress and the middle strata. Miliband's main focus for much of the book is on how the status quo 
is maintained and why the domination of the economic or business elite isn't challenged. He argues 
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that this is done by the business elite imposing its own interests as the basis for 'sensible' political 
debate and by conflating business interests with the 'national interest'.167 
Miliband also places an emphasis on educational institutions and the media and their 'process of 
legitimisation' which he defines as a thinning or narrowing of sensible or acceptable political 
discourse.168 In this way a culture of conservative or business-friendly thought is indoctrinated into 
the general public.  
However Miliband was not the only Marxist thinker concerned with power elites. Nicos Poulantzas169 
in a review of Miliband's book took issue with his conclusions based on the social origins of state actors 
and their connections to each other and the two then held a debate170 in the magazine New Left 
Review. Jessop171 summarised this debate as being whether the domination of society by an economic 
elite is down to an instrumentalist origin - a shared elite background and upbringing within which 
individual members of the elite act (Miliband's position) - or a structuralist origin believing that the 
state is itself a capitalist construct in nature and is solely concerned with the perpetuation of capitalist 
control of society (Poulantzas' position).  
Jessop172 himself concluded that there needs to be drawn a distinction between a capitalist state and 
a state operating in a capitalist society which is not itself capitalist but is constrained by the nature of 
the society which surrounds it. Maclean et al173 agreed based on their case study of British and French 
political elites.  
The Marxist critique was not just a criticism of Mills but also that of another strand of thought that 
had emerged from his work, pluralism, most closely associated at the outset with the theorist Robert 
Dahl.174 Dahl studied the city of New Haven as a model for democratic polities more broadly and 
concluded that power, especially at the local level, is not necessarily invested in a single elite class or 
in the three elite hierarchies of Mills. Rather he argues for a plurality of power175 with some groups 
having more resources and therefore influence than others, but none able to dominate to the extent 
described by Mills or the Marxists. For Dahl political decision-making is primarily concerned with 
constructing a viable coalition of the multiple poles of power to enact specific decisions or policies.176 
This was because to Dahl no one group had sufficient resources – in the form of money, institutional 
position, legitimacy, public support etc – to dominate. Dahl also argued that breaking into the 
politically active level of society was comparatively simple and therefore politicians were forced to 
respond to the concerns of competing groups in order to maintain their position.177  
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Domhoff178 revisited Dahl's work forty years later, taking issue with Dahl's methodology and 
concluding that a better definition of class and of businessmen gives a larger dataset which challenges 
Dahl's conclusions. Domhoff states that this new data supports the theories of interconnected elites 
described by Mills. 
Dahl himself modified his position over time.179 Recognising that corporations as the prime economic 
actor in society exert more influence than other groups in society can compete with. Along with other 
NeoPluralists such as Lindblom180 he also recognised that the state is an actor in its own right and 
pursues its own interests.  Dahl and Lindblom coined the word Polyarchy to describe the NeoPluralist 
position of multiple but unequal loci of power, dominated by corporations. There have still been some 
criticisms, for example Krouse181 argued that Dahl's argument logically implies that the solution to the 
control of corporate power is a system of Democratic Socialism, yet that Dahl shrinks from stating 
such. 
With Jessop,182 as above, advocating that a state can operate in a capitalist society without being a 
capitalist actor itself, and Dahl183 and Lindblom184 arguing for the primacy of economic actors as a locus 
of power in a Polyarchy it could be argued that there is a process of convergence happening between 
NeoMarxist and NeoPluralist positions. However Higley and Pakulski185 in 2000 argued that the two 
fields have not become reconcilable. To Higley and Pakulski all Marxist theories place an emphasis on 
class to an extent that denies the agency of the individual actor, believing them to only be able to act 
in the manner determined by their social class. For Pluralists on the other hand individuals are 
primarily concerned with preserving or increasing their own political power and this overrides class 
backgrounds or structural concerns. Gilens and Page186 also compared different theories with the case 
study of the United States legislature, which they defined as the Economic-Elite Domination of Mills, 
Majoritatrian Pluralism as described by Dahl, Biased Pluralism as espoused by neopluralists and 
Majoritarian Electoral Democracy, the traditional view of democracy holding elites in check by the rule 
of the majority. Their analysis identifies that policy tends not to be an outcome of equally competing 
groups but rather tends to favour certain groups, in particular business groups, lending support to 
biased pluralism and the convergence of neoMarxist and neopluralist theories.  
This study is focused on the mechanisms by which individuals become a part of the political elites and 
as such will provide an empirical test case for the above debate. As discussed previously it takes as a 
hypothesis that the barriers to entry in youth wings mean that there is an advantage to a middle class, 
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metropolitan background, however that this is not insurmountable. It would therefore contribute to 
the NeoPluralist side of the debate by looking at one of the competing loci of power and by being 
primarily focused on the actions of individuals seeking selection. However it is also focused on the 
Social Democratic family and thus highlights a key weakness in both sides of the debate – the 
assumption that a political elite acts in a homogenous manner regardless of ideology or party 
competition.  
Intra-elite competition.  
There have been other studies which have highlighted this issue.187 Mills did posit two further strands 
of society below the elite level and locates political parties and the U.S. Congress as well as local and 
federal leaders and special interest groups such as trade unions at a middle level of power188 with the 
masses at the bottom. Mills argues that although this middle layer makes some political decisions it is 
not allowed to threaten the hegemony of the elite strata. Marxists, with their central tenet that 
political elites are subordinates of the economic elite, have a similar standpoint.  
But empirical case studies have not borne this out. Martin189 in her analysis of the American tax system 
points out that individual businesses want contradictory policy outcomes, meaning the economic elite 
does not speak with one voice thus making it impossible for the political elite to act as its servant. 
Kritzer190 looked at ideology amongst the US Republican and Democrat parties in 1958 and 1972 and 
found that the impact of ideology on the behaviour of elites was greater than believed by elite 
theorists. Scully and Patterson191 also emphasise the role of ideology in decision making in their case 
study of the Ohio House of Representatives as does Putnam192 in his study comparing Elites in the UK 
and Italy.  
However other case studies have also shown a marked difference between democratic and 
undemocratic or semi-democratic states in this regard. Ilonszki and Edinger193 looked at 9 ex-
communist states in Central and Eastern Europe and found that the make-up of their elites is more 
homogeneous than in established democracies, a hangover from the elites of communism. Melvin194 
in his analysis of the elites of the Omsk region in Russia found that economic and political elites did 
combine and dominate positions of power within the Oblast, but that two other important but 
subordinate groups also emerged amongst the political elites who were able to influence some areas 
of policy. Melvin concludes that this situation is dependent in large part on a lack of genuine political 
competition. Cheng and White195 in their case study comparing mainland China and Taiwan conclude 
that regardless of whether the regime is undemocratic or a semi-Democratic regime the elites take 
the form of technocrats. They also argue that technocracy has become a form of ideology itself and 
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that this drives both countries, but demonstrate that the elites are homogenised between the 
political, economic and administrative spheres. 
Others have focused on case studies which demonstrated the changeover between democratic and 
undemocratic regimes to bring this into focus. Bermeo196 as well as O'Donnell, Schmitter and 
Whitehead197 followed Stepan and Linz198 in looking at the elites in the changing regimes in Southern 
Europe and Latin America in the 1960's and 70's. They all, to a great or lesser degree, conclude that 
the behaviour of power elites was the primary factor both to the collapse of democratic regimes in 
South America and Greece in the 1960s, but also to their redemocratisation – alongside Spain and 
Portugal – in the 1970s. They come to similar conclusions to Dahl199 by finding that existing elites in 
the form of authoritarian regimes can gradually move to accepting an elite formed of competing 
groups, although they also conclude that at the moment of transition it is not possible to predict which 
group will take what role within the emergent elites200 rather than focus on the economic elites as 
inherently dominant.  
Crowther and Matonyte201 analyse political elites in transitioning, former Soviet states – Estonia, 
Lithuania and Moldova. They conclude that where individuals in the elites are able to maintain 
powerful positions in the legislature during a regime transition then such elites are likely to remain in 
place afterwards and for the pace of change to stagnate, as in Moldova. In Estonia there was a very 
high initial turnover rate of individuals in powerful positions in the legislature and swift change which 
then settled down. Lithuania fell somewhere in the middle. However with all three states the 
individuals which made up the legislature after the transition period had a relatively high turnover, 
and they conclude this is evidence of the pluralist position of competing elites.  
This is supported by case studies of more stable democracies, particularly in Scandinavia. Edling et 
al202 looked at four municipalities in Sweden and concluded that there are three separate spheres of 
power elites – political, economic and the state administrative sphere. They conclude that integration 
between the spheres is indirect, with the administrative elite acting as a form of bridge between the 
political and economic spheres. Ruostetsaari's203 analysis of Finland in the 1990s also concluded that 
elites are more fragmented than has been traditionally considered, and that this fragmentation 
increases during times of economic upheaval.  
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This study, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter three, will focus on stable democracies of Western 
Europe in part because of these findings. The context of the competition provided by the fragmented 
elites of mature democracies means genuine competition happens between individuals seeking office 
both between and within political parties. It is the outcomes of those competitions which interests 
both this study and the field of legislative recruitment.  
2.3: Recruitment and selection. 
The field of legislative recruitment is a sub-discipline of Party Politics which looks at, essentially, who 
becomes a Parliamentarian and how. Its thinkers are interested in analysing both the biographical 
background of MPs and also in the mechanisms of political party recruitment. As such it is the primary 
field to which this study will contribute.  
Key thinkers in Legislative Recruitment such as Norris,204 Lovenduski,205 Cotta,206 and Marsh and 
Rhodes207 recognise that the recruitment of a Parliamentarian is a process, or journey which has, 
broadly speaking, four distinct phases, the recruitment of an individual from being a general 
sympathiser and voter into being an active party member or volunteer,208 followed by a period of 
political exposure and activity within the party. Bruter and Harrison209 found that those young people 
who join political parties and become active members fall into three types, moral-minded members 
who join for idealistic reasons, social-minded members who join looking for a like-minded peer group 
and professional-minded members who join with some level of ambition, whether that is to become 
a politician or to work in the political ecosystem. In a follow-up study, Bruter and Harrison210 find that 
this latter group in particular are likely to deliberately seek out exposure and active roles within the 
party and proceed to take on larger and larger roles within the party and politics more broadly. That 
is, they will begin to work within a political ecosystem, incorporating party employees, parliamentary 
staffers or advisers, NGOs, think-tanks, trade union employees and political commentators.211 
Legislative recruitment, we can see from this, is a subset of political recruitment – initiating individuals 
into political activity – that carries it to its ultimate conclusion, standing for national office.  
At some point within that political exposure an individual may begin to seriously consider running for 
political office, either taking the decision themselves as a form of self-selection or at the instigation of 
another individual such as a more senior party activist or sitting representative. Following that decision 
the individual will continue with their party activities but with a renewed focus on how such activities 
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may benefit them in influencing a potential coalition of support internal to the party to succeed in the 
final stage, the actual formal selection process by which a specific individual is selected as the 
flagbearer of a political party for an election cycle. This journey as described by the literature can be 
collated together and summed up as in Fig. 1.212  
One issue with studying this proposal is that motivation is private so the decision of an individual to 
seek candidate status may be known only to that person or a very small group of trusted confidants. 
Observers cannot tell whether an individual activist is actively looking to build an intra-party coalition 
of support for a selection bid, or whether they are simply engaged in campaign activity for its own 
merit not intending to take it further. An individual seeking selection, as well as the standard 
campaigning activity conducted by a party activist such as voter identification (finding out which voters 
will support you), door-knocking or phone-banking, programmatic work or service on internal party 
committees may also seek formal titles within internal units of the party to act as a shorthand for 
certain skills or evidence of party loyalty or dedication to an issue – examples of roles within internal 
units are also given in Fig. 1.  
However, it is equally true that an individual may seek to perform such roles out of a genuine 
dedication rather than simply to advance themselves. Further they may do so initially but then whilst 
performing that role decide to put themselves forward to be a candidate. A candidate may also have 
experience at lower levels of government or have been a candidate in an unwinnable seat previously 
not as a means of personal advancement but as a way to advance causes or legislation they have a 
genuine commitment to.  
Additionally, not all roles useful to a potential candidate in the selection will be internal to the Party. 
Examples of non-Party activities which could help an individual build a profile or evidence skills include 
prior experience as members of charitable organisations and local public bodies,213 social network 
building through church membership or friendship groups or simply those who are rich and 
influential.214  These activities are even more likely to be conducted for their own sake, with their 
benefit to an individual going for selection being incidental to their motivation to undertake them. 
The process in these central phases is therefore non-linear, fluid and very difficult to measure. This 
can lead researchers to focus on the final stage – the formal selection process – and attempt to divine 
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backwards to ascertain what led individuals to be formally selected.215 Frequently this is in the context 
of mapping sociodemographic trends – drawing maps of WHO is selected rather than being focused 
on HOW they put themselves in a position to be selected. Other studies216 focus on the nature of 
gatekeepers and therefore straddle the formal selection stage and the preceding stage of building a 
coalition of support to influence them. 
This study will look at this journey in several areas. Firstly it considers two institutions which seek to 
move an individual from being a party sympathiser to a party activist in the form of the youth wings 
and the trade union movement. These seek to politicise individuals in different contexts, Unions in the 
workplace and youth wings usually earlier, often at University, and this may have some bearing on the 
later political activities of the activist in question. Secondly it will look at whether these institutions 
also act as gateways to the political ecosystem of jobs and professions connected to the party, either 
formally or informally, and what role that plays in the formal selection process.  
The first stage which any individual goes through on the path to becoming a candidate is the decision 
to become actively involved in the political campaign activity of the party. This may be marked by 
formally becoming a party member, or an inactive member may become an active one. Both youth 
wings and trade unions actively seek to recruit activists. Abramson and Claggett217 analysed the 
attempts of political parties as a whole to recruit sympathisers into activists and concluded that they 
were exceedingly effective at doing so, and the youth wings and unions were one means by which this 
happens.  
There is however some finer distinction on what being active means. Ware218 differentiates between 
supporters – non-members who vote and may carry out small electoral tasks, such as displaying a 
poster – members, those who pay their membership dues but do not participate greatly in 
campaigning activity, and activists, who form the backbone of the party on the ground and undertake 
most of the tasks necessary for a successful electoral outcome. The word sympathiser is perhaps a 
better term for those favourably disposed towards the party than supporter, as entrenched party 
loyalties amongst the general public have been in decline219 and voter support is much more fluid and 
malleable than previously.  
Nevertheless, crossing the threshold between a non-member sympathiser or an inactive member to 
being an involved activist leads to the politicisation of the individual, in the sense of learning more 
about what it takes to be a successful political operator. Differences in how this process occur 
depending on the context in which it takes place are central to this studies argument about the 
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mechanism by which the nature of the parties change. For the purposes of outlining the journey here 
this is not important but should still be borne in mind. Once politicised activists will frequently get 
involved in voluntary party positions or positions within internal party units as a form of campaign 
activity. Further these activists are likely to be the main source of recruits for the political ecosystem 
of the party, its own employees, legislator’s staffers, think-tank staff etc. and these can form another 
stage in the recruitment journey. Most individuals in this ecosystem do not choose to run for office, 
however some do. 
The decision to run for political office may have multiple origins. An individual activist may, after 
political exposure, gain confidence in their ability to perform as a political representative and thus 
look for an opportunity or respond to a specific opportunity.220 There can also be an element of talent-
spotting whereby party gatekeepers encourage certain individuals to stand for office.221 
Studying the motivation for an individual to run to be a candidate is exceedingly difficult222 as it is a 
private decision.  As such there is comparatively little literature on the subject. 223 Nevertheless it is a 
key variable in the process. It is also true that the majority of activists, never mind inactive members 
or sympathisers, choose not to run for political office.  
However an individual decides once they have they are likely to seek out opportunities which would 
reflect favourably on them with gatekeepers or put them in a position to raise their profile. This may 
not be visibly dissimilar to their previous stage of getting more involved in the activities of the party, 
internal party units or the political ecosystem. The nature of these opportunities will be diverse and 
will also depend on the nature of the gatekeepers to which they are targeted. Where gatekeepers are 
a small group of party staffers activities may be more informal or social in nature or they may seek 
employment with the party or its legislators. Where gatekeepers are large groups of local activists, 
members or the general public activities may be more geared towards opportunities that come with 
a formal title, as a convenient shorthand to indicate involvement, loyalty or skills to people unfamiliar 
with the potential candidate on a personal level.  
The nature of the party gatekeepers varies – in constitutional systems which formally have a high level 
of affiliation to a local district such as the Canadian,224 or British225 systems they will be formed of local 
activists. In the American226 system there is also a high level of localism, but the primary system used 
in many states means the gatekeepers are more numerous and diverse, being composed of either 
registered party supporters (closed primaries) or even as broad as the general public (open primaries).  
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In list systems the gatekeepers will be composed of those deciding whose name goes on the list and 
in what order. In some polities such as The Netherlands227 and Israel228 party lists, whilst nominally 
national, retain an element of local or regional influence on the list such as the 19 Dutch Kieskringen 
or the Israeli system of having reserved places based on geographical areas. Others such as Romania229 
are closer to the traditional proportional representation model of one national constituency. 
However with a few exceptions (principally US States with an Open Primary system)230 the process 
does not involve voters directly but those who are either party members or – as in a closed primary – 
formal sympathisers. Although the legal barriers to becoming a candidate are often very low, such as 
being above a lower age limit (frequently the voting age or legal age of maturity) and Party 
Membership, candidates for selection are drawn all but exclusively from the activist strata of party 
support231 because there is no other way to influence the party gatekeepers. 
The exception to this comes in seats deemed completely unwinnable by a Party when an individual 
who is not particularly active may allow their name to be put forward as a nominal ‘paper’ Candidate 
as a favour to the Party or an individual within the Party.232  
Several studies233 use a ‘Supply and Demand’ analysis, whereby party officials satisfy a demand for 
candidates from a supply of activists seeking to put themselves forward. In this model, as advocated 
by Norris and Lovenduski,234 the over-representation of highly-educated, upper- and middle-class 
male candidates can be explained by innate prejudices (in the neutral sense of predetermined 
assumptions) of gatekeepers who use social standing, professions or education levels as a shorthand 
to rate a candidate on their perceived ability. This is dependent on an assumption, which they state 
implicitly, that “candidates are rarely well known to most selectors”.235 Ashe236 however, in a more 
recent study on the UK Labour Party, finds that the supply side issue can be secondary to the 
preferences of local members who act in a gatekeeper role and who often look for an ‘ideal type’ 
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candidate, which is frequently white, male, middle aged, heterosexual and working in a professional 
capacity. Ashe did however find that being local, and/or serving on the local council can override this, 
and that ‘being local’ can override the preference for the ‘ideal type’ in contested selection contests.  
This is contradicted by Seligman,237 who found in his data that ambitious individuals sought out 
opportunities for contact with gatekeepers and that many of those individuals had previously been 
'talent-spotted' by influential gatekeepers such as existing legislators or party veterans. Again the 
discrepancy is likely due to different case studies, the main UK political parties in Norris and 
Lovenduski and the US Democrats in the state of Oregon in Seligman. The degree of familiarity and 
therefore the type of support building activities is likely to vary based on the type of gatekeeper in an 
individual case study, an aspect of the formal selection process.  
Formal selection in the vast majority of cases in Western political parties (though not all)238 is governed 
by two overarching factors – it is formal and it is loose. Formal in the sense that there are universal 
rules, applied usually by the Party rather than the law, applicable openly and equally to all selections 
undertaken within the Party. Loose in the sense that within the framework of those rules party 
gatekeepers frequently have a great deal of leeway in the selection of candidates. As such many 
studies seek to not only map the trends of who is being selected but to look at what happens at the 
earlier stages, with a corresponding interest in those who are doing the selecting239 and how 
individuals interact with the party gatekeepers.240 This can be seen in Ashe and Stewart,241 Childs,242 
Chiva,243 Eliassen and Pederson,244 Kittilson,245 Norris and Lovenduski246 and Sanbonmatsu.247  
The context of the recruitment journey.  
The nature of the journey from sympathiser to candidate is also heavily influenced by the 
environmental context of the process – the political system and culture of the polity, as well as the 
selection rules of the party itself and the context of competing relationships between individual actors 
and sub-units within the Party. As such with the difficulty of studying the process as it emerges many 
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studies – including this one – focus on the context of the journey, that is to say on mapping the 
potential paths rather than on an individual’s intended footsteps.  
An individual’s journey from a generic supporter to being the candidate of a political party does not 
happen in a vacuum, there are well-worn paths constrained by varying factors. These factors happen 
across three levels – the external level, the party level, and the internal level.248 It is important to 
recognise that although these three levels are different, they are interlinked and symbiotic to one 
another. 
The external level are those factors which are outside of the party and form the environment in which 
it operates – including the political system of the territory within which the party is competing for 
election. There is also the external factor of those politics-facilitating jobs which form the political 
ecosystem such as those working for the party or existing legislators or for sympathetic NGOs, charities 
or think-tanks, an arena which is dominated by graduates – a further external contextual factor.  
The Party Level are those factors which relate to the party as a whole. Principally this relates to the 
rules the party uses to formally select candidates but it may also relate to environmental factors which 
influence that party but not all parties in the political system, such as electoral defeats or party 
scandals. This can sometimes include youth wings if there is a scandal which specifically affects them. 
It also includes the attitudes of party gatekeepers and the individual rules around selection, such as 
all-women shortlists in the UK Labour Party.249  
The internal level relates to intra-party factors, principally the relationships between different internal 
party units, be they power-struggles between factions based on ideology or personality or tensions 
between local or regional groups and the national party HQ. It is important to remember that just as 
parties do not act in a unified manner, internal units also will not necessarily operate as a single block 
when it comes to a specific vote.250 This results in competing internal demands as to the level of control 
exerted over candidate selection by central party headquarters and internal units. It is at this level 
which Youth Wings predominantly sit, although they may be more fluid than other internally organised 
units and thus even less likely to act in a unitary manner, combining as they do both the characteristics 
of a factional actor and a factional arena. The levels of unity in the actions of the youth wings is likely 
therefore to vary in strength and direction depending on its internal debates and conflicts.   
When considering these factors it is important to bear in mind that although in particular in matters 
of selection, political parties cannot be considered to be unitary actors251 there are strong incentives 
for political representatives to present a united front in order to enhance the reputation of the party 
'brand' and thus aid their own re-election chances252 and even the most notorious rebels will vote with 
their party far more often than they go against the party line.253 As such a certain level of conformity 
can be assumed, but that level will vary depending on the strength of the incentives to toe the party 
line. 
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This is just one way in which the recruitment journey has to be contextualised, this section will now 
go on to discuss two other contextual factors – the rise of well-educated career politicians, and the 
impact that electoral systems has on the recruitment journey.  
Career politicians and ‘Diploma Democracies’.  
One of the key contextual factors is the impact of education, in particular tertiary education, on 
democracy. Bovens and Wille254 analysed several Western European democracies for the impact of 
tertiary education inequalities and argue that they have become ‘diploma democracies.’ They found 
that educational elitism has come to dominate politics and that this is a key divide in society. This not 
only applies to elected office-holders but also to the political ecosystem of NGOs, think-tanks and 
party employees which form the steps of the recruitment journey.255 Ainsley,256 Allen,257 Evans and 
Tilley,258 Goodhart,259 Savage260 and Standing261 have also found that this educational divide exists and 
that party members as well as those working in the political ecosystem are drawn in very large part 
from the university educated sections of society.  
This ecosystem produces so-called ‘career politicians.’ Allen et al262 define career politicians as those 
full-time politicians with little experience outside the world of politics, and who have strong levels of 
political commitment and ambition, but narrow life experience and occupational backgrounds. This 
matters, because as Henn263 found the number of Parliamentarians with a background in this political 
ecosystem has increased in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, particularly amongst the ranks of 
cabinet ministers; although the numbers of ‘accelerated’ career politicians, who becomes a legislator 
in their 30s and quickly rises through the political ranks, has plateaued. Goplerud264 did find that those 
who had served specifically as Special Advisors to existing ministers or shadow ministers do experience 
rapid career progression if/when they are elected to the legislature. Looking at cabinet ministers 
Atkins, Heppell and Theakston265 confirmed this, finding that contemporary senior cabinet ministers 
were less experienced than previously, but that this did not seem to the case at junior ministerial level 
and was less pronounced than is the case with the party leaderships. Cowley266 noted that the political 
leadership of the UK parties post-2010 was the least experienced since the second world war, and 
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attributed this to a change in the nature of experience, with leaders now gaining political experience 
in non-legislative political functions such as aides and special advisors, rather than through the 
legislature.  
This rise of the career politician has real consequences for the citizens of Western European 
democracies. Ting267 found that the pre-Parliamentary background of legislators does profoundly 
affect the manner in which they perform their duties as legislators, including their voting behaviour. 
In addition, the backgrounds of legislators shape the legislative bodies, influencing how representative 
democracy itself works.268  
Previously, the trade unions provided a route for non-university educated individuals to move up into 
national legislatures,269 the disappearance of that route and the domination of graduates in the 
political ecosystem has excluded the working-class from social democratic parties270 and thus 
gentrified them. This means that this recruitment journey increasingly happens within a context which 
excludes large quantities of the population.  
The impact of electoral systems on legislative recruitment.  
A further contextual factor is the polity’s electoral system. Some studies271 have argued that electoral 
systems in fact influence the type of candidate selection criteria employed by political parties. In 
contrast Pennings and Hazan272 argue that the way a party chooses its candidates comes not from the 
national election system but from the demands of grassroots activists to have a say in how their 
electoral standard bearers are chosen, which links to the nature of the activist base in particular their 
educational background as discussed above. These are not necessarily mutually exclusive, since 
activists will take account of external factors such as the electoral system when making such demands 
on the party authorities. 
Shomer273 states that the primary effect of a country's electoral system on candidate selection is to 
constrain or dictate the level of central control, arguing that parties aim for unity as much as possible 
in order to have a stable and reliable legislative which can drive the party's policy agenda forward. To 
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that end in electoral systems which incentivise representatives to seek a personal reputation 
differentiated from their colleagues parties will adopt strictly controlled selection procedures to 
mitigate against this by selecting loyalists and deselecting troublemakers. Conversely electoral 
systems where ballots are cast for a party rather than an individual or otherwise incentivise 
representatives to focus on improving their internal party reputation by building the 'brand' selection 
criteria will be looser as the party responds to pressure to democratise internally with little 
consequence for party unity in the voting chamber.  
Another aspect of the electoral system which may impact on party candidate selection is the degree 
to which it encourages turnover of legislators. Rule274 analysed twenty-three democratic systems with 
a focus on how likely they were to achieve gender parity. She found that PR systems such as those in 
Scandinavia were far more likely to return higher numbers of women representatives because of the 
increased turnover of legislators compared with first past the post systems with single member 
electoral districts such as the UK. Rule also found that the greater the number of representatives per 
district the higher the turnover of legislators and therefore the more likely they were to be more 
gender equal. The impact this has on candidate selection is likely to be to increase the stakes for those 
individuals and parties operating in a single member or first past the post system. With lower turnover 
of legislators there is likely to be more focus put on selections than in systems with higher turnover 
whereby an unsuccessful candidate can try again relatively easily and where opportunities to correct 
a 'bad' selection are more abundant for the party high command.  
Finally the electoral system will influence candidate selection by changing the nature of the 
'gatekeepers'. In systems such as the UK275 and United States276 which elect an individual for a specific 
area the gatekeepers which a potential candidate is seeking to influence will be local activists or local 
members of the public where open primaries are used.  Bochel and Denver277 found that these local 
activists favour local knowledge, ranking “being a local person” second in their preferred 
characteristics, behind only “being intelligent/articulate/able”. In contrast in list systems the 
gatekeepers are the party authorities,278 who frequently prioritise loyal service when looking to rank 
candidates.279  
In contrast Lundell280 argued that in fact electoral systems have no statistical impact on the manner in 
which parties carry out candidate selection, at least in terms of whether it was a centralised or 
decentralised one. Looking at established Western democracies he argued that a more relevant 
statistical indicator was the region of the world under discussion, finding that the Nordic countries 
were very decentralised and the Southern European countries very centralised and offering some 
comments on shared cultural experiences as possible reasons for this.  
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The likelihood therefore having looked at competing claims in the literature is that there is a dynamic 
and fluctuating tension between the external factors of the electoral environment and the internal 
factors of grassroots pressure versus central leaderships attempting to maintain control. Both 
Hopkin281 in the case of the UK and Heider and Saglie282 in the case of Norway have concluded that 
the democratisation of candidate selection is more in form and symbol than a meaningful 
surrendering of control from party authorities. Similarly Rahat and Hazan283 found that in the case of 
the Israeli political parties central headquarters found that they had lost control of candidate selection 
via excessive democratisation and during the 1990s sustained and successful efforts were made to 
claw back the ability to control selections.  
Lundell284 found that in the more mature democracies the situation is more stable. As such the paths 
to selection in the case studies used for this study are more easily mapped out, allowing the focus to 
be more on the journey an individual takes to become a candidate for the legislature than the 
contextual character of the polity.  
2.4: Factionalism and power dynamics. 
As with politics more widely, the relations between individuals within a political party is characterised 
by both conflict and consensus building.285 And as with politics more widely individuals form groups in 
order to increase their bargaining position.286 All political parties contain factions in some form, but 
social democratic parties more so than their centre-right equivalents.287 In order to understand the 
balance of power within contemporary parties and therefore their likely behaviour we need to study 
their internal factions, and understand the highly uncertain context in which they operate.288  Factions 
– internal party groupings who organise and compete with each other to achieve policy or political 
objectives – may form around ideological, geographic or personality cleavages. One of, indeed 
potentially the, key political objectives for factions is selection for legislators.289 Getting supporters 
into legislative positions enables greater influence over manifesto commitments and when the party 
is in power the legislative direction of the government.290  
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Factionalism is often underreported within contemporary political science and is often barely covered 
in core texts291 with the focus instead being on formal power structures within the party.292 However 
there have been scholars who have placed the requisite importance on the role of factions within 
political parties, such as Rose,293 Bale,294 Graham295 and Moar.296 As Sferza297 noted factions can be 
sources of both strength, in allowing for bargaining and routes to resolve conflicts, and weakness 
when such bargaining becomes conflict. Scholars such as Rose298 and Hine299 have sought to 
differentiate organised factions of individuals acting over time from tendencies, loose coalitions of 
like-minded individuals who group together for a set purpose in an unsustained fashion, lacking a 
formal structure or organisation. It is important to note that in this study when discussing factions 
then we are discussing intra-party groups who are both organised and sustained over time.  
These institutionalised factions require a level of ideological or principled coherence to allow 
individuals to identify with them and support their aims.300 Whilst there have been occasions of 
division based on ideologically similar personalities, such as the “TeeBee-Gee-Bees” of Tony Blair and 
Gordon Brown,301 these are nearer examples of tendencies than factions, as the grouping does not 
exist separate from the individual being supported. Therefore, the primary factional division within 
contemporary western European social democratic parties is often ideological302  often termed as 
conflict between ‘the left’ and ‘the centre’303 although this can be oversimplistic. 
These factional conflicts are a key dynamic in discussions involved the selection process, and the role 
of youth wings and trade unions in them. Youth wings and indeed trade unions are both factional 
actors and arenas for factional conflicts. As one faction becomes dominant within the organisation 
then it becomes a factional actor as those individuals within a powerful position are able to act. When 
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factional conflicts are narrower or no one faction is dominant then the ability for the organisation to 
be used for factional purposes is lessened or removed.  
This is true of the parties, as discussed by Ceron304, but it is equally true for individual party units, 
including the youth wings. It is important to keep in mind the dual nature – factional actor and 
factional arena – of the youth wings when considering how individuals navigate through them. As will 
be discussed in the empirical chapters, factional service in an internal party unit such as a youth wing 
is one method of bringing an individual to the attention of party gatekeepers. Indeed these ideological 
factional conflicts have been described as “the real school”305 of the parties enabling the development 
of skills and their demonstration in a locale which party gatekeepers pay attention to. This dynamic of 
internal conflict and an individual’s performance within such factional battles are a key part of the 
process of socialisation within the party.  
2.5: Professionalisation and gentrification in politics and social 
democratic parties. 
One of the issues with the academic study of professionalisation in politics is that the term 
professionalisation itself is ill-defined. For Holtz-Bacha, Mancini and Papathanassopolous306 it means 
the influx of communication professionals, PR experts and consultants into politics. For Karlsen and 
Saglie307 it means the growth in political staffers and party employees, turning some formerly 
voluntary activists into paid practitioners. For Black308 it is the assimilation by practitioners of 
standards and values prevalent in the political environment and likely to lead to a positive judgement 
by peers and thus advancement. For Saalfield309 the concept refers to a rise in ‘career politicians’ – 
political actors whose professional life has been spent in jobs within the political ecosystem and for 
Mellors310 it is a rise in Parliamentarians with a background in the ‘communication professions’ – law, 
education and journalism. For Cairney311 too it relates to an increase in Parliamentarians from ‘politics-
facilitating’ professions, and Allen (2013)312 finds that those who come into Parliament from a career 
as a special advisor, in think-tanks or other jobs in the political ecosystem are promoted further and 
faster when in government. For Evans and Tilley313 it is a shift in the focus of political parties from the 
concerns of the working-class to those of the middle-classes, and therefore the exclusion of the 
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working-class from the political process. Best and Cotta’s314 extensive historical study discussed 
professionalisation as the shift from legislators drawn from rural aristocracies to those drawn from 
the urban middle-classes. Norris315 concurred with that adding that this process excluded not only the 
land-owning aristocracy but also the working class. Allen (2018)316 argues that, through social change 
such as the fragmentation of class identities (rather than it being the fault of the parties themselves) 
the distance between the parties and the public has led to a lack of ordinary people with an interest 
in pursuing party politics, and that politics has shifted to being a debate on who has the most 
technocratic competence to govern, rather than a clash of ideologies.  
Broadly however these can all be placed into two distinct typologies which this study as discussed in 
chapter one will term professionalisation and gentrification. The first is a process of increasing 
sophistication in the organisation and techniques required by political parties to succeed in the 
permanent arms race of electoral politics. This is evidenced by a requirement (or at least a perceived 
requirement) for increased levels of expertise and institutional capacity – the external experts of 
Holtz-Backa et al,317 the increased numbers of party employees of Karlsen and Saglie318 and the 
adoption and spread of professional practices discussed by Black,319 as well as the rapid rise of political 
insiders found by Allen (2013).320  
Various factors could be feeding into this process, from an increasingly educated and sophisticated 
electorate to the rise in the internet and social media. What is not in doubt is the Darwinian nature of 
electoral politics seeing a rise in adoption of any perceived advantage. Margaret Thatcher’s hiring of 
the PR firm Saatchi and Saatchi in 1979,321 seen as helping turn the election in the Conservatives 
favour, meant that communication had to be a part of Labour’s “Party into Power” project.322 The 
success of the Conservatives on social media in 2015323 led to a response from Labour on social media 
campaigning in 2017324 in both cases bringing perceived success to the respective parties.  
The second typology found in the literature is what this study terms gentrification. It relates not to the 
process of increased political sophistication but to the nature of the individuals who are able to 
succeed within this changed environment, and further to the backgrounds and experiences which 
 
314 Best H. and Cotta M. (Eds). 2000. Parliamentary Representatives in Europe 1848 – 2000. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press.  
315 Norris P. 1997. Passages to Power. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.  
316 Allen P. 2018. The Political Class: Why it Matters who our Politicians are. Oxford, Oxford University Press.  
317 Holtz-Bacha C., Mancini P. and Papathanassopolous S. (Eds). 2007. The Professionalisation of Political 
Communication. Chicago, Intellect Books. 
318 Karlsen R. and Saglie J. 2017. Party bureaucrats, independent professionals, or politicians? A study of party 
employees. West European Politics. Vol. 40, No. 6. pp 1331 – 1351. 
319 Black G. S. 1970. A Theory of Professionalisation in Politics. The American Political Science Review. Vol. 64 
No. 3. pp 865 – 878. 
320 Allen P. 2013. Linking Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience and the Career Trajectories of the 1997 
General Election Cohort. Parliamentary Affairs. Vol. 66 No. 4, pp 685 – 707. 
321 Thatcher M. 1993. The Downing Street Years. London, HarperCollins Publishers.  
322 Minkin L. 2014. The Blair Supremacy: A Study in the Politics of Labour’s Party Management. Manchester, 
Manchester University Press.  
323 Byrne C. 2015. Getting Engaged? The Relationship between Traditional, New Media, and the Electorate 




324 Margetts H. 2017. Why Social Media May Have Won the 2017 General Election. The Political Quarterly. Vol. 




equip an individual so to succeed. It is in this typology that the works of Allen (2018),325 Evans and 
Tilley,326 Saalfield,327 Mellors,328 Cairney,329 Best and Cotta330 and Norris331 sit. It is also in this aspect 
that the concepts of gentrification of the party fade into the field of the studies on legislative 
recruitment already discussed above, since it is in many respects simply that aspect of the study of 
who is successful that relates to class origin.332 Of further interest to note is Beckman’s333 study of 
Swedish government ministers which found that this process had plateaued in modern times.  
What it is important to note however is that these are two qualitatively different if highly interlinked 
concepts, despite frequently being referred to by the same terminology. For reasons of greater clarity 
this study will use the term gentrification for the trend of more middle-class individuals emerging into 
the legislative sphere and professionalisation for the process of the parties adopting more 
sophisticated methods of campaigning requiring specialist expertise and additional capacity.  
Professionalisation and gentrification in social democratic political  parties.  
This study concerns itself primarily with investigating the individuals who come through the social 
democratic political parties, who succeed in becoming selected as a potential legislator, and how 
socialisation in those party’s youth wings forms a part of that process. Therefore, this study is primarily 
concerned with the concept of gentrification and hypothesises that more affluent individuals are best 
able to navigate that to a successful conclusion.  
A further, important, note to make is that there has always been a process of socialisation that takes 
individuals and in some fashion forms them into a political individual prior to becoming a legislator, as 
discussed in chapter one. Historical examples of parliamentarians who come from manual trades such 
as factory work or coal mining underwent a process of professionalisation before becoming a 
legislator.334 Historically this was done via the trade unions, which gave individuals experience of 
negotiation, balancing constituent priorities, organising and public speaking prior to their selection as 
a prospective parliamentary candidate.335  
What has changed is the required skills. As mass communication technology – especially television 
and latterly social media – became more and more important for achieving political objectives there 
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was a pressure on the parties to find individuals with the requisite skills to take advantage.336 This was 
a process of professionalisation. Individuals from the professions which also require communication 
skills such as law and education had an advantage.337 Thus there may be a link between 
professionalisation and gentrification. However, this is only a slight advantage – the presence of 
lawyers in the legislature is hardly new – and these two processes may not inevitably follow one from 
the other. This is explored in the empirical chapters of this thesis, and this study therefore has an 
important contribution to make on the discussion of party professionalisation and gentrification.  
2.6: Conclusions from the literature.  
These four fields of research are closely intertwined and the boundaries between them are shifting 
and impermeable. This study sits across those these different fields and will contribute to the debates 
in all of them by also commenting on that recruitment journey. All four relate to the journey an 
individual takes to go from being a general party sympathiser to assuming a position as an electoral 
standard bearer and the consequences which ensue from that.  
Elite theory focuses on the outcomes of that selection journey, that is to say the movement of an 
individual into a political power elite. Elite Theory is starting to look more seriously at the processes 
by which Political Parties influence which individuals move up into a political elite as empirical case 
studies find that the elites in mature democracies are more fragmented than the theories predicted.338 
The additional findings that internal competition, in particular ideology, are more important than 
previously considered is also contributing to this shift in focus.339 Shifts in training grounds which have 
a great influence on who moves into the political elites have an obvious impact on those elites. 
Changes in the nature of those training grounds then have much to say in the debates in elite theory. 
This will also be relevant to the field of legislative recruitment. Recruitment studies focuses both on 
who makes that transition but also on the immediately preceding step, the formal selection process 
and its impact on an individual’s ability to become a Parliamentarian. Whilst this recruitment journey 
has been well-described from the point of formal selection onwards340 the role of youth wings 
specifically within that has yet to be subjected to in-depth academic scrutiny. Further whilst some 
attention has been paid to the preceding step, the political ecosystem from which individuals emerge 
to challenge for selection, this has often focused on inherent characteristics such as gender or 
ethnicity and the role those play.341  
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This leaves several open questions. Firstly, what role do factors which are not inherent but rather 
chosen by the individual play in this process? Secondly, what benefits do they bring to breaking both 
into the political ecosystem, the world of party and union employees, think-tanks, political journalism, 
senior activists, staffers and political and communication consultants, and then breaking out of it again 
into elected national office? By what mechanisms do the parties and the other organisations in that 
space recruit into it?  
Whilst there has been some investigation of initial politicisation of individuals342 the field has yet to 
unpack how changes in the context and manner in which that politicisation occur can have a profound 
influence both on the individual and, in the mass, on the party as a whole. If the contention that 
characteristics such as gender or race343 lead to changes in the nature of the parties and the manner 
in which they make policy is correct, then the initial politicisation – the way an individual learns how 
politics is done and the preconceptions this gifts them – must be equally important to this process. 
This thesis focuses on that aspect as well as on how the choice to be active in a political youth wing 
impacts upon the selection journey an individual undertakes. 
In order to do this this thesis needs to understand the contextual factors surrounding this journey. No 
study of legislative recruitment can be comprehensive if it ignores the issue of factionalism. The 
ideological divides within social democratic parties are a key factor not only in the actual performance 
of party membership but is also a key component of selection.344 Factions look to promote their 
supporters and supress those of their intra-party opponents and must therefore form a part of the 
discussion of selection dynamics. This study will explore that dynamic and thus add to the relatively 
thin debate on party factionalism.  These factions also form part of the political ecosystem. Not only 
do they provide ample opportunities for activists to develop and demonstrate skills in achieving 
political outcomes, but they can provide employment opportunities within the ecosystem. 
Momentum, Progress and Labour First are all examples of contemporary factional organisations 
within the Labour Party who employ staff.  
This is, of course, also an example of the professionalisation of the parties, by which the increasing 
levels of sophistication required within the political realm requires increasing numbers of specialists 
and staff capacity.345 This development of professionalisation comes with the linked but separate 
notion of gentrification, an increasing dominance of those with the high levels of sociocultural and 
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economic capital required to become specialists.346 The first is the notion that a political career is now 
possible, the second that career politicians have resulted. The main aim of this study therefore is to 
demonstrate a causal mechanism by which the gentrification of social democratic parties – as distinct 
from professionalisation – occurs. It will then, contribute to this field by demonstrating why more 
affluent individuals are better able to navigate the selection journey and provide empirical answers to 
how this change has occurred. It will focus on the increasing role of party youth organisations as origin 
points both for the political ecosystem and then the ranks of national legislators. The literature at 
present focuses on this political ecosystem without readily acknowledging that this is an intermediate 
phase, not an origin point. This study will go some way to correcting that.  
The bodies of scholarly literature in which this study is anchored then fruitfully complement each 
other and this research offers a conceptual bridge between them. Therefore, this study contributes to 
the theoretical debate in all four fields and provides empirical evidence for discussion. Beyond this, 
the study aims to inform the wider, public debate on the nature of the contemporary centre-left and 
its parliamentarians, how this has changed in the last four decades, as well as contributing to the 
internal discussions of their future taking place within and between the various social democratic 
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Chapter 3: Methodology. 
 
3.1: Introduction.  
 
Before moving to the empirical chapters, it is necessary for this study to set out a methodology for the 
research – that is a justification for the methods selected for finding the answers to the research 
questions posed. This chapter will explore the reasoning behind the chosen comparative mixed-
methods approach, set out the details of the quantitative and qualitative methods selected and why 
and explain the case studies selected. It will then discuss the ethical considerations of the methods 
selected for the study. Finally, it will discuss the issues that arose with the data collection and the steps 
taken by the researcher to compensate.  
 
The decisions taken for the methodology of this study stem from the selected research questions and 
hypotheses. It is therefore necessary to remind ourselves of these before proceeding any further.  
  
Research Questions Hypotheses 
RQ1: How have the youth wings of social 
democratic political parties impacted on the 
selection of national representatives since the 
elections of 1979/80? 
 
H1: Youth organisations have grown in 
prominence as sources of social democratic 
parliamentarian recruitment since the 1980s, 
filling a vacuum created by the decline of the 
trade unions. 
RQ2: What are the dynamics of social 
democratic party youth wings in relation to the 
recruitment of national representatives?  
 
H2: The youth organisations present significant 
practical barriers to entry which wealthier, 
middle class individuals are better able to 
negotiate. 
RQ3: What is the impact of any change in the 
role of youth wings on social democratic parties’ 
legislative recruitment upon the nature of those 
parties? 
H3: The shift in recruitment patterns contributes 
to the gentrification of social democratic parties 
by creating a shift in the political culture of the 
party representatives and therefore a shift in the 
nature of the parties in question. 
 
These hypotheses require different methods to test but are the starting point for the selection of 
which techniques are used to answer the research questions. Linked to that but broader is the notion 
of comparativeness, and how generalisable the answers to these questions can be. This also provides 
the reasoning behind the selection of the case studies. The case studies as discussed further below 
allow for a comparative study that is also at least somewhat generalisable. 
 
The next section discusses the linked notions of why the use of mixed methods with a small number 
of case studies contributes to the ability both to answer the research questions by testing the 






3.2: Theoretical framework.  
 
Ontology.  
The methodology of a research project should be drawn out of and relevant to the ontological and 
epistemological positions which sustain it.347 Ontology can best be described as the nature of being.348 
Epistemology in turn is the relationship between ontology and the research or researcher.349 In other 
words, ontology is the nature of reality (is there a real world?) and epistemology is how we can 
understand that reality (how do we know?).  
There are broadly two competing ontological theories350 within the study of political science – 
positivism and post-positivism. Each ontological position then has corresponding epistemological 
positions and further following on from that different theories or approaches to the discipline. It 
should be noted that there is some debate regarding terminology351 with positivism, realism, 
functionalism and objectivism being used for one side of the ontological debate and post-positivism, 
constructivism, anti-foundationalism, interpretivism and relativism for the other side. This thesis will 
use the terms positivism and post-positivism in order to avoid confusion as it helps keep clear in the 
reader’s mind that the post-positivist position was a reaction to the positivist one. Regardless of the 
nomenclature essentially the debate between the two positions is whether or not there is an 
independent truth, separate from the individual – positivists argue that truth and facts are observable 
whereas post-positivists argue that facts are a product of social knowledge, rather than ‘found’.352 
Ontologically speaking the positivist tradition holds that truth is external to the individual, with 
objective facts that exist regardless of the opinions of the researcher but which the researcher can 
discover.353 Epistemologically then, it holds that the duty of the researcher is to uncover these facts 
by the generation and testing of disprovable hypotheses.354   
In contrast the ontological position of post-positivism is that there are no objective facts because there 
are multiple versions of the truth, each relative to the perceptions of the individual.355 Thus 
epistemologically the duty of the researcher is not to discover objective facts, but to provide an 
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interpretative, context-driven and specific understanding of socially constructed 'perceived' 
knowledge.356 
This is more than simply an academic debate, as it governs what researchers consider to be 
'acceptable' knowledge to admit to the canon of their disciplines and simultaneously the debate 
governs the relationship between theories and empirical research.357 Positivism is often deemed to be 
seeking to apply the rules of the natural sciences to the study of the social sciences358 in order to 
establish and explain generalizable laws, whereas post-positivism argues that the agency and 
unpredictability of human beings disbars the techniques of the natural sciences from being applicable 
to the social sciences359 and therefore seek to interpret and understand socially constructed 
knowledge.  
In addition in almost (though not quite) all cases, research which includes quantitative methods falls 
into the positivist tradition (although many studies in the positivist tradition also utilise qualitative 
methods), whereas post-positivists utilise qualitative methods such as ethnography, or linguistic 
conceptualisation.360 This is largely because of the differing objectives of the two schools of thought – 
either to discover, describe and explain and then form generalisations, or to interpret and understand 
a specific set of cases. As such the ontological and epistemological grounding of a piece of research 
has a large impact on the choice of methods used. These are however not iron-clad and it must not 
be assumed that the use of one or other method automatically aligns with a certain ontological or 
epistemological position.  
Epistemology.  
There is some debate between the exact nature of the relationship between ontology and 
epistemology361 – or rather between how one can be distinguished from the other and which logically 
should follow the other – do we have an idea of the nature of the world and then know how to 
understand it,362 or do we learn the nature of the world through the manner in which we understand 
it,363 or are the two inextricably entwined and we are unable to say one comes before the other?364 
What is not however debated is that there is an intrinsic relationship between the two.  
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The post-positivist ontological position is inextricably linked to the constructivist epistemological 
position, however the positivist ontological position has two epistemological derivatives – positivism 
and realism.365 
Constructivist epistemology is built upon post-positivist ontology, which holds that there is no world 
independent of the individual researcher. The role of the constructivist researcher is not therefore to 
discover, describe and explain, but to understand and interpret. The researcher therefore does not 
place any great advantage in being objective – since it holds that all knowledge is subjectively created 
the constructivist does not believe it is possible to be objective - rather constructivists look to 
experience what they are researching and to co-create knowledge in conversation with research 
participants as well as with their own prior understanding and to blur the boundaries between 
scientific data and personal experience.366 As such constructivist research, focusing on motivation and 
meaning, is context-specific. Constructivists do not therefore seek to establish generalizable, abstract 
claims or theories.367 
Positivism in the epistemological sense however places an emphasis on objectivity and seeking to 
draw generalizable and abstract conclusions from data – its aim is to make causal statements. Since 
facts are objective and provable, positivists concentrate their research on describing and explaining 
the facts generated by their data and in order to do this effectively seek to apply reasoned, rational 
and logical approaches to methods, to draw a distinction between their research and their personal 
experience and between facts and value judgements, and to do so by being a detached, dispassionate 
observer of reality.368 Additionally positivists hold that there are broad analogies between the natural 
and social sciences, and also hold that empirical questions (questions of ‘what is’) can be separated 
from normative questions (questions of ‘what should be’).369  
There is a second epistemological position which is based on a positivist ontological position – realism. 
The realist position holds that there is an independent world separate from the researcher, and that 
causal statements can be made. However, where it differs from positivism is in arguing that social 
phenomenon and the causal relationships which link them are not necessarily directly observable.370 
The methodological considerations this throws up are that research should be designed to provide 
inferences based on what is observable in society. This is not an enormous difference from the 
positivist position but is included here to demonstrate there can be internal nuances to the position.  
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An approach, in political science, can be defined as different schools of thought on the focus or prism 
through which to define the principles of political studies going beyond that suggested by 
constructivism or positivism.371 Some approaches take a normative standpoint (what should be)372 but 
most approaches are more concerned with an empirical standpoint (what is). Equally some draw on 
the ontological and epistemological debates detailed above, others cross such boundaries. In those 
examples there are sometimes debates within political science as to whether an approach can be 
considered a coherent whole or should more accurately be referred to as a family of sub-disciplines 
with differing epistemological takes focused through a single prism. Some of these are discussed in 
detail below.   
Classical Marxism is an example of an approach which takes a realist epistemological position.373 
Marxism as an approach attempts to infer the reality of the state, social and economic systems from 
the visible sections viewed through an analysis of capitalism374 and as such could be argued to apply 
to a study on political elites. However classical Marxism struggles to explain the failure of Marxist 
predictions, as a result of which neo-Marxism has attempted to reimagine the analysis of ideology, 
state agency and state power.375 Despite this Marxist approaches tend to underplay the fragmented 
nature of elites and as such do not pick up on the issues of internal competition discussed in this 
study.376    
Behavioural analysis in contrast focuses on observable behaviour, with any conclusions that are 
reached subject to empirical testing377 – a positivist standpoint. It seeks to explain the question of 
why, in a political setting, do people behave the way they do? This can be at either the individual level 
or the societal level, whichever is appropriate for the research in question.378 However the difficulty 
of distinguishing between behaviour motivated by promoting causes and behaviour motivated by 
promoting themselves in individuals seeking selection means behavioural analysis is not a suitable 
approach for this study.  
Rational choice theory takes a more extreme positivist position and is an importation of economic 
theory into political science.379 Rational choice theory argues that people are both rational and self-
interested and that therefore the role of political science is to uncover the system of incentives which 
governs that behaviour.380 Rational choice theory however suffers from the same issues as behavioural 
analysis in understanding motivation for this case study.  
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Political psychology also imports elements of another discipline into political science, specifically 
(unsurprisingly given the name) psychology.381 This is based on several assumptions – firstly that the 
choices, preferences and decisions of certain individuals and groups has a significant influence on 
history and the political landscape.382 The second is that an empirical study of the psychology of those 
individuals and groups can explain those decisions and choices, and therefore political outcomes.383 
Epistemologically the majority of the political psychology approach is positivist, but there are some 
exceptions which take a constructivist standpoint.384  
The institutional approach to political science shifts the focus from people to the institutions which 
govern political life.385 The ‘old’ institutionalism was the basis of much of political science prior to the 
1950s, but in more recent years a ‘new institutionalism’ has become prominent, which expands the 
meaning of ‘institution’ beyond constitutional arrangements of organisations for policy construction 
and formal decision making and supplement this with considerations of power relationships, values 
systems and other relationships between the individual and institutions.386 However institutionalism 
has come under fire for having little coherence as a school of thought other than that institutions are 
an important focus of study. Part of this is epistemological confusion – there are both constructivist 
institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism sub-disciplines which take diametrically opposed 
ontological and epistemological positions.387  
Randall388 argues that there are also differing ontological and epistemological approaches within the 
feminist approach. Feminist political science grew out of, but is not the same as, the feminist social 
movement, and is a form of political science with an insight into and focus on the power dynamics 
surrounding gender.389 Randall argues there should be a debate as to whether feminism is more 
properly considered a family of sub-disciplines with a shared focus.390 Overall the feminist approach 
is concerned with power, in particular with the everyday experiences of power, politics and the 
international system and how they relate to gender.  
Applications to this study.  
The research questions will be drawn from the existing literature on political recruitment and elite 
theory in order that the questions posed can provide theory-driven hypotheses.391 As such it will take 
influence from both the institutionalist (new and old) approaches and the political psychology 
approaches, without adopting either as an organisational framework.  
This study falls into the positivist school of thought at both the ontological and epistemological level. 
This is because the research question and research aims are to analyse the effect of youth wings on 
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the recruitment of representatives to national legislatures and how that ought to colour our 
understanding of the nature of social democratic parties in Western Europe. Although the process of 
getting to that point is contested, complex and dependent on a number of things ultimately the 
recruitment of a member to the national legislature is a binary, provable phenomenon: either an 
individual is elected or not. Equally the key independent variables – membership of a youth wing, 
membership of a trade union, or senior service in either, are binary choices. It is seeking to establish 
generalizable statements pertaining to the impact of these independent variables on the dependent 
variable of the nature of centre-left parliamentarians by drawing lessons from the case studies which, 
when compared, can provide an insight into what common elements are present, and therefore which 
can be extrapolated to be proposed common elements in other cases as a basis for future research. 
Although King, Keohane and Verba392 in their work ‘Designing Social Inquiry’ have been criticised for 
an emphasis on hypothesis-testing rather than hypothesis-generation393 at the epistemological level 
their framework does advocate deriving disprovable hypotheses and applying empirical tests using 
quantitative and qualitative data394 by setting two tests for research questions – firstly that they 
“should pose a question that is important in the real world”395 and secondly that the research project 
should “make a specific contribution to an identifiable scholarly literature by increasing our collective 
ability to construct verified scientific explanations of some aspect of the world.”396 King, Keohane and 
Verba proceed to explain that this latter point does not just include studies which seek to contribute 
to explanations of phenomenon in the Social Sciences but also studies which are aimed at fact-finding, 
descriptive inferences, close observation of particular events or other studies which focus on the 
“prerequisites for explanation.”397 From this we can see that though they claim that Designing Social 
Inquiry is not a work in the philosophy of social science398 in its emphasis it does fall within the 
positivist tradition, as discussed by George and Bennett.399 
This can also be seen in their prescription that data must be operationalised in order to be 
replicable,400 and their emphasis on the importance of linking theoretical explanations and data401 and 
examining causal mechanisms.402 They do however sound a note of caution when it comes to drawing 
abstracts and generalizable conclusions from a research study around the rhetoric of causality and the 
attendant issue that correlation is not in and of itself sufficient proof of causality.403 They do however 
argue that researchers can make bold statements of causality providing they acknowledge that the 
inferences such statements are built on are uncertain, which they termed the ‘variance of causal 
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effect’.404 Consequently the study will acknowledge where it’s generalised conclusions rest on 
uncertain ground.  
This study is heuristic405 in nature in that it identifies youth wing participation as a new variable and 
potential causal mechanism. Additionally, this study acts as a 'building block study'406 in that it is 
confined to mature democracies of Western Europe (see the discussion on case studies below). 
3.3: Why a comparative mixed methods approach? 
 
As set out above this study will make use of the comparative method to provide generalizable findings 
and will adopt a mixed method approach in order to provide a more rounded response to the research 
questions by using quantitative methods to discover and describe the predicted phenomenon, and 
qualitative methods in order to explain it.  
 
The importance of being able to generate generalizable predictions is what Lees407 refers to as 
‘resonance’– the factor which allows the Political Science discipline to build up a volume of knowledge 
and prevents it from being merely a form of very slow journalism.408 To Lees it is abstraction which 
grants a sufficiently long half-life to theories that they are not rendered irrelevant by subsequent 
events or political discourse.409 Thus without a certain level of abstraction any contribution to the 
canon is likely to remain ephemeral410 as it is unable to make itself relevant to the wider discipline.411 
 
It is possible to generate abstraction from a single case study412 however these can be overly context-
specific or assumptive of cultural exceptionalism.413 In addition the comparative method can be seen 
to have greater rigor, as the comparison between case studies can and does shine a light on logical or 
empirical errors or weak-spots within the given concept.414 This would seem to imply that the greater 
the number of case studies the better, in order to have more testable examples via a large-N study. 
Within the discipline however the term comparative method is also applied to small-N studies and the 
methodological issues which arise from it415 and provides a framework for generating useful data with 
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few case studies, or (as is prevalent in political science) where direct experimental control is not 
plausible.416 Small-N studies also allow for more detail and therefore richer, deeper conclusions.  
 
There are good reasons for this study to adopt a small-N approach – focusing on those youth wings 
linked to a small number of political parties - for the analysis of the effect of youth wings on the 
character of social democratic parties. Lijphart argues that in some topic areas conducting an in-depth 
comparative analysis of a smaller number of cases can provide deeper and more nuanced conclusions 
than a more superficial overview of a larger number of test cases.417 This is because for many 
phenomena in political science – including youth wings – there is a relative dearth of examples upon 
which to draw.418 In addition the desirability of a relatively extensive time period in this study imposes 
a practical limit on the number of geographic case studies on which it can depend, an issue which also 
afflicts scholars in the comparative historical analysis school.419  
 
There is however the issue Lijphart420 refers to as ‘many variables, small-N’ and George and Bennett421 
called ‘equifiniality’. This is the problem of having a high number of competing explanations for a 
phenomenon and a small number of case studies demonstrating that phenomenon, as it can make 
using statistical comparisons problematic in distinguishing between different causal explanations.422 
There are however techniques which can mitigate against this.  
 
The first is to focus on comparable cases.423 That is, case studies which are so far as is possible 
equivalent when it comes to variables which have little or no impact on the key variables being 
studied, to provide some measure of controlling for them. This has the added benefit of avoiding the 
pitfall of concept-stretching whereby a concept is forced to be so broad or be accompanied by so 
many caveats and addendums as to render it relatively meaningless in order to incorporate a 
sufficiently large number of case studies.424 It is important to utilise case studies which have enough 
similarities to be comparable, whilst also being different enough to say that any findings are 
generalisable and that we can have confidence they are explained by the key variable under 
investigation.425 Researchers can also cut down on the number of extraneous variables by the use of 
theoretical parsimony426 – i.e. using a smaller number of explanatory variables.  
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There is a tension between the need to have enough case-studies that the research can be 
generalizable and test the key variables and having a small enough number of case studies to allow 
the study to delve into the mechanisms of causation. Fewer case studies also allow the study to probe 
more deeply into the revealed phenomena, avoid concept-stretching and control for unimportant 
variables. It is thus a case of striking a balance. This minimises, as far as is possible, variations in the 
dependent variable - the nature of social democratic parliamentarians – in line with the principle of 
controlling for non-key variables as much as possible. This can then allow the key independent 
variable, the effect of youth wings role in recruitment, to be more clearly identified.  
  
This then is the reasoning for this study to take a comparative approach with a small-N study based 
on the youth wings attached to the selected case studies, discussed below. When looking at the 
hypotheses it also becomes clear that a mixed method approach adopting both quantitative and 
qualitative methods is necessary to explore and test them. The following sections will detail the 
quantitative and qualitative methods used to test the hypotheses in more detail.  
 
3.4: Explanation of the quantitative research. 
 
The first research question and hypothesis, exploring whether MPs with a background in a youth wing 
have grown in prominence, requires a quantitative method to analyse to what extent that is the case, 
if at all. By mapping the numbers of MPs with such a background over time the study can plot the 
relative importance of the key independent variables – past participation in a youth wing and prior 
experience as a trade union activist. This is both to see their relative prominence over time and also 
to chart whether there is any correlation between the two independent variables to see whether there 
is a potential connection worth exploring – specifically whether the youth wings have supplanted the 
trade unions as training grounds. By so doing the statistical analysis can both test the extent of the 
hypothesis and indicate potential lines of enquiry into causal relationships that may not be 
immediately apparent before the beginning of the study. 
 
This was done by classifying the backgrounds of parliamentarians into different categories. The 
quantitative analysis of the backgrounds of members of the legislature over time analysed the 
following criteria: 
 
• Membership of a youth wing 
• Senior role within a youth wing's governing structures 
• Membership of a trade union 
• Employed by a trade union or senior voluntary role (e.g. shop steward, lodge secretary) 
 
These variables are then plotted over time, both as raw numbers and as percentages. This will 
demonstrate the increase or decrease over time of members with different backgrounds both in terms 
of pure numbers and as proportions of the whole. There is however likely to be a degree of overlap 
which will need to be taken into account.  
 
A distinction is drawn between membership of both youth wings and trade unions and active roles 
within them – either as a member of a youth wing governing structure or by being employed by a 
trade union as an official or in a senior voluntary role. In the case studies of both Labour and the SPD 
all party members below a certain age automatically have membership of the youth wing. 
Differentiating between membership and active roles within the youth wing helps avoid the problem 
of nominal but inactive membership of a youth wing skewing the results. Additionally, many members 
of both parties are members of a trade union without being active within them. It is those who are 




skills needed to put themselves in contention for selection and therefore it is necessary for the 
research to distinguish them. 
 
The initial method envisioned for the collection of this data was to explore biographical details 
recorded by the national legislatures themselves cross-referenced against other available resources 
such as parliamentarian’s own websites, obituaries, political biographies and autobiographies and 
newspaper reports. In the event however this had to be modified slightly for one case study. This is 
discussed in detail in the issues with the data collection section below.  
 
This data will be plotted as both raw numbers and percentages on graphs to indicate how it has 
changed over time. This will allow for an easy comparison and an ability to spot trends across time 
both in terms of the actual numbers, but also percentages which can give a better insight into levels 
of influence within the party. In this way the study will analyse whether youth wings have become 
more important over time as recruiting grounds. Similarly, by plotting the numbers and percentages 
of trade unionists this study will explore the dynamics surrounding the rise or otherwise of the youth 
wings as a source of recruitment.427 
 
However as already discussed correlation is insufficient proof of causality. As such a statistical rise in 
the number of MPs with a background in youth wings at the same time as a drop in the number from 
a trade union background does not necessarily indicate a definitive relationship between the two. In 
order to compile the statistical data taxonomies have to be created based on similarity of outcomes – 
an MP with a certain variable in their background. However similar does not mean identical. For 
example, in the UK Labour Party there are three different youth wings in a state of semi-competition 
and with different focuses which would all come under the variable 'youth wing participation' but may 
well have differing effects on the careers, culture and choices of MPs. Similarly, a former shop steward 
of long-standing such as the Labour MP Alan Johnson is likely to have had a qualitatively different 
experience in the trade union movement to an Oxbridge educated lawyer who was hired by a union 
for a relatively brief time such as the Labour MP Richard Burgon, but both will be classified as having 
a trade union background. Consequently, the variables selected need to be subjected to further 
scrutiny than can be done using statistics alone. On top of this hypotheses 2 and 3 look at factors such 
as culture and perception which, lacking a basic unit of measurement, cannot be analysed numerically.  
 
As such this study will merge the statistical findings and analysis detailed in chapters four and five with 
qualitative data to respond to the research questions and test the hypotheses, which will be detailed 
in chapter six. The next section will discuss the qualitative research.  
 
3.5: Explanation of the qualitative research.  
 
The qualitative data will both add context, nuance and explanation to hypothesis 1 as well as 
answering hypotheses 2 and 3. To explore fully the concept of political culture and how this might 
have altered due to changes in parliamentarian recruitment patterns the study will strike a balance– 
so far as is practically possible – between parliamentarian participants who have and do not have a 
background in youth wings and trade unions and also between past and present parliamentarians and 
current members of party youth wings. Elite interviews across multiple countries are a time-intensive 
form of research, due to travelling to the interview and then transcribing it. This also limited the 
number of interviews that it was possible to conduct. As such the research conducted a smaller 
number of in-depth interviews. The study aimed for 15 to 20 interviews and 16 were eventually carried 
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out. These were gender-balanced – 8 male and 8 female respondents – and included 4 individuals 
from an ethnic minority background.  
 
The knowledge that is being sought is what contextual and causal factors have impacted on members 
of a youth wing reaching the level of a national representative and how that has impacted on the 
nature of the parliamentarians and the make-up of the parliamentary parties. This is ‘insider 
knowledge’ – that is to say it is knowledge which is predominantly known to the parliamentarians 
themselves, past and present. Current senior members of a youth wing will also have insights into the 
perceived benefits of belonging to a youth wing for a political career and the motivation behind 
joining. Both groups will have knowledge of the internal processes, both formal and informal, that 
lead to parliamentarian recruitment. As such the research requires a method which can access that 
insider knowledge.  
 
This renders many potential tools, such as ethnography, impractical. Surveys are unlikely to explore 
the issues in sufficient depth and extremely busy parliamentarians are unlikely to produce a sufficient 
return rate to make the insights valuable, further one of the case studies – the Labour Party – is 
notorious for not responding to survey requests.428 As such the best method in order to access the 
knowledge is interviews and the nature of parliamentarians necessitates that these be elite interviews. 
 
As the research questions are exploratory, in order to go into sufficient detail and to explore openings 
which come up during the interview a semi-structured elite interview will be best. This allows for the 
participant to expound upon ideas and to provide information which may not have been foreseen by 
the researcher (this is also another argument against the use of surveys). Information from these 
interviews can then be used in conjunction with the quantitative data to build up a causal narrative 
from which generalizable abstracts can be inferred.429 This data is presented in the form of direct 
quotes with analysis. Quotes were edited for clarity and conciseness, and in the case of some of the 
German interviews were translated.  
 
There is a potential issue for social desirability bias. That is to say some respondents may feel that 
presenting themselves or their backgrounds as more working class may give them a political 
advantage. However, the confidential nature of the responses and use of pseudonyms makes this 
unlikely, as the responses are not linked to a named individual and anyone with sufficient insider 
knowledge to recognise the individual from the data would also be aware of their background, there 
is therefore little incentive for interviewees to answer dishonestly.  
 
3.6: Case study selection.  
 
The Case Studies method provides a detailed contextual analysis of a small number of examples and 
their relationships to each other and to theories, to use empirical examples to apply ideas and test 
methods and theories. It allows for an exploration of context as well as theory and is useful when the 
relationships and borders between events or examples are unclear.430 It was originally envisioned that 
this study would examine the cases of three social democratic parties and the youth wings linked to 
them. Those three case studies were to have been the German Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands (SPD), the UK Labour Party and the Swedish Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti 
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(SAP). However due to issues related to data availability the case study of the Swedish SAP had to be 
dropped. This is discussed in detail in the section on issues with the data collection below.  
 
The first question in terms of the case selection to explain is why this study focuses only on social 
democratic parties, rather than investigating the impact of youth wings across the spectrum. The 
reason for this is quite simple; there is a widespread perception both within academia431 and the 
general public432 that the nature of social democratic parties has changed in recent decades, and this 
study is seeking to explore one potential driver of that change. In consequence the broader context 
of this study is the change in social democracy, an issue which in some locales such as Greece and 
France is an existential one. The decision to limit the case studies to social democratic parties is then 
one inherently built into the entire puzzle that this study seeks to answer. The shift in the nature of 
social democratic parties and the potential disappearance as a meaningful force of one of the key 
mainstream political ideologies in parts of Europe is relevant beyond the confines of this study.  
 
The central issue which this study will investigate is the effect of youth wings on the recruitment 
patterns of the case study parties for representatives to national legislatures, together with how shifts 
in those patterns can change our understanding of the nature of Social Democratic parties more 
broadly. Therefore, the objective when selecting the case studies has been to minimise, so far as is 
possible, the variance in the dependent variable – the nature of parties. At the same time the study 
has sought to maximise the variance both in the key independent variable of the youth wings and in 
the external context of the political environment. This allows the study to best explore the dynamics 
of the relationships between the youth wings and the parties and test how generalizable the 
hypothesis. 
 
The selected case studies are all social democratic parties from mature democracies in Western 
Europe. As referred to in the discussion on the existing literature in chapter two this study focuses on 
mature democracies. This is for reasons both of being able to analyse an extended time frame as well 
as the theoretical parsimony point identified by Lijphart.433 Countries with recent history of communist 
domination – Poland, Czech Republic, the Baltic states etc – or dictatorships – Spain, Portugal, Greece 
– were excluded. To include examples of young democracies would cloud the water as to the evolution 
of youth wings as a source of recruitment. There was a question surrounding Germany, in particular 
the effect of East Germany and reunification. However steps were taken to counteract this, detailed 
in chapter four, including running the data for a ‘continuity’ West Germany as well as for the unified 
country. The three case studies selected all had a stable and coherent democratic system and culture 
in which to operate for the entire period under investigation, 1979 – 2019.  
 
Further the case study parties selected have an historical association with the trade unions and, 
though varying in depth and degree of that association, all were politically aligned with the trade union 
movement between the end of the Second World War and the late 1970s. This included significant 
parliamentarian recruitment from the trade union movement by these parties. Importantly unlike in 
other potential case studies such as the French Parti Socialiste these parties all have or until recently 
 
431 See for example Schattle H. and Nuttall J. (eds) 2018. Making Social Democrats - Citizens, Mindsets, 
Realities: Essays for David Marquand. Manchester, Manchester University Press; Kitschelt H. 1994. The 
Transformation of European Social Democracy. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press and Gamble A. and 
Wright T. (eds). 1999. The New Social Democracy. Oxford, Blackwell Publishing.  
432 See for example Frank T. 2016. Listen, Liberal or Whatever Happened to the Party of the People? London, 
Abacus; Lilla M. 2017. The Once and Future Liberal: After Identity Politics. New York NY, HarperCollins 
Publishers and Gould P. 1998. The Unfinished Revolution: How New Labour Changed British Politics For Ever. 
London, Abacus.  
433 Lijphart A. 1971. ‘Comparative Politics and Comparative Methods’ American Political Science Review, Vol. 




had434 an effective monopoly on political links to the trade union movement rather than competing 
with far-left parties. The parties had similar ideological journeys - seeing a decline in political support 
during the 1980s and early 1990s and adopting the ‘Third Way’435 as a result. They had periods in 
government in the late 90s and early 2000s and have seen periods in opposition and a decline in 
electoral support since then. They also now have internal disputes as to the nature of the parties 
following the third way and the 2008 global crash. As with most if not all social democratic parties 
they have also had a perceived rise in 'career politicians' and a distancing from both the working 
class436 and the trade union movement.437 These similarities mean that the nature, culture and 
perception of the parties – the dependent variable of this study – are aligned and easily comparable. 
  
However, whilst the parties have gone on similar journeys, the external contexts of the case studies 
also provides a justification for their selection. The contexts are exceedingly different. The three 
originally selected case studies use different voting systems and have differing levels of federal, 
regional and local political structures, two are Parliamentary Monarchies whereas one has a 
Presidential system, two have a bicameral parliamentary system whereas one has a unicameral 
system, the UK is a two-and-a-half party system, whereas Germany can be classified as a five-party 
and Sweden a seven-party system etc.438 This provides a balance between enough similarity to 
demonstrate and test potential causal mechanisms whilst also having enough differences external to 
the party to allow the findings to be generalizable. The loss of Sweden as a case study does impact on 
the generalisability of conclusions from this perspective and is discussed further below. Nevertheless, 
the remaining two case studies still provide very different contexts and political cultures.  
 
Furthermore, and importantly there are large differences in the relationships between the youth 
wings and the selected parties. The relative strengths and prominences of the youth wings varies 
considerably, with those of the SPD (and also the SAP) enjoying considerably more prestige than that 
of the Labour Party. In the SPD the youth and student wings are combined (although they have not 
always been), whereas in Labour they are separate. In Germany an unaffiliated youth wing, SJD-die 
Falken, enjoyed some historical links to the SPD, and in the UK the Young Fabians enjoy a formal 
affiliation at one remove via their parent organisation the Fabian Society. These differences in the 
political and social contexts and in the relationships to the different youth wings mean that if the 
hypotheses are proven correct the study can be more confident that the findings are applicable more 
generally.  
 
The criteria used to decide on which youth wings to study, as discussed in chapter one, were those 
organisations with an ideological or extended historical link to the party, formal or informal, and either 
an age qualification with an upper limit or a limitation to students (who are in large majority of a young 
 
434 The SPD was the traditional party of the trade union movement in West Germany and into the 1990s, but 
Die Linke now has a significant presence, and Frank Bsirske – the President of Ver.di, Germany’s second largest 
trade union, from 2001 to 2019 – was a member of Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen (the Greens), albeit a fairly 
inactive one.  
435 Allen C. 2009. Empty Nets: Social Democracy and the ‘Catch-All Thesis’ in Germany and Sweden. Party 
Politics, Vol. 15 No. 5, pp. 635 – 653 and Driver S. and Martell L. 2000. Left, right and the third way. Policy & 
Politics. Vol. 28 No. 2, pp. 147-161. 
436 Merkel, W. 1991. After the golden age: is social democracy doomed to decline? in Institut de Ciències 
Politiques i Socials (Barcelona) (Ed.): Socialist parties in Europe. Barcelona, Institut d'Edicions de la Diputació de 
Barcelona. pp. 187-222. 
437 See Howell C. 2001. The end of the relationship between Social Democratic Parties and Trade Unions? 
Studies in Political Economy. Vol. 65 No. 1, pp. 7 – 37 and Taylor A. 1993. Trade Unions and the politics of 
Social Democratic Renewal. Western European Politics. Vol. 16 No. 1, pp. 133 – 155. 
438 Allen C. (2009) ‘’Empty Nets’: Social Democracy and the ‘Catch-All Thesis’ in Germany and Sweden.’ Party 




age) and who had alumni or current members serving as parliamentarians between the general 






By this criteria the youth wings selected as case studies are: 
 
German SPD:  
• Arbeitsgemeinschaft der JungsozialistInnen in der SPD (the JUSOS, current formal youth and 
student wing). 
• Sozialistische Arbeiter-Jugend (Socialist Workers Youth – historical youth wing pre-1933). 
• Sozialdemokratische Hochschulbund (Social Democratic University Union, historical student 
wing 1960 - 1971). 
• Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (Socialist German Student’s Union – historical 
student wing pre-1960). 
• Sozialistische Jugend Deutschlands –Die Falken (Socialist Youth of Germany–the Falcons, SJD-
Die Falken, informally linked socialist youth organisation, founded in 1904). 
 
British Labour Party: 
 
• Young Labour (current formal youth wing). 
• Young Socialists / Labour Party Young Socialists (historical youth wing 1960-1993).  
• Labour League of Youth (historical youth wing pre-1954). 
• Socialist Labour League (historical youth wing in Scotland 1954 – 1965). 
• Labour Students (current formal student wing).439 
• National Organisation of Labour Students (NOLS, historical student wing 1971 - 1992). 
• Students for a Labour Victory (historical student wing 1970 – 1971). 
• National Association of Labour Student Organisations (NALSO, historical student wing 1946 – 
1967). 
• Young Fabians (youth wing of the Fabian Society, formally affiliated socialist society, founded 
in 1960). 
 
This may appear to be a long list of examples. However, the historical organisations are counted as 
equivalent to the current ones. It should also be noted the dates above are the dates of their 
affiliations to the main parties, the organisations themselves sometimes continued as separate 
entities.  
 
One further question for case studies is why the choice to focus on youth wings and trade unions 
rather than other potential routes to becoming a legislator – in particular employment by the party or 
a long career in local, regional or European office.  
 
What this study does not include.  
There are two certain areas which this thesis will not look at. Firstly, other potential routes into 
becoming a candidate for the legislature such as being a party employee or extended service at sub-
national levels of government, and secondly personal characteristics which might affect success in 
becoming a legislator other than class – in particular race and gender. The reasons why are detailed 
in this section. 
 
 
439 In September 2019 Labour’s National Executive Committee, in a move widely seen as a factional powerplay, 
suspended Labour Students and announced the intention to abolish it. There was however no alternative put 
in place and the organisation has continued to function as before, pending legal proceedings. At the present 
time this situation has not been resolved. See Proctor K. 2019. Labour student wing to fight party's decision to 
abolish organisation. The Guardian. Published on 19.09.2019. Available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/sep/19/labour-student-wing-to-fight-partys-decision-to-abolish-




The issue of party employees will be discussed further in the empirical chapters, however the reason 
for excluding it as a main variable was the issue of where party employees are recruited from. Political 
party employees are almost always (except in cases of high levels of expertise being required) 
recruited from amongst the ranks of voluntary activists.440 In many cases, particularly at the lower 
level these activists are recruited from the party youth wings – in particular from the university student 
sections. Others are trade union employees seconded to the parties, in particular at election time, or 
who move between the party and the unions. However, many party employees do not seek public 
office. This would suggest that party employees are part of the picture, but as an intermediate stage 
forming part of the political ecosystem discussed in chapter two rather than as an origin point in their 
own right.  
 
The second possible route to becoming a national legislator which is not the focus of this study is 
extended experience at sub-national legislative level, either local or regional government, or at the 
European level. This is a possible route into the national legislator. As with party employees candidates 
at non-national levels will also be predominantly recruited from party activists, including those with 
backgrounds in the youth wings and/or the trade union movement. The initial political training 
grounds were the same as at the national level. Service at a local or regional level still requires time, 
skills and energy which can be facilitated by the kind of jobs referred to as ‘politics-facilitating’ or 
communication focused jobs that are also found at the national level. However the higher stakes 
which accompany these contests and dynamics at the national legislative level means that they are 
more visible to researchers.   
 
Therefore the reason to focus on youth wings and trade unions is that these are the initial training 
grounds in which individuals undertake an apprenticeship and become socialised into becoming a 
more and more senior activist before the point comes that they stand for selection to become a 
national legislator. For some individuals they are the only apprenticeship needed. For most their route 
to selection may pass through a period as a party employee or serving at a sub-national (or European) 
legislature. But the skills required to serve as a party employee or lower level legislature have been 
learned to some level prior to their employment or selection. Therefore this study will focus on those 
primary training grounds.  
 
The central big picture question to which this research is contributing is the concept of the 
gentrification and professionalisation of social democratic parties. As such issues of class are central 
to this thesis. However, the impact of youth wings on recruitment in terms of both race and gender is 
also a significant possible area of research. The timeframe being looked at has seen an increase in the 
number of women and ethnic minority MPs in the case studies looked at, and there may possibly be 
a connection between this and the changing roles of the youth wings in legislative recruitment. There 
were female and ethnic minority individuals interviewed for this research and several of them raised 
gender and race as issues. There is therefore some passing references to these in the empirical 
chapters.  
 
However, the impact of gender and race is an extensive topic and both require significant additional 
research in their own right. It would not be possible to do justice to these within the confines of this 
research project. In consequence this thesis will not attempt to do so, but instead will focus on 
demonstrating the role that youth wings have played in recruitment and the impact of this on the 
nature of the party. In the conclusion this thesis will then suggest further potential avenues for 
research which will include both the gender and race aspects of this change.  
 
 
440 Karlsen R. and Saglie J. 2017. Party bureaucrats, independent professionals, or politicians? A study of party 




By selecting the empirical case studies of the youth wings of the German SPD and UK Labour Party and 
contrasting them with the more traditional training ground of the trade union movement this study 
can make valid comparisons, which nevertheless cover a broad enough spectrum of political and social 
contexts to make the findings at least somewhat generalisable.  
 
3.7: Issues with the data collection.  
 
During the data collection phase of the study two issues arose with the collection of the data in two 
different case studies. The case study of the German SPD proceeded in the manner described above, 
with the publicly available archive of the short biographies prepared for the Bundestag website and 
biographical handbooks of Members the German Bundestag (MdBs).441 This information was then 
cross-referenced with other available sources including legislator’s own websites, newspaper reports, 
obituaries and others.442  
 
However no such archive could be found by the researcher for either the UK Labour Party or the 
Swedish SAP. In the case of the UK Labour Party MPs whom the researcher was aware from personal 
experience had a history of involvement with the youth wings did not include information on that in 
their online biographies, either on the Parliament website or their own personal websites. Exploring 
this question in the interviews it became apparent that British Parliamentarians perceive their roles 
within the youth wing as being either a neutral or in many cases a potentially negative thing for their 
perception amongst the public. They perceive that the British public dislikes the concept of student 
politicians or ‘career’ politicians and thus MPs do not make obvious their past involvement. This meant 
that it was not possible to find the data with the technique used in the case of German MdBs. 
However, a workaround was found.  
 
The researcher has a history of activism within the youth wings and thus has developed knowledge of 
individuals who have had past involvement with them. As a consequence eight individuals were 
identified who had been involved with the various party youth wings at different times from the 1950s 
to the present day. These individuals were then approached by the researcher with a complete list of 
Labour MPs from the 1979 general election until the present and asked to identify those whom they 
knew had been involved alongside them in the youth wings under discussion. The lists returned by 
these individuals were then collated and compared. Each MP on the list was, as with the SPD MdBs, 
then researched separately and other data drawn from personal websites, obituaries and sources such 
as the Who’s Who archive were added. This method, relying on the personal recollection of 
individuals, may be less reliable than matters of contemporaneous public record found in the archives 
of the Bundestag biographies. However by drawing the information from multiple individuals and 
adding in other available sources a full picture was able to be drawn. In addition more interviews were 
conducted for the Labour Party case study than the SPD in order to in some measure compensate.   
 
Although academics often conduct polls of experts – such as for likely election outcomes – or conduct 
surveys this was reliant on the insider knowledge of the researcher to identify relevant experts. This 
limitation was evident when it came to the third case study that had originally been proposed, 
Sweden.  
 
A similar problem was found with the case study of the Swedish SAP. Despite approaching the party, 
the party youth wing the SSU, the Riksdag library and several academics who worked on Swedish 
 
441 Principally Vierhaud R. (Ed) 2002. Biographisches Handbuch der Mitglieder des Deutschen Bundestages 
1949-2002. Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, with some information for MdBs from the GDR from Baumgartner G. 
and Hebig D. (Eds) 1996. Biographisches Handbuch der SBZ/DDR. Berlin, Walter de Gruyter. 




politics the researcher was unable to identify an archive to find out which Riksdagsledamöter (RL, 
members of the Swedish Riksdag) had come from a background in a youth wing. Similarly, to the UK 
House of Commons, and despite the greater prestige in which the SSU is held within the Swedish SAP 
compared to their Labour equivalents, the biographies of the Riksdagsledamöter on the Riksdag 
website did not list any involvement in the youth wings. Nor was the data identifiable from websites 
of existing members. Even if it had been this would only have provided a contemporary snapshot and 
not allowed for the extended time-frame that is required for this study.  
 
Unfortunately, neither the researcher nor the supervisory team had the necessary familiarity with the 
history of the Swedish youth wings to be able to identify the individuals who could provide first-hand 
knowledge in the same manner as that which was employed to gather the data for the Labour Party 
case study. Attempts to contact the SSU to try and identify potential individuals did not meet with a 
great deal of engagement from them.  
 
Attention therefore switched to trying to complete the case study of the Swedish SAP as a qualitative 
only study. Unfortunately attempts to engage individuals, both Riksdagsledamöter and current 
members of the SSU, also did not meet with high levels of engagement. Being unable to gather 
quantitative data and only having secured one qualitative interview, coupled with logistical concerns 
as the researcher approached the end of their scholarship, the decision was taken by the researcher 
and the supervisory team to drop the case study of the Swedish SAP and proceed with a comparative 
study of the German SPD and the UK Labour Party.  
 
Having two cases studies instead of three does mean that the study can be less confident in the 
generalisability of the conclusions from the study. Although Germany and the UK have sufficient 
similarities to be very easily comparable they are not the same. There are differences in terms of their 
political systems, political and social culture and the prestige, structure and dynamics around their 
respective youth wing organisations. As such the study can still make conclusions which are 
generalisable. There is however greater scope for further research to support and further test the 
conclusions which would be generated.  
 
One potential positive effect of the reduction to two cases studies however is that this allowed the 
study the capacity to explore those two in greater depth. This means that the understanding of the 
causal mechanisms can be more nuanced and sophisticated than might otherwise have been the case.  
 
3.8: Research ethics. 
 
The ethics of research in the Social Sciences, in particular of those involving human participants, is of 
paramount importance regardless of the methodology chosen. There is a duty imposed on researchers 
to be aware of, anticipate and resolve ethical concerns which could potentially arise during or due to 
their research.443 This section will discuss the ethical implications of both the quantitative and 
qualitative research and the methods being employed. Further it will discuss what methods are used 
to minimise any potential for harm to come from the research.  
 
Much of the quantitative data used for this study is sourced from publicly available sources, such as 
obituaries, legislator’s websites, newspaper reports and biographies. The only data which is not from 
public sources is that which was generated for the Labour Party by asking relevant individuals. 
However, this, as with all the data in this thesis, is simply recording the number of individuals who fit 
 
443 For a discussion see for example Association of Social Anthropologists of the UK and Commonwealth, 
Ethical Guidelines for Good Research Practice. 2001. Available at 




a certain typology. Therefore, the data presented is already anonymised – you cannot tell which 
individual is in which typology from the data itself. The original data is kept on secure university servers 
and is password protected. Given this the ethical concerns around the quantitative data are minimal.  
 
The primary concern is the ethical imperative to record the data accurately, as misconceived 
conclusions drawn from inaccurate data have the potential to cause serious harm both in the 
academic world and the broader community. This is just as much the case when data has been 
recorded inaccurately in error as when it has been deliberately falsified.444 To prevent this several 
steps were taken. The researcher undertook a course of research training provided by the university. 
An additional associate supervisor with expertise in quantitative techniques was brought into the 
supervision team and undertook additional training with the researcher to ensure their competence 
to accurately record data and utilise the results using relevant statistical software.  
 
Finally, the researcher and the supervision team cooperated to ensure a meaningful level of self-care 
was taken. It can often be forgotten that high levels of stress associated with conducting a PhD 
engender concerns not only over the wellbeing of the researcher but also of their ability to maintain 
the necessary vigilance required for the competent and ethical carrying out of the research activities.  
 
The qualitative data being collected presents larger ethical issues which the study will need to address. 
When conducting research involving human participants researchers need to ensure that the rights of 
those participants are ensured445 including the right to privacy. It is best practice to guarantee 
participants anonymity where possible. Anonymity means that it is not possible for an individual to 
connect the data provided with the participant who provided it. This unfortunately is not possible in 
this research. There is a broad concern in research ethics over the ‘vulnerability of elites’446 and as to 
whether any elite interview can ever guarantee anonymity. The issue is that as there are usually very 
few individuals in an elite such as national representatives it can be possible to extrapolate who the 
individual is from the data they provide.  
 
This is exacerbated in this study in that the researcher is involved in one of the political parties used 
as a case study. An individual familiar with the researcher could infer which individuals had been 
interviewed with knowledge of the researchers pre-existing professional and social relationships 
within that case study, both with parliamentarians interviewed and with members of the youth wings 
in that individual case study. Further as this study is investigating the backgrounds of parliamentarians 
some of the data collected relates to the paths individuals took to become a parliamentarian or their 
reasons for becoming active in a youth wing. As such someone who is familiar with that interviewee 
may be able to recognise facts from their biography and from that deduce their identity. This is a 
concern across both case studies. 
 
For these reasons it was not possible to guarantee anonymity to the participants of this study. There 
are however some steps which were taken to minimise the potential for harm to arise. Firstly all the 
participants were informed in advance that it was not possible to guarantee anonymity and that they 
should treat the interview as ‘on the record’. This explains the risk and leaves the choice as to whether 
or not to participate in the research to the interviewee. In order to ensure this is well understood the 
risk was explained to the potential interviewee in writing at the stage of initial contact. It was 
 
444 Panter A.T. and Sterba S.K. (eds). 2001. Handbook of ethics in quantitative methodology. London, Taylor & 
Francis. 
445 Cresswell J. R. 2009. Research Design: Quantitative, Qualitative and Mixed Methods Approaches. New York 
NY, Sage Publications.  
446 See Neale S. & McLaughlin E. 2009. Researching Up? Interviews, emotionality and Policy-Making Elites. 
Journal of Social Policy. Vol. 38 pp. 689-707 and Smith K. 2006. Problematising power relations in “Elite” 




reiterated on the interviewee information sheet and included as a separate point in the consent 
form.447 In addition, as the data cannot be guaranteed to be anonymous it will be treated as 
confidential. Confidential means that the data will be treated as private and steps were taken to 
protect the data provided, but that anonymity cannot be guaranteed.  
 
A number of steps were taken to ensure this. Firstly, the study protected the data provided via the 
use of pseudonyms for all participants. Secondly the research data was secured by only referring to 
the participants by pseudonyms and the list of the names of the participants and their pseudonym 
was not stored on the same computer system as the research data.448 The data was password 
protected and kept on secure university systems. Further potential identifying markers including 
names of organisations or places in the data were anonymised individually. For example, if an 
interviewee refers to a location it was replaced with “the city” or “my region” or if they used the name 
of a union it was replaced with “the union” except when the specific organisation was relevant to the 
point being made. 
 
Those details were explained to participating interviewees in full as part of the informed consent 
process. They were asked to sign a consent form to confirm they agreed to the above. Informed 
consent forms are standard practice449 and the form was accompanied by a participant information 
sheet which identified the researcher to the participants, including their academic institution, and a 
description of the study, its purpose and its proposed future dissemination.  
 
The information sheet also included contact details for the researcher, for the supervisory team and 
for the secretary of the university ethics committee in case the interviewee wished at any time to 
make a complaint. Also explained in the documentation was the participants right to withdraw450 at 
any point prior to the submission of the Thesis and provided contact details for this purpose. Copies 
of the information sheet and consent forms in both English and German are included in the 
appendices.  
 
There is also a potential issue of conflict of interest in that the researcher is a former but recent senior 
member of one of the organisations selected as a case study and sat on its national committee until 
recently. This has some benefits. For example, it means that a pre-existing level of trust is present and 
can allow for a greater sharing of information. It does have ethical implications however.  The power 
structures of interviews within that case study may be less unidirectional than in the other case 
studies.  
 
Potential conflicts of interest were minimised by the agreement of objective parameters between the 
researcher and the supervisors. These were the same regardless of the pre-existing professional and 
social relationships between the interviewee and the researcher as the steps taken to protect the data 
and interview subjects did not vary. In all cases confidentiality was enforced and data anonymised as 
far as possible. Contact was kept in writing from the university email system to keep a record of it and 




447 Copies of the participant information sheet and the consent form are included in the appendices. Both were 
given to interview subjects in both written and electronic form and in the appropriate language. 
448 Cresswell J. R. 2009. Research Design: Quantitative, Qualitative and Mixed Methods Approaches. New York 
NY, Sage Publications.   
449 Crisp R. J. & Turner R. N. 2007. Essential Social Psychology. New York NY, Sage Publications.  
450 Buttolph-Johnson J., Reynolds H.T. and Mycroft J.D. 2008. Political Science Research Methods. 6th Edition. 




A further potential issue was that of the social desirability bias discussed briefly in chapter one. In 
short, in social democratic politics it can be a perceived advantage to play up the working-class 
credentials of middle-class individuals in order to take advantage of a positive perception of strong 
working-class identity found in the parties and the trade union movement. There was therefore a 
potential risk that interviewees might embellish that part of their narrative during the interviews to 
gain a perceived advantage. However, the interview data is presented anonymously. The researcher 
is also under an obligation not to confirm whether any particular individual took part in the research. 
This incentive is therefore removed, and therefore the interview data is reliable. A further reason to 
suppose that the interviewees responses were accurate is that many of them had a pre-existing 
relationship with the researcher and participated in the research as a personal favour to them. 
 
3.9: Declaration of the researcher’s history in a youth wing.  
 
The researcher is a member of both the Labour Party and the SPD. Further the researcher was actively 
involved in the Young Fabians from 2013 until reaching the age limit in 2018. He was founder and first 
Chair of the Young Fabians International Network in 2014-15, before serving for two terms on the 
Young Fabians National Executive Committee. He has since served on the National Executive 
Committee of the Fabian Society from 2017 until the present. He had no active involvement in the 
main structures of either Young Labour or Labour Students but did serve as the Youth and Student’s 
Officer on the Executive Committee of Birmingham Northfield CLP in 2010-11. Although technically a 
member of the JUSOS as a member of the SPD under the age of 35 the researcher has never attended 
a meeting and has no active involvement in the organisation. Nor has the researcher ever been a 
member of the SJD-Die Falken. He is too young to have been a member of any of the historical 
organisations studied. He has since September 2019 been an employee of a Labour Member of 
Parliament.  
The idea for this study grew out of the experiences of the researcher in the Young Fabians, the youth 
wing of the Fabian Society which is formally affiliated to the Labour Party. He was the first person for 
many years elected to the Young Fabians NEC from outside London and his experiences serving as the 
regional officer and trying to get those outside of the capital involved sparked the initial interest in 
the topic of the gentrification of the youth wings. During his time in the Young Fabians it was seen 
internally as the breeding ground for future MPs. A frequent anecdote told within the organisation at 
the time was that Ken Livingstone, the left-wing former Mayor of London, had stated that if the Young 
Fabians annual boat party was sunk the centre-left of the party would lose a generation of MPs.  
It was by a synthesis of these two experiences, the assumption that the Young Fabians was a breeding 
ground for future MPs coupled with the logistical difficulties for those unable to attend events held in 
central London late on weekday evenings that prompted the initial interest in the topic and the initial 
hypotheses.  
The supervisory team were aware of this at all stages of the PhD, from the initial application onwards, 
and took steps to ensure the research was not affected by preconceived biases. Further the researcher 
and supervisory team between them ensured that the points made in this thesis are all supported by 
the evidence in the data. Further this background was highly beneficial in terms of building contacts, 
trust and rapport with the interviewees, who were also made aware from the outset of the 
interviewees background; indeed, many of them were already familiar with the researcher from 





3.10: Conclusion.  
Because of the research questions selected this thesis adopts a positivist position both ontologically 
and epistemologically. The key variables explored are binary, either an individual is or isn’t elected to 
the national legislature, either they held a senior role in the youth wing or trade union or they did not. 
These research questions also drive the thesis to adopt a comparative mixed methods approach, 
utilising both quantitative analysis of numbers from each background and qualitative semi-structured 
elite interviews across two case studies, that of the UK Labour Party and that of the German SPD, 
along with their linked youth and student organisations across the timeframe from the 1979 UK and 
1980 German general elections up until the 2017 parliaments of both. Data from by-elections and 
replacements until the end of June 2019 was included in the dataset, the 2019 UK general election 
was not included.  
These case studies, along with the case study of the Swedish SAP which had to be dropped, were 
selected because they provide a most-similar sample with enough commonalities that they can be 
comparable. Equally there are differences which allow for generalisable conclusions to be drawn.  
With two of the case studies the data for who had been in the youth wings simply did not exist as an 
archive or matter of record. In the Swedish case this proved impossible to surmount, however in the 
Labour case the researchers pre-existing insider knowledge allowed them to identify individuals who 
had been active in the various youth wings from the 1950s until the present day. They therefore 
created a list of all Labour MPs from 1979 until the end of the 2017 Parliament and sent this to these 
individuals, who marked those who had been active with them and in which youth wings. These were 
then collated together and cross-referenced with other publicly available sources such as 
Parliamentarian’s websites, obituaries and newspaper articles to create a database of the relevant 
information.  
The researcher also identified certain ethical issues, which were resolved in collaboration with the 




Chapter 4: The role of youth wings in the German SPD. 
 
4.1: Introduction.  
The first empirical test case for this study is that of Mitglieder des Bundestages (Members of the 
German Bundestag, MdBs) of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party 
of Germany, SPD) in the Federal Republic of Germany. One of the oldest and most influential members 
of the Social Democratic party family the SPD has also been historically one of the most successful. 
This chapter will introduce the case study with a brief discussion of the SPD’s history in order to 
provide context for the research. Further initial framing is provided by an explanation of the SPD’s 
organisational structure in order to define the institutional context of the research.  
From there the chapter will focus on the relevant youth wings which are at the heart of this study with 
an emphasis on the Arbeitsgemeinschaft der JungsozialistInnen in der SPD (working group of young 
socialists in the SPD, known as the JUSOS) which is the formally affiliated youth and student wing of 
the SPD and the most important for the study. There will also be a brief overview of a trio of now-
defunct historical youth or student wings which appear in the research and the aligned but unaffiliated 
Sozialistische Jugend Deutschlands – Die Falken (Socialist Youth of Germany – the Falcons, SJD-Die 
Falken). It will then discuss candidate selection in the SPD beginning with a description of the formal 
process of selection, an analysis of the gatekeepers and a discussion of the power dynamics and 
internal factors involved in selection. 
This chapter will then focus on research question and hypothesis 1, investigating the impact of the 
youth wings when it comes to the selection of candidates for the Bundestag. The study will discuss its 
findings that the number of SPD MdBs coming from a background in the JUSOS has risen sharply, and 
that the number coming from a trade union background has also dropped, but that the relationship 
between the two is more nuanced than simply former JUSOS replacing trade unionists as and when 
they retire from the Bundestag. It will discuss a ‘ratchet effect’ found in the quantitative data whereby 
the numbers coming from a youth wing background have shot up when the party has done well – in 
1998 and 2013 – but have not then fallen back in line with their peers when the party loses seats. This 
has seen those coming from a JUSOS background increase more starkly as a percentage of the SPD 
MdBs than they have in pure number terms.  
A final section of the chapter will consist of the concluding analysis and discussion of the role the youth 
wings play and have played in the selection of candidates for the Bundestag in the SPD. This section 
will discuss initial links to the broader theoretical discussions and establish a baseline for the 
discussion of research questions 2 and 3 in the following chapter.  
4.2: SPD party history.  
Founded in Leipzig on 23rd May 1863451 the SPD adopted its current name in 1890.452 Banned several 
times, in Imperial Germany from 1878 to 1890,453 in the Nazi period from 1933 to 1945454 and in the 
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GDR until 1989455 the party has nevertheless been hugely influential throughout German history, 
forming the first government of the German Republic in 1919456 and being the only party to vote 
against Hitler’s enabling act in 1933.457  
Abandoning Marxism with the Godesberger Programme458 of 1959 the SPD becarme a Volkspartei, 
that is a party which is committed to the people as a whole rather than one specific class.459 The SPD 
entered government for the first time since the Second World War in 1966 as part of a Grand Coalition 
with the CDU460 before in 1969 becoming the dominant partner in governing coalitions with the Freie 
Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Part, FDP)461 under Chancellors Willy Brandt (1969-74) and 
Helmut Schmidt (1974-1982). By the start of the period covered by this thesis, the 1980 Bundestag 
election, the SPD had therefore been in government for over a decade.  
By 1982 the global economic crisis of the 1970s was badly impacting Germany, with over 2 million 
unemployed.462 Splits developed both within the SPD and between the SPD and its coalition partners 
the FDP over the economic situation and the possibility of American medium range missiles being 
deployed on German soil via NATO.463 Schmidt lost a vote of no confidence in the Bundestag464 after 
the FDP switched their support to the CDU. He was replaced by the CDU’s Helmut Kohl.  
Internal conflicts between the left and centre-left ravaged the SPD during the 1980s, with the JUSOS 
at the forefront of a challenge from the ‘New Left’ to the existing SPD leadership.465 The more centrist 
leadership of the SPD (with their trade union allies) broadly ‘won’ these internal battles466 but it cost 
them a great deal in terms of energy and focus and was a contributing factor to the SPD being out of 
power between 1982 and 1998. The triumph of the centre-left wing of the party also led to the 
creation of a new political rival as the New Left found a home in the Green Party.467 These conflicts 
are discussed in more detail below in the section looking at the power dynamics of selection.  
At the end of the Cold War German politics was profoundly affected by reunification. Although West 
Germany was led by the CDU in East Germany a reconstituted Sozialdemokratische Partei in der DDR 
(Social Democratic Party in the GDR, SDP)468 formed part of the grand coalition in East Germany that 
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decided on reunification and in the West the SPD voted for it.469 This was crucial to the pace of 
reunification, if not the actual outcome, but didn’t necessarily capture the mood in Germany at the 
time and contributed to poor election results for the SPD in the early 1990s.470 The SDP and the SPD 
unified slightly before Germany did.  
By the 1990s the SPD, like the UK Labour Party, adopted ‘the Third Way‘ shifting ideologically towards 
the centre under Gerhard Schröder, returning to government in 1998471 in coalition with Bündnis 
90/Die Grünen (Alliance 90/The Greens, usually referred to as the Greens). Schröder remained as 
Chancellor until 2005 but his time in office, from the internal SPD perspective, led to rising tensions 
between the constituent parts of the party, in particular over the Agenda 2010 welfare and labour 
market reform, also known as the Hartz proposals.472  
The first three Hartz proposals focused on an expansion of job opportunities and were relatively 
uncontentious. The ‘Hartz IV’ reforms however focused on welfare cuts, and a sanctions regime for 
those who didn’t find work, have proven to be deeply unpopular and divisive, both with the public 
and in particular within the SPD,473  causing a deep rupture between the Schröder leadership and both 
the trade unions and the JUSOS, as well as large sections of the membership.474  
In 2005 Schröder called Bundestag elections a year early due to the divisions both within the SPD and 
between the SPD and their coalition partners the Greens. The result of this election was inconclusive. 
Although the Red-Green coalition was no longer possible it could have been possible for the two 
parties to continue to govern with the addition to the coalition of the Partei des Demokratischen 
Sozialismus (Party of Democratic Socialism, PDS),475 the successor party to the Sozialistische 
Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of Germany, SED), the communist ruling party of the 
GDR. Schröder and the SPD leadership wished to maintain a cordon sanitaire against the PDS, 
something they had also committed to prior to the election.476 They therefore opted instead to enter 
into a Grand Coalition with the CDU/CSU with the CDU leader Angela Merkel as Chancellor.477  
This began a period in which three of the four governments of Germany have been Grand Coalitions 
(Große Koalition, “GroKo”) between the CDU/CSU and the SPD under Angela Merkel, from 2005-09, 
2013-17 and from 2017 until the present. The 2017 Grand Coalition in particular was divisive within 
the SPD, with the JUSOS and their chair Kevin Kühnert particularly opposed and campaigning against 
the agreement with the slogan “NoGroKo”.478 Only 56.4% of SPD conference delegates voted for the 
party to enter formal negotiations with the CDU/CSU with 66% of all members then voting in favour 
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of the coalition after the negotiations following intense campaigning for a yes vote from the SPD 
leadership.479   
Divisions within the SPD over these coalitions have led to several attempts to bring the party together, 
including the 2007 “Hamburg Programme” 480 followed in 2011 by reforms which increased the powers 
of the party base and a ‘citizen’s dialogue.’481 These reforms however did not prevent the acrimony 
within the SPD during the 2017 coalition talks, and divisions continue. The JUSOS take the position 
that Grand Coalitions should be an exception rather than the rule and risk the SPD losing its distinctive 
profile. Such concerns contributed to the election of left-wingers Saskia Esken and Norbert Walter-
Borjans as joint leaders of the SPD on 30th November 2019.482  
4.3: The party structure of the SPD.  
The SPD operates a highly democratic form of internal organisation and procedures governed 
principally by Section 6 of the Party’s Rulebook483 and the Federal Parties Law.484 Members are 
grouped into 7,712 Ortsvereine, or local associations, which are present throughout the Federal 
Republic of Germany. These are further grouped into approximately 350 sub-district, district and 
municipal organisations and then further into Länder (state) organisations. Both the sub-district, 
district and municipal groupings and the Länder groupings send delegates to the Party Congress, which 
is convened every two years. In the alternate years there is a Party Conference with less decision-
making powers than the Congress. The Party Congress determines policy and elects the SPD’s 
leader,485 Executive Committee and two commissions, the Arbitration Commission and Control 
Commission, to ensure the smooth running of the party between conventions. The Executive 
Committee then further elects a 13-member Presidium which meets weekly to discuss the party’s 
response to events and issues and arrange party events. There is a gender quota for both the Executive 
Committee and the Presidium, a minimum of 40% (two-fifths) of the members must be women. Since 
1998 there has also been the post of General Secretary, whose principle duty is the coordination of 
the party’s election campaigns. This structure is laid out in Fig. 4.1 below.486  
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The SPD contains several party sub-groupings which exist in parallel to the main structures. They are 
designed to act as bridges between the SPD and other groups in society. There are different forms of 
these sub-groupings; the “Arbeitsgemeinschaften” (formal working groups), “Arbeitskreise” (informal 
working groups) and “Foren” (forums) each of which have different levels of rights and recognition 
within the SPD structures.  
The Arbeitsgemeinschaften are the most established and formal level of the sub-groupings. There are 
three Arbeitsgemeinschaft where SPD members who meet the criteria are automatically members; 
these are the JUSOS, the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Sozialdemokratischer Frauen (Working Group of Social 
Democratic Women, ASF) and the Arbeitsgemeinschaft SPD 60 plus (Working Group of the SPD 60 
Plus, AG 60 Plus) for older members. Membership of the other Arbeitsgemeinschaft is not automatic 
or mandatory. All working groups operate semi-autonomously and individuals can join them without 
being a member of the SPD, but they are not legally separate organisations and remain a part of the 
SPD. This research focuses in particular on the JUSOS. There are multiple other SPD working groups, 
such as those for Jewish members, lawyers, Christian members etc. However, these do not form part 
of the focus of this research.  
4.4: The youth wings of the SPD; the JUSOS, SAJ, SDS, SHB and SJD-
die Falken.  
The SPD currently has only one formal youth and student wing, the Arbeitsgemeinschaft der 
JungsozialistInnen in der SPD (the JUSOS) which covers ages from 14 to 35 and has over 70,000 
members487 as of 2018. All members of the SPD who are under the age of 36 are automatically a 
member of the JUSOS, and non-party members can also join if they are under 36, although non-party 
members do not have the right to vote or stand for office within the organisation.488 The JUSOS is 
therefore the primary focus of this chapter when it comes to the youth wings.  
The JUSOS structure is geographical, mirroring that of the SPD, and is extremely dense and complex. 
At the lower level a JUSOS group will be attached to each Ortsverein. There are then further groups 
at the Unterbezirk (sub-district) and bezirk (district) level as well as Land (state) level and Federal 
levels. As well as the main youth section the JUSOS operate Hochschulgruppen (University groups) as 
a student wing within Universities and some high schools. The JUSOS holds congresses and 
conferences meeting annually to make major policy decisions, and an elected executive committee 
which manages matters between the conferences.489 Depending on the level of the conference 
(federal, state, regional) different levels of JUSOS groups send delegates. The Hochschulgruppen also 
have their own conferences each semester and an elected executive committee.490 However the 
JUSOS are not the only youth wing with a relationship with the SPD.  
Prior to the Nazi period the affiliated youth wing in the SPD was known as the Sozialistische Arbeiter-
Jugend (Socialist Workers Youth, or SAJ),491 the SAJ appears in the research due to Egon Franke, who 
was the Chair of the SAJ in Hannover until it was banned in 1933, but who was still a member of the 
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Bundestag in the early 1980s.492 Given that this was an historical predecessor of the JUSOS and that it 
only impacts one individual in a small percentage of the timeframe under consideration the SAJ is 
treated as directly equivalent to the JUSOS in the data.  
From 1946 the SPD also had a separate affiliated student wing, the Sozialistischer Deutscher 
Studentenbund (Socialist German Student’s Union, SDS) until in 1960 the SPD leadership deemed 
membership of the SDS to be incompatible with membership of the SPD following conflicts over the 
adoption of the Godesberger Programme.493 It was replaced by the Sozialdemokratische 
Hochschulbund (Social Democratic University Union, SHB) formed from SDS branches which had 
supported the Godesberger Programme.494 Following a leftward turn the SHB also came into conflict 
with the SPD leadership until in 1971 party support was stopped. Since 1971 therefore the JUSOS 
combines the functions of both a youth wing and, via its Hochschulgruppen (University Groups), the 
student wing of the SPD.495 Nevertheless several former members of the SDS and SHB were members 
of the Bundestag in the 1980s and they are therefore included in this study. 
In addition, there is one further organisation with strong links to the SPD but no formal affiliation, the 
Sozialistische Jugend Deutschlands – Die Falken (Socialist Youth of Germany – the Falcons, SJD-Die 
Falken). The SJD-Die Falken are a youth movement arranging camps, education activities and political 
seminars for young people with an avowedly Socialist political philosophy.496 Although there is no 
formal affiliation the ideological alignment between the aims of the SJD-Die Falken and the SPD means 
there are links between them and individuals have often held membership in both the JUSOS and the 
SJD-Die Falken.  
These youth wings play a major role in the selection of SPD candidates, operating within the party 
processes and competing for influence with other aspects of the party, as detailed in the next section.  
4.5: Selection in the SPD; the process, gatekeepers and power 
dynamics.  
The selection process in the SPD, in terms of the selection journey any specific individual undergoes 
before considering putting themselves forward, proceeds as outlined in chapter two. However, once 
the individual gets to the stage of the formal selection process Germany’s electoral system means 
there are unique features of the SPD’s process, candidate selection being one area which is governed 
by Germany’s Electoral Law.  
For the Bundestag there are 299 local districts which elect a candidate by first past the post.497 The 
remainder of the (theoretically) 598498 seats are determined by a second vote, for a party rather than 
an individual. Every party that cleared the 5% threshold of this second vote is allocated a percentage 
 
492 Childs D. 1995. Obituary: Egon Franke. Available at: 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/obituary-egon-franke-1587529.html accessed 22.05.2018 15:33 
493 Miller S. and Potthof H., 1983. A History of German Social Democracy: From 1848 to the Present. Translated 
from the German by J. A. Underwood. New York; Berg Publishing, p.184.  
494 Renaud, T.R., 2015. Restarting Socialism: The New Beginning Group and the Problem of Renewal on the 
German Left, 1930-1970. (Doctoral dissertation, UC Berkeley). 
495 https://www.jusos.de/wir-jusos/hochschulgruppen/ 14.11.2018 16:50 
496 https://www.wir-falken.de/ueber_uns/englisch.html 14.11.2018 17:44  
497 http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-election-system-explained-a-923243.html accessed 
on 10.12.2018 14:15. 
498 The limits of seats in the Bundestag was set at 496 from the 1965 to 1987 elections (inclusive), 656 from the 
1990 to 1998 elections (inclusive) before being reduced to 598 from the 2002 election until the system was 




of these list seats based on their percentage of the vote.499 It is important to note that individuals can 
be a candidate for both a direct mandate and hold a place on the list for the party seats at the same 
time. In this instance the direct mandate, if successful, takes precedence and they are removed from 
the party list, meaning those below them move up a place. 
The selection process for the geographical constituencies, known as direct mandates, involves a 
meeting of either the areas constituency election committee or of all the members of the local 
organisation(s) who democratically elect a prospective candidate from a shortlist presented to 
them.500  The constituency places are decided first, before the party list is drawn up. Unlike the CDU 
the SPD recommends that its local branches elect delegates to decide on candidates rather than hold 
all-member meetings.501  
Candidates for the party list places are selected by either the congress of the Land party or by a 
meeting of delegates from the party organisations in the Land. The Party Executive for the Land will 
make recommendations, usually based on balancing interests within the party. These may be regional, 
gender, generational or factional balances, with regional balance particularly important.502 Changes 
can be made by delegates to the recommendations from the executive, but this can upset these 
balances and is therefore uncommon.503  
This means that local members, or their delegates, in the constituencies and the local and regional 
party executive for the party list places are both acting as gatekeepers to selection. Gatekeepers are 
those who control access to the system, in this case those who exert a measure of control over the 
selection process. As discussed in chapter two, gatekeepers play a key role in the recruitment 
journey,504 both in the phase of actively building intraparty coalitions of support and potentially earlier 
when nurturing individuals by opening up opportunities for advancement. They may also play a key 
role in convincing an individual to stand as a candidate.505   
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Gatekeepers to selection in the SPD.  
Party gatekeepers have a significant impact on the likelihood of an individual being selected to stand 
for public office. When the interviews for this study were conducted several of the interviewees would 
raise the topic of gatekeepers and the power dynamics of selection unprompted.  
The selection system and its practical functioning were described by DE03.  
“We have local branches of the party, they are within a borough, and within that 
borough the whole of these grassroots that are usually based on cities or villages. 
They decide who they are going to put forward as the direct candidate. From my 
experience if you had a borough where there is a local industry they still do the old 
thing, they still go for someone from the workers council. Then they will obviously 
see if they would be willing to do it. But quite often we have a fighting [contested] 
vote, where there are several candidates and then the entire grassroots within that 
borough would vote and the candidate who got the most votes within that borough 
would be nominated. In parliament, whether in the federal Länder or the whole of 
Germany, it is about half and half people who get voted in directly and people who 
get in via the party lists. The lists that the parties make are decided by the party 
within the federal state, they make the decisions do they want a lot of teachers, do 
they want a lot of lawyers, do they want a lot of people working in public services 
and the party then decides who is getting on the list and in what order. If you’re 
top of the list you’re going to get in.” 
DE03, MdB from a Trade Union background. 
What is of interest in this account is the word “They”. In both methods of becoming a candidate – 
direct vote or party list – DE03 identifies gatekeepers as playing a vital role. In the case of a direct vote 
these gatekeepers approach an individual to stand who is then either adopted or faces a selection 
vote, during which the known support of these gatekeepers can be presumed to be valuable. In the 
party list case the gatekeepers decide which candidates are on the list and in what order.  
DE03 doesn’t identify these gatekeepers beyond simply “the party”. Other respondents however did 
identify who they conceived to be the gatekeepers.  
“The decision of who gets which nomination or who gets which job or who is a 
candidate for which office is the task and the practice of the democracy in the 
party. The most important people are the chairs at each level of the party. The chair 
of our federal party is Andrea Nahles and she is the most important person for 
deciding on candidates at the federal level. In the 16 countries, federal countries, 
there we have 16 chairmen of the federal party and on the local level we have 373 
local party units and they are the chairmen, or chairwomen, responsible on their 
level. And on the basic level we have 7,712 basic units and they’re responsible for 
their level. The Chair is the most important person, they are not alone, but they are 
the master of the process. They have to speak with the board, or speak with those 
who are in office, I think that is the next most important group: those who are in 
office. For example, if you are a Member of Parliament here in the Bundestag you 
 





are yourself a very important person when it comes to whether you will get the 
nomination again or not.” 
DE01, Senior SPD party employee. 
The party chairs of the varying levels within the SPD are therefore identified as having a great deal of 
power within the selection process. DE01 identifies a process of the balancing of interests, the chair 
must at least consult with members of their board and DE01 also identifies a benefit to incumbency. 
The chair must take soundings from others with influence over the process but ultimately they exert 
significant control over who is selected. DE01 does not differentiate between the importance of the 
chair in the two sections, in the party list when their level of influence over the list and placings being 
drawn up by the committees which they chair would be obvious, but also in the selection of candidates 
to compete for direct mandates. Wigbers506 identifies that it is extremely unusual for a candidate 
recommended by the district chair to be overturned by the membership. Put together with the 
comments from DE03 it indicates that the sponsorship and support of the party chairs is considered 
an important factor in terms of the selection from the membership for a direct mandate candidate 
selection as well as the party list.  
Factionalism and selection in the SPD.  
Party gatekeepers, and in particular party Chairs, are thus able to advance the interests of those who 
agree with them ideologically. This factionalism is identified with the sources of recruitment. The issue 
of factionalism will be explored in more depth in chapter six, however it is relevant to hold a brief 
discussion on how it relates to the selection process here.  
When DE04 was asked to describe the recruitment process they raised the issue of factionalism and 
described the JUSOS and the Trade Unions as being on opposing factional and ideological sides.  
“If you want to have a career in the SPD you have two chances. First you can be a 
member of the unions and second you can be a member, if you are younger than 
35, of the JUSOS. To have a career it is important to have the right connections to 
the leaders in the party in the region and in the sub-region. If the sub-region and 
the region is a little bit on the right you have a better chance coming from the 
unions, if it is on the left you have a better chance coming from the JUSOS.” 
DE04, Former MdB from a JUSOS background. 
This part of the discussion is of interest for several reasons. The first is the impact of ideological 
conflicts on recruitment patterns when one or other training ground is predominantly a source of 
recruitment for one wing rather than being across the wings. This will be discussed in more detail in 
chapter six. There is also here an explicit discussion of the role of gatekeepers in selecting candidates 
with the same ideological or factional allegiance as them. This is linked to the geographical nature of 
the gatekeepers implying there may also be a geographical element to the factional conflicts 
depending on which faction is dominant within a given geographic area or party sub-unit. This includes 
 
506 Wigbers D. 2012. Pathways to Parliament: Legislative recruitment in Germany and Great Britain. Doctoral 




the JUSOS which is seen and often sees itself as a faction in its own right,507 which is discussed in 
further detail in chapter six.508 
Gatekeepers are however likely to favour those who produce political outcomes which favour the 
faction, ideological or otherwise, which they themselves support and to conversely seek to stymie the 
careers of those who they perceive to be able to achieve political outcomes which favour other 
factions or go against the interests of their faction. DE04 referenced this in the quote already discussed 
above when they referenced the factional contests for selection as “the actual school of the SPD”. 
DE01 also identified the more pernicious side of this equation when asked an unrelated question. 
“The SPD’s is dominated by people who have a lot of time and the culture of the 
SPD is also dominated by a fight with each other. I speak of the ‘mushrooms 
principle’ – if they are growing and come out of the earth they are cut. And that is 
good for mushrooms but not good for people. If you are coming out and you show 
your brilliance, that you are better than average, you have a problem. I think we 
are still a mass organisation, with 440,000 members, and in a mass organisation 
nowadays brilliant people have a lot of problems, too many problems.” 
DE01, Senior SPD party employee. 
In other words, those who demonstrate to gatekeepers that they can effectively produce political 
outcomes which the gatekeepers view with disfavour will find that those gatekeepers take steps to 
remove them from contention within the party.  
A point to clarify is that the mechanism by which individuals are changing is natural replacement. That 
is the contest is to replace retiring Members of the Bundestag or for seats which the SPD does not 
hold, rather than attempts to force out sitting Members. Wigbers509 does identify one incident of a 
concerted campaign to deselect a sitting MdB in Hamburg Eimsbüttel in 2009 but states that this is “a 
very rare example”510 and that the reselection of a sitting MP – lacking any form of public scandal – is 
“the default case.”511 Even in times of high levels of factional tension it is very rare for a sitting MdB 
who seeks re-election not to be selected as the candidate again.512 During conversations with the 
researcher none of the interviewees raised the concept of deselecting a sitting member, only on 
looking to replace those who were standing down or in seeking mandates in places where the SPD did 
not have a sitting Member.  
This does however have the effect of increasing the stakes when trying to win the contest the first 
time around, as the winning faction is likely to see their candidate remain in office for some time. This 
also applies beyond factional considerations, with a reduced possibility to ‘correct’ a ‘bad’ selection 
gatekeepers face pressure to ensure they select the best candidate.  
  
 
507 Braunthal G. 1994. The German Social Democrats since 1969: A Party in Power and Opposition. Colorado; 
Westview Publishing Inc. Second Edition, p121-147. 
508 See chapter six, section 6.4.  
509 Wigbers D. 2012. Pathways to Parliament: Legislative recruitment in Germany and Great Britain. Doctoral 
Dissertation; Darwin College, University of Cambridge, p50. 
510 Ibid p.50.  
511 Ibid. p46. 
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Skills or networking? What are gatekeepers looking for?  
When DE04 is discussing “leaders in the party in the region and sub-region” it is highly likely they are 
referring to the same individuals as DE01, specifically the Party Chairs, incumbent representatives and 
the local Party Board, and the individuals referred to as “they” by DE03. These individuals are acting 
as talent scouts in some respects, such as when they approached DE03 to turn to politics from the 
trade union. Whilst they are looking for individuals who will share their political perspective, they are 
also looking for competent and capable legislators who have the ability to advance their political goals 
in office as well as within the party. The question then, when it comes to power dynamics, is what 
they are looking for when making a decision?  
When DE01 was asked what the Chairs he had identified as being key gatekeepers were looking for in 
a candidate he placed an emphasis on skills.  
“They should get the best possible person. But what do we mean by best? Is it the 
most intellectual man or woman or is it the best communicators or is it the most 
intelligent? I don’t know. It’s a mix of attitudes. But I think that they have to be 
quick-thinking, they have to be moral, honest, and they have to be loving people. 
They need empathy. And communication skills.”  
DE01, Senior SPD party employee. 
When the politician interviewees were also asked what benefits they perceived their experiences in 
their respective training grounds gave them that made them more likely to be selected the 
respondents also placed an emphasis on the skills they learnt over networking. 
“The skills are more important; I’m still profiting today from what I learnt in the 
JUSOS. That was way more important than the networks. Reading texts, writing 
proposals quickly, propaganda in the positive sense. The networking is not in the 
foreground”.  
DE02, MdB from a JUSOS background. 
However, it wasn’t only those from a JUSOS background who identified skills as important. DE03 also 
identified skills as important, in particular communication skills, but they couched it more in terms of 
a factor driving a process of gentrification in the party.  
“It used to be that we used to look at the factories, and we would see there is a 
good guy on the workers council, he has already got votes for him because he was 
voted onto the workers council within the factory and these people were put 
forward for the Parliament. But these days the focus is more on people who can 
talk well, who can sell themselves. So, because of that the educational level of the 
Members of Parliament is much more important, meaning people like teachers, 
lawyers, people from higher education, people that studied politics. We have a 
professionalisation of the Parliamentarians”.  
DE03, MdB from a Trade Union background. 
This allowed the opportunity for a follow up question regarding whether they had learnt those skills 
in the trade union movement and if so whether the skills had been a factor in their selection and useful 




“Yes, a lot. I was organising a lot of demonstrations, I managed to get 40 or 50,000 
people onto the streets. My colleague made the comment that there is not much 
use protesting in front of the parliament, it is much much more use if you’re actually 
in the parliament… The experiences that I had previously helped me a lot in the 
committees [of the Bundestag]. Because I had a lot of Trade Union experience and 
because I was taken out of the Trade Unions to enter politics I basically packed a 
lot of punch, my voice carried a lot of weight because of that experience, within the 
Bundestag special committees and within the party. When it comes to topics such 
as social policy I am not just sitting and listening but I can actually contribute”. 
DE03, MdB from a Trade Union background. 
Here it is important to note that DE03 specifies the skills they learned allowed them to pack a punch 
in the party as well as once they got to the Bundestag. The two are of course linked, as a candidate 
can use the skills they have learnt and their applicability in the legislature as a selling point in the 
selection process.  
Interestingly however DE04, the former MdB with a JUSOS background but from an earlier timeframe 
than DE02, identified networking as a key factor, but also made reference to skills as being necessary. 
In the quote already mentioned above he identified both the JUSOS and the trade union movement 
as schools for the SPD and in a later question on the importance of the JUSOS as a recruiting ground 
they returned to this theme, commenting:  
“In the regions there are other criteria, it’s not just having a radical point of view - 
they are more complex personalities generally and they focus on deliberation, on 
discourse, on debating issues that are relevant to their everyday lives.”  
DE04, Former MdB from a JUSOS background. 
Identifying a focus on deliberation, discourse and debate is identifying a focus on the communication 
skills necessary for the successful prosecution of that political conversation.  
This is not just the assessment of the individuals who had gone through the process or witnessed it 
firsthand, it was also the opinion of those who were currently members of the JUSOS. Both DE05 and 
DE06 placed an emphasis on the skills they learnt, whilst also acknowledging the importance of 
networking. When asked about the benefits of being in the JUSOS DE05 commented: 
“I think there are a lot. I think it is one of the best decisions I have made in my life. 
Public speaking is one of them because you have to present your case. Organising 
skills is another thing because you organise a lot of events and you organise 
campaigns. You often manage a meeting as well, there’s timekeeping, seeing 
people don’t interrupt each other and these kind of things which can also be very 
useful later on in life. You make a lot of connections to important people which can 
help you in many ways for example I started organising big anti-racism events and 
it was at that point that it was really helpful that I knew a lot of politicians because 
politicians are always well-connected. They’re always well-connected with the civil 
society and so on and if you get them on board then this helps you bring other 
people on board because they, if they support you, they can use their network to 
support you and the goals you want to achieve. So this is also great. You learn a lot 
about politics, you think a lot about politics, you meet really nice people. Especially 




it is not only work but also fun so you meet a lot of really nice people to hang around 
with and get long-lasting friendships from this. I think these are the main ones.” 
DE05, Senior JUSOS activist. 
DE05 identifies the skills but here also makes another important point, which is that time in the JUSOS 
can yield networks which enable people to work in politics, in one of the jobs within the political 
ecosystem discussed in chapter two.  
DE06 also placed a very heavy emphasis on the skills that an individual learns. In particular they 
focused on the political education, what DE02 termed learning the craft of politics, and on the 
communication skills which had also been mentioned by other interviewees: 
“For me personally the benefits, I think it was a very, very good political education 
I got there. Not by some guys who told me how to think but by struggling on my 
own, struggling with some comrades, struggling to find solutions for political 
problems in my daily life. On the other hand you gain some social qualifications, 
reading texts and speaking and so on. It’s about networking, it’s about learning to 
discuss and to fight for political issues, learning about oneself and your 
organisation, about political topics and the political needs you have to fight for and 
of course learning about a lot of, and this is an additional nice-to-have thing, but 
you learn a lot about designing postcards and about finance stuff and designing 
budgets and whatever. Because you have to do it and you have to educate yourself 
about how to organise your political work and how to speak in front of a lot of 
people. Where else do you have the opportunity to speak and learn to speak in 
front of a big crowd? This is quite useful. At university all the people who study with 
me are always afraid of giving a lecture and I am not afraid. So you learn a lot of 
these soft skills as well and it’s very nice. You can’t evaluate this highly enough 
because it will make you fluent in expressing yourself in a confident way. This is 
very useful, in job interviews as well of course! This is not the goal or the main aim 
of JUSOS but its additional value you get there as well by being active.”   
DE06, Senior JUSOS activist. 
The two factors identified in this section however seem to provide slightly contradictory conclusions. 
The heavy emphasis placed by the respondents on the importance of gatekeepers would seem to 
imply that the most important element in selection is the good favour of the individuals in question, 
principally identified as the Party Chairs. This would in turn imply that the most important benefit 
provided by the training grounds, whether the youth wings or the trade union movement, was the 
opportunity to network and put an individual in good favour with those gatekeepers. When asked 
about the benefits provided by the training grounds however all the respondents either explicitly or 
implicitly identified the specific skillsets they had developed within their training ground, with a 
particularly heavy emphasis on communication skills.  
This may be because the move from the JUSOS to the Bundestag is rarely direct, and that the skills are 
more useful because they are applicable to the intermediate stage of the process, that is to say 
working within the political ecosystem as identified by DE05. This is discussed in more detail in chapter 
six. Further it may be that the way for an individual to gain favour and a positive assessment from 
prominent gatekeepers may be via the exercising and the demonstration of the skills identified. That 
is to say that the primary advantage offered by the training grounds of the SPD is not just the ability 




skills necessary to achieve a political outcome in an environment which can bring an individual to the 
attention of gatekeepers. Those gatekeepers may then open up further opportunities, in local 
government or as a member of party staff for example, all of which build into the political capital 
required for a selection bid.  
In the following sections of this chapter the relevant levels of success of the youth wings and the trade 
unions in getting their favoured individuals into a position to be elected as MdBs are discussed. Whilst 
the below figures count only those successfully elected after selection nevertheless as factional 
conflicts are fiercest around finding candidates for winnable seats and for a high placing on the party 
list the two are linked. Conflicts will be particularly strong in contests to replace members who are 
retiring, as the seat is self-evidently a winnable seat if it is held by the SPD. Consequently, the lens of 
gatekeepers and power dynamics has to be born in mind when analysing the shifting patterns of 
recruiting grounds.  
4.6: The youth wings and SPD legislative recruitment.  
The major contention being tested in this chapter is that the SPD’s youth wings have increased in 
prominence as a source of recruitment for the social democratic party family of Western Europe, and 
that this has come at the expense of the trade union movement as outlined in hypothesis 1. It is 
therefore worth reminding ourselves of hypothesis 1: 
H1: Youth organisations have grown in prominence as sources of social democratic 
parliamentarian recruitment since the 1980s, filling a vacuum created by the 
decline of the trade unions. 
In order to test this a quantitative analysis of the backgrounds of MdBs was carried out, as detailed in 
the chapter three. A database was created in which every SPD Member of the Bundestag was listed 
by election cycle and their backgrounds codified. The dataset coded firstly membership of any (and 
which) of the youth wings listed above, whether they had served in an elected role in a youth wing, 
membership and employment within any German trade union (and which). Further it coded whether 
or not they grew up in the German Democratic Republic (as the timeframe covers reunification). In all 
cases the data was self-declared being taken from the official mini-biographies submitted to the 
Bundestag. 
The data from the 1994 election onwards originates from the biographies each MdB is required to 
prepare for inclusion on the Bundestag website, the archive of which is publicly available.513 This data 
was then cross-referenced against other sources available online, principally the biographies included 
on the individuals own website, sources held in the archive of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and 
newspaper reports.514 Data prior to 1994 was primarily sourced from the Biographical Handbook of 
the Members of the German Bundestag 1949-2002.515  Again every entry was then cross-referenced 
against other available source, including newspaper reports, reports of long-service celebrations 
carried on local party websites and obituaries. This makes the data easily comparable. Once coded 
this data was then analysed.  
 
513 Available at: http://webarchiv.bundestag.de/archive/2007/0206/mdb/bio/index.html (data from 1994 to 
2007), at 
http://webarchiv.bundestag.de/archive/2013/1212/bundestag/abgeordnete17/biografien/index.html (data 
from 2007 to 2013) and https://www.bundestag.de/abgeordnete/biografien (2013 to present).  
514 A complete list of sources used to cross-reference the data is included in Appendix 4.4.  
515 Vierhaud R. (Ed) 2002. Biographisches Handbuch der Mitglieder des Deutschen Bundestages 1949-2002. 




As the data is from self-declared Bundestag mini-biographies it is coding whether the individual MdB 
felt their service in the youth wing was worthy of inclusion. It is therefore reliant on the MdBs own 
collective assessments of whether their level of service was relevant to their political development. 
It is also important to note that this data is looking at those who have undertaken a political 
apprenticeship in the youth wings, not those who have moved immediately from a senior position in 
the youth wings to the Bundestag. The data does not distinguish on the length of time between an 
individual’s service in a youth wing and their election to the Bundestag.  
Findings from the empirical data.  
As discussed in chapter three the data tables below are comprised of individuals who served as an 
elected officer of the youth wings in question, not merely those who had membership. Any individual 
who joined the SPD before the age of 35 automatically has membership of the JUSOS, regardless of 
whether they have ever attended a meeting. Thus the data for membership would not indicate the 
individuals who had received any political benefit from youth wings. By coding for those who have 
held a role as an elected officer of a youth wing the data indicates individuals who can be shown to 
have had the opportunity to demonstrate political skill, at least enough to win an election within the 
relevant organisation.  
Several things immediately become clear from this data. The first is that there has been a rise in the 
number of SPD MdBs coming from a background in one of the youth wings, but that it has not been a 
steady increase. There was in fact a steady decline from 1980 to 1994 followed by two big jumps, one 
in the 1998 electoral cycle and one in the 2013. This can be seen by combining the different youth 
wings together and plotting a simple line graph of numbers of the SPD’s MdBs who come from a 
background in one or other youth wing (Fig. 4.2). 
 
 
What is of interest here is that these numbers do not track the electoral fortunes of the SPD. Although 





Gerhard Schröder the number of MdBs from a youth wing background does not then fall back 
significantly as the party suffered losses in the elections of 2002, 2005 and 2009. In the 1998 electoral 
cycle MdBs from a youth wing background accounted for 59 out of 307 MdBs.516 In the 2002 and 2005 
elections the number of youth wing MdBs went up, to 62 and then 64, despite the SPD as a whole 
suffering losses in those elections, and in the 2009 cycle the youth wings still accounted for 57 MdBs 
out of a total which had halved from its 1998 level to 155.  Similarly the 2013 election did see the SPD 
increase its number of seats and 84 of the 199 individuals who served as SPD MdBs had a youth wing 
background. In the most recent election, 2017, youth wings still accounted for the background of 82 
of the MdBs despite a drop in the total by almost a quarter to 155.   
This has resulted in a ‘ratchet effect’ whereby the number of MdBs from a youth wing background 
leaps forward with the SPD’s gains but then hold their numbers in losing election cycles. This ‘ratchet 
effect’ means that the number of MdBs from a youth wing background has increased as a percentage 
of the MdBs quite dramatically even as the actual numbers have plateaued across cycles. Plotting a 
line graph of the number of MdBs with a background in one of the youth wings in terms of the 
percentage of total SPD MdBs therefore shows a very different line (Figs. 4.3 and 4.4).  
 
The steady decline between 1980 and 1994 is still discernible, though with perhaps a mini-ratchet 
effect between 1980 and 1983 as numbers dropped but the percentage increased slightly, suggesting 
SPD MdBs from a youth wing background marginally outperformed their peers in that election cycle. 
The big leaps in 1998 and 2013 are masked by the leaps forward for the SPD as a whole so do not 
 
516 A reminder that this relates to the cycle – 1998 to 2002 – not just the election itself, and therefore includes 
MdBs who took up their role as replacements for MdBs who stepped down between elections. It is the 
number of individuals who have served as SPD MdBs during the cycle, not the number of seats won during the 

























appear as dramatic but the overall increase in the prominence of the youth wings as a background is 
much starker, now accounting for more than half – 52.90% – of the SPD’s total. 
The implication of this is that individuals from a youth wing background establish themselves in safe 
constituency seats or safe list positions, allowing them to survive as MdBs in election cycles when 
more marginal SPD seats are lost. There is also a benefit to incumbency, with existing members moving 
up the list places and newcomers entering the list lower down, suggesting those from a youth wing 
are outlasting their peers and thus moving up the lists with time. This provides added impetus to the 
ratchet effect, so once youth wing MdBs have a good election cycle as they did in 1998 and 2013 the 
effects have a lasting impact in the following cycles.  
This could also be linked to the demonstration of skills as discussed previously, once the individuals 
win a seat they have the political skills to be effective, meaning they consolidate their positions and 
are less likely to drop down the lists or face an effort to replace them in their local party.  
The JUSOS vs the other youth wings. 
A second finding is that the JUSOS have crowded out the other affiliated youth wings. This can be seen 
by a comparison of the breakdown of which SPD affiliated517 youth wings the MdBs coded as having a 
youth wing background belonged to in 1980 and 2017 (Fig. 4.5). Note that an individual can have 
served as an officer of more than one youth wing and therefore the percentages will add up to more 
than 100%.  
 
Fig.4.5 1980 2017 
The JUSOS 79.16% 98.78% 
SJD-Die Falken 14.58% 2.45% 
SDS/SHA  6.25% 0% 
SAJ  2.08% 0% 
 
In 1980 slightly more than one in five MdBs from a youth wing background had not come from the 
JUSOS, mostly those who had come from the SJD-Die Falken. Only one individual in 2017 had not 
served in the JUSOS (one more had served in both the SJD-Die Falken and the JUSOS). The SAJ in 1980 
is one individual: Egon Franke, who had been SAJ Chair in Hannover until 1933. The length of time 
since the SAJ was dissolved by the Nazi’s and since the SDS and SHA were proscribed by the SPD 
explains why they disappear from the data by 1987 and 1990 respectively. SJD-Die Falken have 
however slowly decreased, with the exception of a brief revival in the 2005 election cycle from seven 
throughout the 1980s to two in 2017. This would suggest either that gatekeepers are now more 
focused on the JUSOS or that figures from JUSOS are now successfully ‘outcompeting’ comrades from 
SJD-Die Falken in selection terms.  
 
517 The data also includes Christoph Strässer, who was active in the JungdemokratInnen (Young Democrats), a 
youth wing which at the time was linked with the Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party, FDP) 
although they have since moved leftwards and became more closely linked to Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Alliance 
90/The Greens). He is included as an MdB with a background in a youth wing in figs 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 but not 




Controlling for the effect of German reunification.  
A further question is what lies behind the steady decline prior to 1994. After a short drop between 
1980 and 1983 the numbers from the JUSOS actually remain stable, with most of the decline coming 
from a combination of the retirement of those individuals from the historical youth wings and those 
from SJD-Die Falken. There is a linked question as to why those or other seats were not picked up by 
the JUSOS and why the ‘ratchet effect’ isn’t apparent before 1994. 
One possibility is the effect of German Reunification. Those Members of the East German 
Volkskammer who ascended to the Bundestag upon reunification in October 1990 but before the 
election of 2nd December 1990 are classed in the 1987 election cycle figures. These plus the first 
reunified election in 1990 would be expected to show a drop in the percentage of MdBs from a youth 
wing background as those MdB who came from the GDR had no opportunity to be part of any SPD 
affiliated youth wing.518 This could be masking what was happening in terms of selection of youth wing 
candidates, especially as the percentages of MdBs from the electoral cycles of 1980, 1983 and 1998, 
just before and just after the three elections most affected by reunification, are not dissimilar.  
By removing the data-points for all of those SPD MdBs who come from the GDR519 and rerunning the 
analysis we can remove this potential bias.  Fig. 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 opposite show the same data as above 
with those from a GDR background removed.  When plotted onto a line graph these figures are not 
dissimilar to those when the GDR is included with the same trends visible.  
When looking at specific numbers of individuals the number of those with a youth wing background 
is a gently sloping decline through the 1980s with a more significant drop in the numbers in the two 
election cycles of the early 1990s. There then follows the two dramatic increases in 1998 and 2013 
coupled with the ratchet effect discussed above.  
When the percentage figures are plotted on a line graph the picture is subtly different. The percentage 
of SPD MdBs through the 1980s is extremely stable before dropping more sharply for the 1990 and 
1994 electoral cycle. Reunification and the importing of MdBs from the Volkskammer before the 1990 
election does therefore seem to explain the decline shown for the 1987 election cycle. When those 
individuals are removed from the equation the number of SPD MdBs from a youth wing background 
as a percentage is very similar to 1980 and 1983.  
What is also clear however is that his does not explain the drops in the election cycles of 1990 and 
1994. The decline is still there, albeit as you would expect less marked. This is discussed further below. 
Moving closer to the present a further point of interest made clear in fig. 4.8 is that even by 2017, 27 
years after reunification, the percentage of MdBs in this ‘continuity West Germany’ are still higher by 
a few percentage points than when including the new Land. This indicates that JUSOS are less effective 
at getting their members or former members selected in the new Land than they are in the former 
West Germany. This may simply be a hangover and this discrepancy may diminish and disappear with 
time.  
 
518 To avoid clouding the results the Freie Deutsche Jugend (Free German Youth, FDJ) – the youth wing of the 
East German Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of Germany, SED) is omitted from 
this study. Membership of the FDJ was near-compulsory for young people in East Germany and over 75% of the 
country’s population aged between 14 and 25 were members, meaning most of those SPD MdBs who grew up 
in the GDR will have been members. Due to the authoritarian nature of the political system in the GDR however 
there is unlikely to have been any discernible benefit derived from membership that would lead to a political 
career in the democratic system of the Federal Republic of Germany.  




Overall, then when controlling for the impact of reunification on the number of SPD Members of the 
Bundestag coming from a youth wing we can say that it has not had a significant impact in either 
direction. The same patterns of youth wing selection are present when the new Land are included and 
when they are excluded.  This does however leave an open question. If reunification was not the cause 









Explaining the drop in the 1990s.  
It is worth looking into the data in more depth to look for an explanation for the drop in those coming 
from a youth wing background in both purely numerical and percentage terms between 1980 and 
1994. The in-depth numbers show that in fact the number of individuals specifically from the JUSOS is 
actually comparatively stable, going from 38 in the 1980 cycle to 34 in the 1983 cycle, 34 again in the 
1987 cycle, 35 in the 1990 cycle and 33 in the 1994 cycle (Fig. 4.9). This is despite the factional 
infighting that dominated the selection process in the SPD in the 1980s with the JUSOS at the 
forefront.520 The explanation for the drop in youth wings overall then is mostly coming from a decline 
in the numbers from the other youth wings.  
 
The disappearance of MdBs who have a background from one of the historical youth wings – the SAJ, 
SDS and SHA – is simply through the process of time. These drop through the 1980s and help to explain 
the marginal decline in numbers of those coming from the youth wings over those three election 
cycles, although it is notable they have not been replaced by those from a JUSOS background. They 
also did not account for a particularly large number. The big drop in the number of MdBs from a youth 
wing in the election cycles of 1990 and 1994 is predominantly linked to a substantial drop in those 
coming from the SJD-Die Falken.  
This can be seen in Fig 4.10. The number of MdBs remains steady at 7 through the 1980s but then 
drops dramatically to 4 in 1990 and just 2 in 1994. Indeed, one of those who had held office in SJD-Die 
Falken in 1994, Uwe Hiksch, had also held an elected role in JUSOS which was more likely to be the 
reason behind his selection.    
There are several possible reasons for this. Firstly the factional infighting in the SPD during the 1980s 
could have led to the SJD-Die Falken – which is not formally affiliated to the SPD – looking to distance 
itself from the party, leading to less influence and therefore less individuals moving through the 
system in the 1980s to be in a position to go for selection during the early 1990s. Additionally the 
factional fighting could lead to gatekeepers focusing on their own faction, especially as JUSOS and the 
 
520 Braunthal G. 1994. The German Social Democrats since 1969: A Party in Power and Opposition. Colorado; 




trade unions were identified as the key organisations within those factions,521 meaning they were not 
looking for potential candidates in the SJD-Die Falken. These two possibilities are also not mutually 
exclusive and a combination of the two could be in place. 
 
Therefore, the drop during the 1980s seems to be only slightly down to a drop in the numbers coming 
from the JUSOS, with the drop between 1980 and 1983 probably reflecting the overall election losses 
of the SPD and the number then remaining pretty stable. Rather the retirement of those from an 
historical youth wing and a large drop in those SPD MdBs coming from a background in SJD-Die Falken 
explains this drop. During the 1980s and early 1990s individuals from the JUSOS did not seem to take 
those seats being vacated or rather if they did they lost seats elsewhere leading to little overall change. 
This crowding out however seems to have set the stage for dramatic increases in the numbers coming 
from the youth wings, and in particular from the JUSOS, from the 1998 election cycle onwards.  
Discussion.  
The quantitative data demonstrates that there has been a clear and demonstrable rise in the number 
of individuals with a background in an affiliated youth wing serving as SPD Members of the Bundestag 
between 1980 and 2019. This rise is even more acute in percentage terms owing to the ‘ratchet effect’ 
meaning the prominence of the youth wings as a source of recruitment is even greater than the 
increase of the number of individuals might suggest.  
Further the rise has been accounted for by the JUSOS, who have also crowded out the SJD-Die Falken 
as a source of recruitment for the SPD. As is to be expected the historical youth wings, via the process 
of time, have also disappeared from the equation. This crowding out process seems to have occurred 
during the 1980s leading to drops in the number of MdBs from SJD-Die Falken from 1990 onwards. 
From 1998 however the number of MdBs coming from a background in a youth wing, which is now 
almost synonymous with the JUSOS, has increased dramatically. This means that the youth wings, and 
specifically the JUSOS, now accounts for the political apprenticeship of more than half of the SPD 
Members of the Bundestag.  
It can therefore be said with confidence that the first claim of hypothesis 1 – that the Youth 






since the 1980s – is in the case of the SPD proven to be correct. This study must therefore move on to 
examine the second claim of hypothesis 1, that this increase has filled a vacuum created by a decline 
in the influence, and therefore the ability to get favoured candidates selected, of the German trade 
union movement.  
4.7: The trade unions and SPD legislative recruitment.  
Unlike many of their social democratic sister parties such as the UK Labour Party and Australian Labor 
Party, and indeed unlike the SPD during the Weimar Republic, there is no formal affiliation between 
the post-war SPD and either the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (German Trade Union Federation, 
DGB) or individual Trade Unions.522 Nevertheless historically both the public’s perception and the self-
perception of the SPD has been that it is a party of and for workers, despite its Volkspartei nature, and 
historically there are major links between the SPD and the Trade Unions with many individuals holding 
posts in both.  Since 1972 this has been organised through the Arbeitsgemeinschaft für 
Arbeitnehmerfragen (Association of Workers, AfA) a working group for trade unionists within the SPD 
similar to the JUSOS but with lower numbers.523 The trade union movement has long been a source of 
recruitment for the SPD when in need of electoral standard bearers and major union figures are often 
big players in the internal organisation of the SPD.524 
One thing which needs to be clarified is that this thesis is looking at the influence of the German trade 
union movement on the selection of SPD candidates for the Bundestag, not other forms of influence 
such as policy implementation. Allern and Bale525 found that the relationship between the German 
trade union movement and the SPD had changed since the early 2000s. Historically the trade unions 
and the SPD had a ‘privileged partnership’ whereby the unions exchanged electoral support for access 
to policymakers. Since the Schröder government that has changed, and the unions now operate a 
system of ‘pluralised partnership’ whereby they look to form issues-based coalitions of support with 
any political partner willing to work with them. This is likely to be both a cause and effect of their 
declining influence within the SPD more broadly.  DE03 explained the historical relationship between 
the SPD and the trade union movement.  
“The SPD and the trade unions have very similar roots in the 19th century. We had 
a party council, in 1921 I think, in Mannheim, and we decided the general rule that 
trade unions work within the workplace and the party works in parliament and we 
try to get the issues that are coming up in the workplace into politics. Trade unions 
in Germany are not bound to the party. They are independent. But if there are 
issues in politics they work with the party. In contrast to many European countries 
the German trade union movement has stayed away from being political. That was 
different before 1933 and that was one of the reasons why the trade unions had 
very little power to resist the Nazis. But because quite a lot of the trade unions are 
close in their political outlook to the SPD quite frequently there were personnel 
within the trade unions who were also members of the SPD. From 1969 onwards a 
lot of trade union bigwigs were not only in the party but also sat in parliament and 
even in cabinet posts. There was an overlap. The head of the miners’ union became 
 
522 Braunthal G. 1994. The German Social Democrats since 1969: A Party in Power and Opposition. Colorado; 
Westview Publishing Inc. Second Edition. 
523 Ibid. p148. 
524 Ibid. p148 – 172. 
525 Allern E. H. and Bale T. 2017. Left-of-Centre Parties and Trade Unions in the Twenty-First Century. Oxford; 




Minister for Employment. The head of the builder’s union became Minister for 
Transport and then Minister for Defence. A lot of people who were big in the trade 
unions became MPs.” 
DE03, MdB from a Trade Union background. 
This is reflected in the assumption of hypothesis 1, that there was a strong link between the trade 
union movement and the SPD which resulted in trade unionists coming into the Bundestag by being 
selected as candidates by the SPD. This assumption is also supported in the literature526 and is a 
necessary precondition for the decline of trade unions to have precipitated the rise of the youth wings. 
The second assumption is that the trade union movement in Germany has declined since the 1970s. 
It is that assumption which the following section tests.  
Trade union decline in Germany.  
Trade union membership in Germany has declined. The decline of trade unions as a force in the 
workplace in Germany is no longer contested and has been manifest for some time. In 1987 
Schnabel527 was still able to discuss trade union strength in terms of cycles of growth and decline. 
Since then however multiple studies such as Frege and Kelly,528 Schnabel and Wagner,529 Visser,530 
Turner531 and Addison et al532 have all found a persistent and marked decline in trade union strength 
in Germany. The literature therefore shows that at the beginning of the timeframe under investigation 
in this study – the early 1980s – the trade union movement was still strong enough to be politically 
influential, but that it has dropped since.   
 
526 See Braunthal G. 1994. The German Social Democrats since 1969: A Party in Power and Opposition. 
Colorado; Westview Publishing Inc. Second Edition; Berger S. 2000. Social Democracy and the working class in 
nineteenth and twentieth century Germany. London, Longman and Miller S. and Potthof H., 1983. A History of 
German Social Democracy: From 1848 to the Present. Translated from the German by J. A. Underwood. New 
York NY; Berg Publishing. 
527 Schnabel C. 1987. Trade union growth and decline in the Federal Republic of Germany. Empirical Economics. 
Vol. 12 No. 2, pp.107-127. 
528 Frege C. M. and Kelly J. 2003. Union revitalisation strategies in comparative perspective. European Journal 
of Industrial Relations. Vol. 9 No. 1, pp 7-24.  
529 Schnabel C. and Wagner J. 2006. The persistent decline in unionisation in Western and Eastern Germany, 
1980 – 2004: What can we learn from a decomposition analysis? Working Paper Series in Economics, No. 31, 
Universität Lüneburg, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Lüneburg. Available at 
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/28149, accessed 15.07.2019 14:48.  
530 Visser J. 2007. Trade union decline and what next: Is Germany a special case? Industrielle Beziehungen : 
Zeitschrift für Arbeit, Organisation und Management, Vol. 14 No. 2, pp 97-117. 
531 Turner L. 2009. Institutions and activism: Crisis and opportunity for a German labour movement in decline. 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review. Vol. 62 No. 3, pp 294-312. 
532 Addison J. T., Bryson A., Teixeira P., and Pahnke A. 2011. Slip sliding away: Further union decline in Germany 




The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development records trade union density as a 
percentage of the workforce533 for its member states, including Germany.534 In 1980 34.9% of German 
workers were members of a trade union. A slow but steady decline set in during the 1980s before the 
influx of unionised East Germans saw a dramatic uptick at reunification, from 31.2% in 1990 to 36% in 
1991. This increase was however short-lived and just two years later by 1993 it had fallen back to 
31.8%. By 2016 (the most recent data) trade union workforce density had dropped to 17%, as shown 
on fig 4.11.  
 
 
As the size of the trade unions decrease so does their membership income and with that the amount 
they can spend promoting political outcomes. The numbers of voters amongst the general public they 
can influence and therefore their reach to promote the SPD, its candidates and policies also declines 
as does the number of individuals who are members in both a union and the SPD, creating downward 
pressure on the ability of the trade unions to support potential candidates for office in the SPD’s 
selection process.  
You would therefore expect to see the level of influence of the trade unions in the selection process 
to decrease, evidenced by a decline in the number and percentage of SPD MdBs who come from a 
background in the trade union movement.  If the contention in hypothesis 1 is correct, the decline in 
trade unionist SPD Members of the Bundestag should be in an approximate inverse relationship with 
the increase in the number of MdBs coming from a youth wing background. 
  
 
533 This is not the same as the total Trade Union membership. The Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour 
Studies at the University of Amsterdam’s Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage 
Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts in 51 countries between 1960 and 2014 (ICTWSS, data available 
from http://uva-aias.net/en/ictwss) estimates that as of 2011 approximately 20% of the 7.4 million trade 
union members in Germany were retired. 
534 All data from OECD figures, available at https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TUD# accessed on 


































Findings from the empirical data.  
The data for prior trade union employment is drawn from the same source as that for those who had 
a role in the youth wings, the formal Bundestag biographies from the online archive of the 
Bundestag535 and the Biographical Handbook of the Members of the German Bundestag 1949-2002536 
again cross-checked with other available sources. As with those who were members of a youth wing 
it does not indicate those who were members of a trade union as mere membership again does not 
provide the necessary political capital to push for selection. It therefore records those who indicated 
in their biographies that they were employed by or in a senior elected voluntary office in one of the 
trade unions or in the DGB itself. 
When looking at the data plotted out the immediately obvious fact is that there has been a large 
decline in the number of trade unionists becoming SPD Members of the Bundestag. There have been 
peaks in the graph during the electoral landslide of 1998 and the gains of the 2013 election but overall 
the trend has been sharply downwards (Fig. 4.12). 
 
More specifically there is a sharp and steady decline between 1980 and 1987, a plateau between 1987 
and 1994 before the increase during the breakthrough election cycle of 1998. During the Schröder era 
between 1998 and 2009 the numbers began to drop rapidly again. There was another upturn when 
the SPD gained seats in 2013 before dropping again in 2017. Superficially this would seem to track 
with SPD performance with peaks in 1998 and 2013, although not with the slight increase in seats the 
SPD achieved in 1987, but other than that a decline in seats. 
However when plotted out as percentages we can that the decrease is not related to overall SPD 
performance.  The data indicates that individuals from the Trade Unions were doing worse than their 
peers at getting selected, with slight upticks in 1994, 2009 and 2013 but an overall decline: indeed 
even the spike in numbers in the 1998 landslide was still a drop in percentage terms (Fig. 4.13).  
 
535 Available at: http://webarchiv.bundestag.de/archive/2007/0206/mdb/bio/index.html (data from 1994 to 
2007), at 
http://webarchiv.bundestag.de/archive/2013/1212/bundestag/abgeordnete17/biografien/index.html (data 
from 2007 to 2013) and https://www.bundestag.de/abgeordnete/biografien (2013 to present). 
536 Vierhaud R. (Ed) 2002. Biographisches Handbuch der Mitglieder des Deutschen Bundestages 1949-2002. 





The declining influence of the trade union movement. 
This data clearly shows that the trade union backed MdBs have declined but doesn’t necessarily 
explain why. This topic was part of the conversations during the interviews that were conducted. 
Senior party employee DE01 commented: 
“The is also a decline of the unions, their importance in the party has decreased. 
They are going down. They’re still important but they have not so much power as 
forty years ago. Because of Neoliberalism they have lost members. You see we have 
43 million employed but they are not 20 million, nor 10 million, union members, 
But just 7 million. So 35 million of people employed are not members of a union, 
only 7 million are.” 
DE01, Senior SPD party employee. 
DE01 explicitly states that the trade unions are less influential than they used to be. They also state 
that the decline in influence of the trade union movement within the SPD was due to the decline in 
their membership figures. 
The trade unionist DE03 also discussed the decline in the number of SPD Members of the Bundestag 
who come from a trade union background. When asked to expand they also referenced the Agenda 
2010 (the Hartz IV reforms) as a specific reason to explain the decrease during Schröder’s time as 
Chancellor: 
“The people who are selecting, recruiting out of the trade unions has gotten less 
over the years, distinctly less. I just read a book about the means of selection and 
there was an interview with Andrea Nahles and it showed the selection process has 
shifted a long way from the unions. In 2002 under the Chancellorship of Gerhard 
Schröder there was a change in social legislation that was called the Agenda 2010 
and in that time there was a huge cut between the trade unions and the party. 
There was a rift. Lots of the trade union people thought that the employment 
policies and the social policies of the Schröder government were wrong and put the 
burden of the social questions very much the wrong side of the workers. A lot of 




members. That is changing now, but it is unlikely that we will get back to the close 
ties that were there before 2002.” 
DE03, MdB from a Trade Union background. 
Although this may have been a contributing factor since 2002 it doesn’t explain the large drop in trade 
unionist MdBs through the 1980s and 1990s. The decrease from 2002 matches the trend going back 
to 1980 so whilst it is likely that the Hartz IV reforms caused a rift and contributed to division between 
the unions and the SPD it cannot explain the overall decline. However, the assertion that the union 
influence is returning to a higher level is seen in the data, at least in percentage terms, for 2009 and 
2013, albeit with a small drop again in 2017. Nevertheless, it is nowhere near the level of the 1980s.  
With regards to hypothesis 1 then there is clear and consistent evidence that the number of SPD 
Members of the Bundestag who had a background of working for the Trade Unions has decreased, 
and that this is in line with and linked to the decline of Trade Union membership, and therefore 
influence within the party. However, this is not to say that the second claim of hypothesis 1 is proven. 
The decline in the number of SPD MdBs coming out of the trade union movement is not sufficient on 
its own to account for the dramatic increase in those coming from a background in the youth wings.  
4.8: Controlling for other factors – local government, party staffers 
and the level of graduates in society.  
This section will look at other potential factors which may have a bearing on the rise of youth wings 
as origin points for SPD MdBs. First it will look at two other potential recruiting grounds – local and 
federal government and party staffers, it will consider a decline in ‘amateur’ politicians as an 
explanatory factor and then it will look at the rise in the number of graduates in society and consider 
what bearing that has.  
Whilst the trade unions have indeed declined as a source of recruitment the youth wings have far 
surpassed the level they would have had by a simple supplanting of the trade unions. This much 
becomes obvious when the two are plotted on the same graph (Fig. 4.14).  
 
A simple comparison of numbers in 1980 and 2017 may appear to support the simple replacement 
theory. In 1980 there were a total number of 101 MdBs from either a Trade Union or Youth Wing role, 
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either background, with 82 from the youth wings and 20 from the Trade Unions. This would seem to 
indicate that the decrease in the number of MdBs from the Trade Unions very closely matches those 
coming from a youth wing. However the picture in between varies wildly, with the combined total in 
1994 much decreased for example. This becomes even more clear when we look at the percentages 
of the two backgrounds on the same graph (Fig. 4.15).  
 
The two backgrounds between them accounted for 42.98% of MdBs in 1980. In 2017 it is 65.8%. This 
suggests that there is more than a simple process of replacement of one training ground with another. 
Rather it begs the question where else is serving as a recruiting ground and is there a decline there?  
Local and federal government.  
When looking at where else an individual may have undergone a political apprenticeship DE04 
suggested one possibility.  
“After the second world war until, maybe, the reunification, it was normally the 
way with JUSOS or with a union to become a member of the parliament. A third 
way was a long time working in the local parliament, and successfully working in 
the local parliament.”   
DE04, former MdB from a JUSOS background. 
This study does not look at local government as the competition between the JUSOS and trade unions 
for selection is likely to play out with similar dynamics for selection at the local level as for the national 
level.537 Further Borchert and Stolz538 conducted a detailed study of the German state parliaments as 
a career option which included a specific question looking at their potential role as stepping stones 
for career advancement. Their findings were that despite a relatively easy potential route for 
individuals to move from Land parliaments to the Bundestag the high level of professionalisation in 
the state parliaments, coupled with the regionalisation of the parties, near equivalence in income and 
the social costs of service at the federal level had led to many of those who achieve long service or 
 
537 See chapter three. 
538 Borchert J. and Stolz K. 2011. German political careers: The state level as an arena in its own right. Regional 
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high office in the state parliaments to want to remain at that level.539 Borchert and Stolz find that only 
18% of Bundestag members are former state legislators.540  
It would perhaps be expected to see more movement from local councils than regional ones, Borchert 
and Stolz found 70% of state legislators had prior local council experience either in political office or 
with a staff appointment at the local level.541 This tallies with the findings from the data for this study. 
This study recorded the length of time an individual had spent in sub-national legislatures before 
entering the Bundestag.542 Although it did not differentiate between State parliaments and local 
councils the findings from Borchert and Stolz would imply the majority of experience at the sub-
national level is at local rather than state level.  
 
As can be seen here there is a steady increase, from 56.6% in 1980 to 72.26% in 2017. However with 
this many individuals serving in local government even in 1980 it would appear to be a common 
denominator, that is that both individuals with a JUSOS background and those who undertook their 
political apprenticeship in the trade union movement will be likely to have served at the local level 
prior to seeking selection, as well as it being a potential career option in its own right. More research 
is required before we can definitively state the role of local government service but it does seem to 
be that more politicians are gaining experience at the local level before moving to the state or federal 
parliaments.  
A further test of this is the average length of time that an MdB spent at a sub-national level – either 
in one of the Landtag of the federal states or at local council level – before entering the Bundestag. 
This has also increased: 
 
539 Ibid. p219.  
540 Ibid. p217.  
541 Ibid. p211.  




























Again this has increased markedly. In 1980 the average SPD Member of the Bundestag had served for 
4.58 years in a sub-national level legislature. By 2017 this had increased to 7.32 years. This means that 
more MdBs have served at the sub-national level and for longer. The increases are likely to involve a 
lot of cross-over between both youth wing and trade union backgrounds and serving in local 
government, as well as it being its own possible career path, especially given that the youth wings 
have increased at the same time.  
Party staffers.  
DE01 and DE03 also identified another possible alternative route, employees of the party or 
politician’s staffers.543 This is certainly a recognised source of potential employment. However, the 
question is where do the party and its politicians recruit staffers from? Politicians aim to recruit young 
people for their office who are politically minded and who hold similar political viewpoints to them, 
in part specifically with mentorship towards a political career in mind. You would therefore expect 
them to select from politically active individuals and given the age at which a staffer is usually recruited 
this is likely to mean an individual who has been active in the JUSOS.  
The data collected for this study bears out this assumption. Of the 155 SPD Members of the Bundestag 
who have served since the general election of 2017 a total of 27 have previously held a role as a staffer 
employed either by the party or one of its elected office holders. Of those 27 MdBs 23 had also 
previously served in an elected role in the JUSOS. In total there were 81 individuals who had held an 
elected role in the JUSOS (plus one who had in the SJD-Die Falken), which would suggest that service 
in the JUSOS is more effective at being turned into political capital for selection than employment as 
a staffer. Whilst again more research is needed to investigate this further the data as above would 
imply that employment as a party staffer is valuable but secondary to service in the JUSOS – although 
employment as a party staffer is likely to facilitate service in the JUSOS. 
There is however a key factor which links both local government service and employment as a 
legislator’s staffer – these are mid-level phenomenon. Political parties recruit from within the ranks 
of their own activists both for candidates for local office and for employment with a Bundestag or 
Landtag Parliamentarian. These factors then are a part of the political ecosystem identified in chapter 
two which allows an individual to expand their political capital. But they are not routes into the party 
initially in the way that the JUSOS and the unions are. Although they will form part of the learning 
 



























process for the individuals who undertake them, they are a secondary stage not the initial primary 
apprenticeship undertaken. 
These then are inadequate explanations for alternative recruiting grounds, the decline of which might 
have provided the space for the youth wings to move into. There is however a possible explanation 
provided by the discussion on professionalisation literature in chapter two.   
A decline in ‘amateur’ politicians?  
As discussed in chapter two the consensus of the academic literature is that gentrification - the 
number of career politicians - has increased. There is also a consensus that professionalisation has 
occurred, that is that parties have gotten more sophisticated in campaigning. These two concepts 
suggest that one answer to the rise in the combined total of MdBs is that some form of political 
apprenticeship is now more of a requirement than it was in the past.  
As the process of campaigning has gotten more sophisticated and politics has professionalised there 
is a greater skill level required to achieve political outcomes. These skills have to be learned. DE02 
commented that individuals need to learn the ‘craft’ of politics, which requires a political 
apprenticeship:  
“There is a misconception that, you know, that when you’re clever you can also 
manage to do something in politics, and that is a misconception because you have 
to know the craft of politics, you know? To know the ways how you get things done, 
that’s why many people fail when they don’t learn how to do that” 
DE02, MdB from a JUSOS background. 
DE02 is specifically stating that as a political apprenticeship is required an amateur cannot come into 
elected office and expect to be successful without one. This is particularly relevant in that DE02 was 
not only a Member of the Bundestag but also a party chair in a large geographical sub-unit of the 
party, meaning they have a significant role as identified by other interviewees in the selection of 
potential candidates. Their thinking on this plays a major role in the selection process, it is not a merely 
academic observation from them.  
The literature’s consensus that career politicians have increase further shows that this was not the 
case in 1980. It therefore follows that the JUSOS are not only filling a vacuum created by a decline in 
the trade union movement, they are also expanding into a space previously occupied by those without 
a prior political career of some kind. More research is required to investigate this further but the 
evidence of this thesis points to not just the decline of the trade unionist MdB, but the decline of the 
amateur politician at the federal level. In both cases what is supplanting them are those who emerge 
from the JUSOS.  
Changes in the number of  graduates in German society.  
There is a question as to whether the increase in the number of SPD MdBs from a youth wing 
background could be linked to an increase in the number of graduates with a tertiary education. In 
other words, it is possible that more SPD MdBs are coming up from the youth wings simply because 
more Germans are getting involved in the youth wings as more remain in education for longer than 




This is of more interest in the UK (see chapter five) than in Germany. According to OECD data544 the 
level of university graduates in the German population is lower than other equivalent countries 
although it has risen, from 25% in 2005 to 28% in 2016.545 This is largely down to the high levels of 
vocational training in Germany, as of 2014 55% of the German population had some form of vocational 
training, although the percentage was 48% amongst 25 to 34 year olds, suggesting it is decreasing 
slowly.546 Completion of vocational secondary school allows individuals to work at entry-level in 
vocations such as nursing,547 reducing the number of German high-school graduates who go on to 
University.  
This, along with the fact that the youth and student wings are combined in the case of the JUSOS, and 
the fact that the rise in graduates as a percentage of the population has been relatively minor 
compared to the rise in the number of MdBs from a youth wing background, suggests that there is 
little to no connection these two facts.  
4.9: Conclusion.  
This chapter began with an introduction to the historical and structural context of the 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands during the time frame under discussion before moving on to 
discuss the assertions made in Hypothesis 1, that the youth wings have increased in prominence as a 
source of recruitment and that this has been at the expense of the trade union movement.  
The data gathered for this study clearly indicates that the youth wings have increased dramatically as 
a source of legislative recruitment for the SPD – more than half of the SPD Members of the Bundestag 
elected in 2017 had begun their political career in an elected role in the JUSOS. Further the data 
demonstrates that this is down to the formal youth and student wing the JUSOS, who have crowded 
out the other contemporary linked youth organisation the SJD-Die Falken, who had previously 
accounted for almost 15% of SPD MdBs backgrounds.   
This increase has proceeded via a ‘ratchet effect’ whereby those from a JUSOS background increase 
with the SPD’s total during good elections but then hold their ground significantly better than their 
peers so that the numbers do not significantly fall back during bad election cycles. There was a 
decrease in the late 1980s and early 1990s but an analysis of the data for a ‘continuity West Germany’ 
shows that this was not just connected to reunification, but rather to the disappearance of the 
historical youth wings through the process of time and of those MdBs from the SJD-Die Falken. The 
factional conflict identified in the discussion of the SPD’s history is proposed as the most likely 
explanation for this.  
With regards to the second assertion though the picture is more nuanced than a simple replacement 
of the trade union movement with the youth wings. Firstly, the trade unions have declined in strength 
and therefore in influence and this is reflected in the decrease in the number of trade unionists who 
have been elected to the Bundestag for the SPD. This will have opened up the space for some members 
of the JUSOS to replace them as and when trade unionists retired.  
 
544 OECD. 2016. Education at a Glance 2016: OECD indicators. Paris, OECD Publishing. Available at: 
https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/education/education-at-a-glance-2016_eag-2016-en. Accessed 26.08.2020 
17:07.  
545 Ibid.  
546 OECD. 2014. Education at a Glance 2014: OECD indicators. Paris, OECD Publishing. Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/education/Germany-EAG2014-Country-Note.pdf. Accessed 26.08.2020 17:12.  
547 Trines S. 2016. Education in Germany. World Education News and Reviews. Published on 08.11.2016. 




This however is an insufficient explanation for the rise of the youth wings as a source of recruitment. 
The existing literature on professionalisation, in both the professionalisation and gentrification senses 
used in this study, would suggest that there is an increasing need for a political apprenticeship before 
an individual can seek federal office. This then is a potential link mechanism between the concepts of 
professionalisation and gentrification identified in chapters one and two. The increasing sophistication 
of politics as an arena has led to a need for more trained, specialised political actors, making a purely 
political career possible due to the functional need for a larger pool of trained political specialists. 
These roles are stocked by existing political activists being paid to undertake work previously carried 
out on a voluntary basis. These individuals can then be called upon to provide electoral flagbearers.  
This is borne out by both the comments of the interviewees and the data for previous service in local 
or regional government or as a member of staff for an existing legislator. These factors have risen but 
form a middle layer as part of a wider political ecosystem which also includes NGOs, think-tanks, 
lobbyists and commentators. This allows for the possibility of a political career and therefore for 
career politicians. Both local government and MdB’s staffers are recruited from existing activists 
however and are not therefore the origin points of an individual’s politicisation or their primary 
apprenticeship in politics.  
The answer to research question 1 then is that whilst youth wings have increased greatly in 
prominence as a source of legislative recruitment for the SPD then this has been at the expense of 
both the trade union movement and what might be termed ‘amateur politicians’ – those who have 





Chapter 5: The role of youth wings in the British Labour Party. 
 
5.1: Introduction.  
The second empirical case study is that of Members of Parliament in the UK House of Commons (MPs) 
belonging to the Labour Party.548 Founded in 1900 the Labour Party has like the SPD formed the 
national government on multiple occasions in the 20th and 21st Century. This chapter will proceed with 
a short history of the Labour Party, focusing on the period since the UK General Election of 1979, to 
provide contextual grounding and underpin the discussion which proceeds in particular on how the 
national fortunes of the party impacted on selection. Additionally, the chapter will discuss the 
structure of the Labour Party, including the place of the youth movement and the formal links to the 
trade union movement, to demonstrate the formal context. The chapter will then set out the youth 
wings which form the principle focus of this study. These are the formal Labour Party youth wing, 
currently known as Young Labour, the student wing, Labour Students and their forbears, and the 
formally affiliated youth organisation the Young Fabians.  
This chapter, like chapter four, focuses on research question and hypothesis 1, investigating the role 
of the youth wings when it comes to the selection of candidates for the House of Commons. The 
chapter will discuss the findings from the Labour case study with regards to hypothesis 1, which 
mirrors the trend seen in Germany identified in chapter four. Like the SPD the Labour Party has also 
seen a rise in the number of MPs coming from a youth wing background and a decrease in those 
coming from a trade union background. Whilst the trends are the same, the numbers are different, 
reflecting both the Labour Party’s historically closer links to the trade union movement and the slower 
rate of Parliamentarian turnover in the UK. Also discussed will be the dramatic rise in the number of 
Parliamentarians who had previously worked as either a Party employee or as a staffer for an existing 
Labour MP and the links between that and the rise of the youth wing.  
Next this chapter investigates the selection process, both the formal vote amongst the members and 
the earlier process of shortlisting during which the party institutions, in particular the regional parties, 
act as gatekeepers. There are also ‘special selections’ when the party institutions alone make the 
decision on a candidate, usually for by-elections or vacancies at short notice. These scenarios and the 
roles of the gatekeepers within them will be unpacked.  
A final section of the chapter will consist of the concluding analysis and discussion of the role the youth 
wings play and have played in the selection of candidates to become Labour MPs in the House of 
Commons and how this relates to the broader theoretical discussions.  
  
 
548 The Labour Party is usually referred to as the British Labour Party or the Labour Party of Great Britain rather 
than the United Kingdom Labour Party. There is some debate within the party as to whether ‘United Kingdom’ 
or ‘British’ is more accurate, as the party does not stand candidates for office in Northern Ireland. However, 
individuals in the principality can join the party, stand for party office and some Northern Irish individuals, such 
as Kate Hoey and Conor McGinn, have been elected as Labour Parliamentarians in seats on the British mainland. 
In common parlance the two terms are synonymous, interviewees used them interchangeably, and therefore in 




5.2: Labour Party history.  
The Labour Party was founded in February 1900 by a group of 129 delegates from trade unions and 
socialist societies such as the Fabian Society.549 The party grew through the ensuing decades and 
formed a minority government twice in the 1920s.550 In 1945 the party formed its first majority 
government following a landslide victory under Clement Attlee, introducing a series of reforms 
including the National Health Service.551 Through the 1950s and early 1960s the party was 
characterised by internal conflict between the left and the centre-left.552 Labour returned to 
government in two periods under first Harold Wilson (1964-70 and 1974-76)553 and then James 
Callaghan (1976-79).554  
At the point this study begins in 1979 the Labour Party was again riven with infighting between its left 
wing – then organised in the ‘Militant Tendency’ – and the centre-left.555 This conflict defined the next 
ten years within the party and led to a split in 1981.556 The leader who followed Callaghan in 1979 was 
left wing intellectual Michael Foot, who led the party to a disastrous showing in the 1983 election557 
leading to Neil Kinnock’s election as leader.558 Much of this conflict played out through selection 
battles,559 and also with the party’s relationship to the youth wings,560 as Militant grew out of the 
youth wing.561 
The conflict between the left and the centre of the party continued throughout the 1980s562 with the 
party in opposition but gaining seats in the 1987 election. Labour unexpectedly lost the 1992 
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election563 leading to Kinnock’s replacement as leader, initially by John Smith before his sudden death 
from a heart attack in 1994564 lead to the election of Tony Blair.565 
Blair was one of the key architects of the ‘third way’566 alongside Bill Clinton of the US Democrats and 
Gerhard Schröder of the SPD and campaigned with the brand ‘New Labour’. The third way sought to 
balance the dominant neoliberal economic paradigm with a liberal agenda of social justice and 
transfers of wealth from the richest to poorest of society and was seen as moving the Labour Party 
towards the centre-ground.567 This led to three consecutive election victories in 1997, 2001 and 2005, 
the first two by landslides.568 Blair resigned in 2007 and was replaced as leader and Prime Minister by 
Gordon Brown.569 There was also conflict in this era between supporters of Blair and supporters of 
Brown, the so-called ‘Tee-Bee-Gee-Bees’, and this also played out in some selection contests.570  
The New Labour government introduced many reforms such as the National Minimum Wage, however 
it also sent British armed forces into Iraq alongside American troops which proved highly divisive 
within the Labour Party and the general public, provoking an ideological split which, whilst more 
mixed, resulted in big divisions in a similar way to the Hartz IV reforms in the SPD discussed in the 
previous chapter.571  
The 2010 UK general election resulted in a hung parliament, only the second such outcome since the 
Second World War, leading to a coalition between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats.572 
Within the Labour Party the result led to the resignation of Gordon Brown and the election of Ed 
Miliband as leader.573  
Miliband sought to distance the party from the Blair and Brown era but his performance as leader was 
characterised by uncertainty and vacillation.574 In 2013 following a scandal in which the Unite trade 
union attempted to unfairly ensure their preferred choice became the Labour candidate for a by-
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election in the Falkirk constituency575 Miliband launched a review into the party’s structure.576 This 
resulted in a change from the electoral college previously used to elect a leader and brought in a new 
system whereby members of the public could pay £3 for a vote in the party’s leadership elections.577 
This new system was instrumental in the election of the hard-left backbencher Jeremy Corbyn as 
leader578 following Labour’s election loss and Miliband’s resignation in the summer of 2015.579  
The time under Jeremy Corby has seen the Labour Party once again beset by infighting580 and multiple 
scandals around antisemitism within its ranks,581 which has also seen a split with some MPs leaving in 
a similar but smaller way to 1981.582 Again this conflict has played out in the form of selection battles, 
and most of the interviewees referenced this.583 It has also seen the party seeing further conflict over 
its response to the Brexit vote.584 At the end of this period the Labour Party in December 2019 suffered 
its worst election result since 1935.585  
5.3: The structure of the Labour Party.  
The Labour Party has a geographical structure which loosely mirrors electoral units, and this is 
extremely important for the selection process as it defines who acts as gatekeepers. The primary units 
of the party are the Constituency Labour Parties (CLPs), those units of the party based on the 
geographical boundaries of Parliamentary constituencies, and the party has input at all levels from 
affiliated trade unions and socialist societies. The structure is set out below in fig.6.1.586  
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The lowest level is a local Branch Party. These are often, but not always, modelled on local Council 
Wards, though in some cases wards are combined into larger Branches. In rare occasions branches 
may be larger and cross over two or more parliamentary constituencies. Branches are usually the level 
of the party who select candidates to stand in local elections for the ward/s covered by the branch. 
Branch parties can send motions and representatives to the CLP which is the primary internal 
organising unit of the Party.  
As the name implies Constituency Labour Parties (CLPs) are predominantly based on the same 
boundaries as parliamentary constituencies, although again there is some variation in certain 
instances. The CLPs key officers are usually elected to form an executive committee, which must be 
gender balanced, but since 2018 CLPs may be organised purely on a model of all member meetings. 
The committee may also have representatives from the branches (with or without voting rights) and 
from formally affiliated groups. These groups may be trade unions who are active in the area or the 
affiliated socialist societies such as the Fabian Society or Socialist Health Association. CLPs can be 
organised in one of two ways. Some operate a structure of all-member meetings (AMM) where any 
Labour Party member can attend and vote. Others have some all-member meetings and at other times 




a general committee members can attend without voting rights. Service as a branch or CLP officer is 
often an indication of a senior activist, and these individuals are often influential supporters for a 
potential candidate.  
CLPs also send delegates and motions to both regional and national Labour Conferences and Women’s 
Conferences and organise hustings and selection meetings to select candidates to stand as 
Parliamentarians, MEPs and where applicable regional assembly candidates. CLPs also send delegates 
to Labour Campaign Forums (LCFs) which cover a local authority or council and coordinate campaign 
activities for that local authority. Regionally Scotland and Wales have their own executives and 
England is divided into regional boards. These have a role in policy development and also organise 
regional Labour Party conferences.  
The national Labour Party conference is held annually, all CLPs and affiliated unions are entitled to 
send delegates. CLPs and trade unions may submit motions to the conference which are debated and 
used to set the policy framework.   
When conference is not in session the governing body of the party is the National Executive 
Committee which oversees the work of the party and the policy development process. The 
composition has changed over time as has the role of the NEC; it currently has 38 members. The 
Labour Party Leader and Deputy-Leader, together with the party Treasurer are ex officio members.587 
The Leader appoints 3 representatives from the front bench and the backbench Parliamentary Labour 
Party (PLP) also elects 3 representatives to the NEC. The trade unions have 13 delegates and 9 
delegates are elected by ordinary members in the CLPs section. Scottish Labour and Welsh Labour 
send one delegate each. The socialist societies and BAME Labour (Black, Asian and Minority 
Ethnicities) elect 2 representatives between them, as do local Labour councillors, and there is a youth 
delegate.588 In addition, the General Secretary of the Labour Party, the Chief Whip and the Chair of 
the PLP attend with no voting rights, the General Secretary acting as the NEC Secretary. There are 
occasions when the NEC has particular power over selection matters, as will be discussed below, so 
its composition is important for this study, in particular the large trade union section. 
Labour’s leadership election process has also changed over time. Currently a One Member One Vote 
(OMOV) election is held with party members, trade union and affiliated society members and 
‘registered supporters’ – non-members who have purchased a vote for a small sum – having one vote 
each. Previously the party leader was elected via an electoral college with varying percentages 
between members, trade unions and MPs.589 Before 1983 the leader was elected by a ballot of the 
MPs only. This suggests the party establishment, including the unions, has been ceding democratic 
control towards the membership, which may also be relevant to selection. Further it links to the 
factional conflict and history, with the unions and party establishment being traditionally perceived to 
 
587 The leader of European Parliamentary Labour Party (EPLP) was an ex-officio member until the UKs exit from 
the European Union on 31st January 2020. Similarly, Labour MEPs could also stand and vote for the 
Parliamentary section up until Brexit.  
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the ability to appoint the delegate. In a factional move in 2016 this was changed to give 50% of the votes in the 
youth section to the trade unions, who have no obligation to consult their members – young or otherwise. The 
incumbent since that date, Lara McNeill, has essentially been selected for the position by the big trade unions, 
especially Unite who were close to the Corbyn leadership. This has been seen as severely undermining the 
credibility of the youth delegate.  
589 From 1983 to 1993 the electoral college was 40% of the vote held by Trade Union and Affiliated Socialist 
Societies, 30% held by members and 30% by Parliamentarians. From 1993 until the Miliband years the 




be more pragmatic and the membership more to the left.590 This has changed in recent years as some 
unions – notably Unite, the CWU, TSSA and FBU – being perceived to be also on the left.  
It may not be that the trade unions have ceded as much control over party process as this would 
indicate however. In 2018 alterations to the leadership process were passed following which a 
candidate needs nominations from either 5% of CLPs or 3 affiliates including 2 trade unions totalling 
over 5% of the affiliate membership to be on the ballot. There are five trade unions with over 5% of 
the affiliate membership – Unite, Unison, GMB,591 USDAW592 and the CWU.593 This gives them 
influence over the leadership and potentially therefore in future more influence over selections. This 
is a very different context to that of the SPD, with the union influence in the Labour Party being 
formally constituted.  
5.4: The youth wings of the Labour Party; Young Labour, Labour 
Students, their previous iterations and the Young Fabians. 
This case study investigates the impact on Labour’s parliamentarian recruitment of three youth 
organisations, two of which have gone through several incarnations; the party’s formal youth wing, 
currently Young Labour and the party’s student organisation, currently known as Labour Students. The 
final organisation investigated is the Young Fabians, the youth wing of the Fabian Society, one of the 
Labour Party’s formally affiliated socialist societies.  
The Labour Party has had a youth wing since 1926, with a hiatus during the late 1950s. The original 
youth section was the Labour League of Youth (LLY) which was open to Labour Party members from 
the age of 16 to 25.594 After World War Two the party leadership exerted more control over the LLY 
due to perceived infiltration by hard-left elements, before the party dissolved the organisation 
completely in 1954595 with the exception of Scotland, where the openly Trotskyist Socialist Labour 
League (SLL) continued until being proscribed596 by the Labour Party in 1965.  The Labour League of 
Youth was not immediately replaced, although some constituencies continued to operate informal 
youth sections. In 1960 the youth wing was refounded as the Young Socialists, renamed the Labour 
Party Young Socialists (LPYS) in 1965. The LPYS was deemed to be strongly on the left of the party 
during factional conflicts. It was a Trotskyist group within the Young Socialists, the Revolutionary 
Socialist League, renamed Militant Tendency (aka Militant)597 in 1964 which attempted an organised 
infiltration of the Labour Party in the 1970s and 80s. Because of this in 1987 the party closed down 
LPYS’s national structures and dramatically reduced its upper age limit to remove the then leadership 
from eligibility. The LPYS continued in a much-diminished form until being reorganised in 1993 into 
the current iteration of the youth wing, Young Labour.  
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Currently all Labour Party members aged from 14 to 26 are automatically members of Young Labour 
and the organisation also has regional groupings such as London Young Labour and Scottish Young 
Labour. These regional groups have elected committees and regional conferences, and there is a 
national committee and a national conference. There is also a youth delegate to the main Labour Party 
NEC, which since 2016 has been controlled by Young Labour (including trade union delegates to Young 
Labour). Previously the electoral system meant the NEC Youth Rep was decided more by the student 
wing than the youth wing.598  
For the purposes of this study MPs are listed as being from a Young Labour background if they held an 
elected role on either the national committee or one of the regional committees of Young Labour or 
its predecessors the Labour Party Young Socialists or the Labour League of Youth. These youth wings 
are treated as a continuous organisation by those in the party and by the respondents from whom the 
data was drawn. As such the dataset does not distinguish between the historical and current iterations 
of Young Labour.  
The second organisation of interest to this study is the student wing, currently Labour Students. All 
Labour members who are enrolled on a course of tertiary education are eligible to be members of a 
Labour Club at their institution if there is one, or to the national Labour Students if it does not. The 
student wing in Labour has always been a federal structure, with individual student Labour clubs at 
different universities which then affiliate to a national organisation. The first national body was 
founded in 1946 as the National Association of Labour Student Organisations (NALSO). In 1967 the 
party withdrew its recognition of NALSO after its takeover by far-left groups, although it continued to 
function in Scotland. Some university Labour clubs formed Students for a Labour Victory in 1970, 
which evolved a year later into the National Organisation of Labour Students (NOLS). Although 
renamed Labour Students in 1992 the organisation is still frequently referred to as NOLS. Labour 
Students is run by an elected executive committee, three of whom including the Chair are sabbatical 
officers paid as employees and based at the Labour Party HQ. Currently Labour Students is seen as 
being run by the centre-left ‘Moderate’ factions,599 and factional fighting has led to some university 
Labour clubs leaving the federal structure, including those of Oxford and Cambridge universities.600  
For the purposes of this study MPs are categorised as being from a Labour Students background if 
they held an elected role in the national Labour Students structures or at the National Union of 
Students as the endorsed candidate of Labour Students, or were an elected sabbatical officer of their 
student union as the endorsed candidate of Labour Students, or held any of the above roles with one 
of Labour Student’s predecessors, the National Organisation of Labour Students or National 
Association of Labour Student Organisations. As with Young Labour the respondents for this study 
treat these as a continuous organisation and as such they are not differentiated in the dataset. 
The final organisation of interest is the Young Fabians (YF), the youth wing of the Fabian Society 
founded in 1960. The Fabian Society is a formally affiliated socialist society and one of Labour’s 
founding organisations. The Young Fabians are therefore affiliated to the Labour Party structures via 
the Fabian Society. Any member of the Fabian Society who is 31 or under is automatically a member 
of the Young Fabians. The Young Fabians operate as a youth orientated think-tank within the Labour 
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movement and although affiliated is separate from the Labour Party. Nevertheless, the relationship is 
much closer than that of the SJD-die Falken to the SPD, for example the Young Fabians have a formal 
right to appoint a representative on the Young Labour National Committee.  
The Young Fabians do not operate a federal structure and are governed by an executive committee 
elected annually. Therefore, for the purposes of this study an MP will be recorded as having a 
background in the Young Fabians if they have served as an elected officer on the Young Fabians 
National Executive Committee.  
5.5: Selection in the Labour Party; the process, gatekeepers and 
power dynamics.  
The selection journey outlined in chapter two applies to the process by which an individual becomes 
a prospective parliamentary candidate (PPC) in the Labour Party. There are however some additional 
nuances related to the logistics of candidate selection which are unique to the Labour Party.  
There are 650 Parliamentary constituencies which each send a representative to the House of 
Commons. The Labour Party however does not stand candidates in the 18 constituencies of Northern 
Ireland. There is also a convention that the major parties do not stand against the Speaker of the 
House,601 meaning in General Elections the Labour Party stands 631 candidates.  
The standard selection process602 for the Labour Party is predominantly based around the local 
membership in the constituency to be represented.603 Sitting MPs who wish to re-stand for election 
notify the party and seek approval from the local membership through a ‘trigger ballot’. Through the 
time period under investigation the threshold for deselection has changed, often depending on 
factional conflict within the party, however the procedure that ensues is the same. If the relevant 
threshold at the time is met in a vote of the members then the MP is automatically reselected as the 
candidate for the upcoming election. It should be noted that deselection is rare in the Labour Party.604 
If a constituency has a full selection process due to no sitting MP – whether because it is not a seat 
Labour holds or the sitting MP steps down or is not reselected – the local regional party will make a 
call for interested applicants, interview potential candidates and draw up a shortlist. There may be 
additional restrictions on who can apply such as all-women shortlists or recently a handful of all-BAME 
shortlists, which will be announced in the call for applicants. In this way the Party also acts to set ‘the 
rules of the game’ for selections. Once a shortlist is drawn up a date is set for a selection meeting, in 
which the CLP members are invited to listen to potential candidates speak and then vote on who to 
select. 
 
601 Labour did breach this convention and stand against a formerly Conservative Speaker in both elections in 
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Press. 
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In this process then there are two sets of gatekeepers – the regional party who draw up the initial 
shortlist, and the local members who make the final decision from the shortlist presented. As 
previously discussed in chapters two and four gatekeepers are those who can provide access to the 
selection process,605 and may play a further role in building coalitions of support for an individual prior 
to the formal vote, or ‘talent-spotting’ – encouraging individuals they judge to be a good potential 
candidate to stand for selection.606   
In situations where there is not enough time for a full selection process a special selection process is 
used. These usually occur for Parliamentary by-elections, when a snap general election is called 
unexpectedly or when an MP resigns very close to the deadline for registering candidates with the 
Election Commission. In these instances, the regional party will make the selection directly from those 
who apply and impose the candidate on the CLP. For obvious reasons it is these elections in which the 
leadership has most control as the party itself is the only gatekeeper.  
Formally the final stage is that the party’s NEC has to finally ‘sign off’ the candidate selected by 
members. It is exceedingly rare that the NEC overturns the decision of the members.607 
Gatekeepers in the Labour Party.  
An overall view of the role of these gatekeepers in the process was provided by GB03, a former senior 
party employee who was frequently involved in the initial shortlisting process. What is important to 
consider is the description of the tension between the two sets of gatekeepers, the leadership 
alongside the party establishment, and the membership. A second important point being made by 
GB03 concerns the dual role played by the party institutions in the selection process. A third point to 
note is the impact of a changed context during ‘exceptional’ selections. 
“The way that candidates tend to get selected is a sort of chemistry between the 
membership and the leadership at different times, and generally speaking the role 
of the institutions is largely to act as the will of the leadership as well as the 
secretariat to the process. So those two things run side by side. Now most selections 
obviously proceed in line with the process that’s set out [in the rule book]. The main 
exceptions would be either parliamentary by-elections or short-term selections if 
somebody stands down immediately before a general election or like in the last 
general election when it happened with short notice. What we tend to see is it’s 
the exceptional selections which are the ones which tend to give the strongest 
reflection of what the leadership wants, and the ordinary selections are a little bit 
more of a bargain between where the membership are and where the leadership 
 
605 Norris, P. 1997. Passages to power: Legislative recruitment in advanced democracies. Cambridge; Cambridge 
University Press and Norris, P., & Lovenduski, J. 1995. Political recruitment: Gender, race and class in the British 
Parliament. Cambridge; Cambridge University Press. 
606 Brookman D. 2014, 'Mobilizing candidates: Political actors strategically shape the candidate pool with 
personal appeals.' Journal of Experimental Political Science, Vol. 1 No. 2, pp. 104-119 and Seligman L. 1961 
‘Political Recruitment and Party Structure: A Case Study’ The American Political Science Review, Vol. 55, No. 1, 
pp. 77-86. 
607 One rare example was the selection for the candidate in Bassetlaw in 2019. The local membership selected 
Sally Gimson as the candidate. She was perceived by the NEC to be opposed to the leadership of Jeremy Corybn 
and was therefore deselected, with no reason being given, causing outrage within the party. The NEC imposed 
candidate then lost the seat to the Conservatives. See: Anon. 2019. Sally Gimson: Bassetlaw Labour candidate 
deselected by ‘kangaroo court’. 06.11.2019. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-




are at any given time. Sometimes the membership wants to select people who are 
in tune with the leadership and sometimes they don’t.” 
GB03, former senior party employee. 
This balance between the membership wishes and those of the party leadership plays out via the two-
stage selection process. Whilst the formal rules seem to give power to the membership the shortlisting 
process means that the regional party, acting as the will of the leadership, has greater gatekeeping 
power. Another interviewee, GB09, described how this power can be exercised:  
“It’s greater now but it has always been the case, there will be intervention from 
the centre. They will try and get people selected, they will fiddle these days who 
has all-women shortlists or not. I mean the archetype was Wolverhampton, which 
was going to be an all-women shortlist and then wasn’t when Jack Dromey was 
interested and moved backwards and forwards and ultimately it had an open list 
and a woman won it.608 So there’s that sort of degree of manipulation.” 
GB09, MP from both a trade union and youth wing background. 
This is an example of how the party institutions enact the will of the leadership by the way in which 
they perform the practical functions of their role as secretariat. Another way in which the process can 
be manipulated is by producing a shortlist for selection in which the leadership’s preferred candidate 
is the only ‘qualified’ option, with potential threats to their selection kept off the ballot that goes to 
the members.609  
The word ‘members’ here however needs to be unpacked, because unlike with the SPD it has not 
always been the case that the membership of the party alone has a vote. Currently the selection of 
Parliamentary candidates is made by a vote of individual members of the Constituency Labour Party 
who have been a member for a minimum of six months.610 Previously however affiliated organisations 
also had a role in electing a prospective parliamentary candidate. These affiliates are in two forms, 
one is the affiliated trade unions611 and the other are the socialist societies. In selection terms however 
the unions hold far greater sway than the socialist societies.  
 
608 The exact seat was Wolverhampton North-East in the selection contest for the 2010 General Election. The 
eventual candidate was Emma Reynolds. Jack Dromey, a senior trade union figure, was selected for the safer 
seat of Birmingham Erdington in the same election.  
609 This can backfire. In the 2019 selection in Coventry North-West members selected the ‘unqualified’ 
candidate, Taiwo Owatemi, in a backlash against the perceived ‘stitching-up’ of the selection shortlist. See: Reid 
L. 2019. Breaking: London Pharmacist, 27, selected to be Labours’ Coventry North West candidate for MP. The 
Coventry Observer. Published on 02.11.2019. Available at: https://coventryobserver.co.uk/news/breaking-
london-pharmacist-27-selected-to-be-labours-coventry-north-west-candidate-for-mp/. Accessed 30.12.2019 
16:35.  
610 Chapter 5, Clause I.1.A.i of the 2019 Labour Party Rule Book.  
611 In the past there were a large number of affiliated trade unions. However, many of the smaller unions have 
disappeared as there have been mergers and there are currently 12 affiliated unions. The most important are 
the ‘big 4’ of Unite, Unison, GMB (named for its previous initials, the General, Municipal, Boilermakers and Allied 
Trades Union) and USDAW (the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers). The 8 smaller unions are ASLEF 
(the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen), BFAWU usually known as the Bakers Union 
(Bakers, Food and Allied Workers Union), Community (a general union formed originally by a merger of the 
steelworkers and clothing workers unions), CWU (Communication Workers Union), the FBU (Fire Brigades 
Union), the Musicians Union, the NUM (National Union of Mineworkers) and the TSSA, often known as ‘Tessa’ 




These rules are not static and shifting power balances within the party lead to shifts in the rules in 
favour of different factions or institutional players. This was particularly the case when the party 
leadership is not strong, such as in the Ed Miliband era.  
“The actual mechanism of a selection process, there’s the actual written rules 
which themselves have been quite contested over their history and at different 
points the rules have been seen to favour whichever political faction is in the 
ascendancy - from the introduction of one member one vote into selections through 
to the argument about the different roles of affiliates and members in them and so 
on. I think certainly in the 2010 – 2015 parliament I think the rules changed three 
times in that one cycle just because they kept being heavily contested. So there’s 
that. The rules themselves are partly the product of institutional pressures.” 
GB03, former senior party employee. 
The institutional powers within the party, principally the trade unions, and the influence they exert on 
the membership in the selection process, are discussed further below.  
The institutional  players within the Labour selection process.  
The main institutional players in the selection process are the trade unions. Historically any nationally 
affiliated union with members who lived in the area covered by a branch of the Labour Party could 
affiliate a branch of the union to that local party, often multiple branches if they had multiple 
workplaces represented in the constituency. When a selection meeting happened each union branch 
would then send a delegate to the selection meeting to vote with a ‘block vote’ representing all the 
members of that union.  
This union vote has historically been significant in deciding on the selection of candidates as described 
by GB09.  
“There will be union interests involved. In the old days you would have quite 
dominant branch affiliations, so up in the North-East in the 1960s and 70s, 
Alderman Andrew Cunningham had made the GMB the biggest union in the North-
East, the only place where it was, and he absolutely dominated the scene. So, the 
Whitehaven constituency, which is now, Copeland it’s called now, Alderman 
Andrew Cunningham affiliated all these branches, got all these delegates, 
assembled them in the local hotel, marched them down to the selection meeting, 
threw open the doors, his army marched in. Elected one Jack Cunningham as their 
candidate and then marched out again.612 There was a lot of that. And the miners, 
in many areas the secretary of the biggest miner’s lodge there became the Member 
of Parliament, probably in his 50s, probably did ten years, they would retire to be 
much thought of and well-regarded in the village, and the next secretary of the 
miner’s lodge took it over. Scargill613 started to undermine that by trying to 
politicise that more but got quite a bit of pushback, then the NUM went into such 
decline that they didn’t have that power anymore. Now there’s quite a bit of horse-
trading that goes on between unions. Again, this is not unprecedented. But it is 
 
612 Jack Cunningham was selected for the 1970 general election. He remained MP for Whitehaven, and then 
the renamed Copeland constituency, until 2005.  




very much you know we’ll give you this constituency and you give us that one sort 
of thing. Those were also the patterns. That’s still going on.” 
GB09, MP from a trade union and youth wing background. 
Although the unions no longer have the power of the block vote, they still maintain a high level of 
influence within the party. This horse-trading of constituencies also allows them to focus that 
influence by combining it with the influence of other unions in specific selection contests. This now 
however frequently plays out at the shortlisting stage rather than the election amongst members.  
The institutional players often don’t take the views of the local membership particularly into account 
when it comes to this horse trading of seats. However, as with the 2019 selection of Taiwo Owatemi 
in Coventry North West, the membership doesn’t always take kindly to these kinds of powerplays.614  
“If it’s a safe Labour seat where the selection is really deciding who the MP is going 
to be very few of the institutional players in the Labour Party if anyone really cares 
about whether the candidate is local or not when they have somebody who they 
want to get into the place. When it comes to whether or not the local members will 
wear it, sometimes yes sometimes no.” 
GB03, former senior party employee. 
As well as the trade unions there can also be other local power-brokers in specific areas which have 
their own dynamics. 
“In the past some parts of the country or constituencies got reputations as the sorts 
of places that liked MPs who were Westminster big hitters. For example it was 
always said that Sheffield was a city that liked Westminster big hitters that didn’t 
bother them too much and frankly the local association ran the council and the 
MPs went to Westminster and made speeches, so you had a succession of people 
like Hattersley, like Denis Healey, who were the sort of people who were going to 
be found a seat somewhere and that was an ideal place to palm them off on. 
Whereas other seats, even in Yorkshire, you get seats like Pontefract, where 
Yvette615 was the first person to be the representative of that seat for a century 
who wasn’t an NUM616 official and it’s quite a different dynamic. If you look at 
somewhere like South Shields, where Dave Miliband was the MP, the local boss up 
there, it’s a family, is the Malcolms who run the council. Very happy with David 
Miliband taking no interest in the constituency at all because they run essentially 
an old school Northern fiefdom. Since then they’ve had an odd selection where 
Emma Lewell-Buck got selected, has tried to be involved in the CLP and they’ve 
been at war ever since.”  
GB03, former senior party employee. 
 
614 Reid L. 2019. Breaking: London Pharmacist, 27, selected to be Labours’ Coventry North West candidate for 
MP. The Coventry Observer. Published on 02.11.2019. Available at: 
https://coventryobserver.co.uk/news/breaking-london-pharmacist-27-selected-to-be-labours-coventry-north-
west-candidate-for-mp/. Accessed 30.12.2019 16:35. 
615 Yvette Cooper, MP for Pontefract and Castleford from 1997 and then for Normanton, Pontefract and 
Castleford following boundary changes in 2010.  




These local party barons can also impart influence, to the benefit of an individual who wants to be 
selected in the areas where they have a powerbase or conversely to their detriment. Both trade unions 
and local barons will endorse individuals and look to get their favoured candidate selected at the 
meeting of the members. This may be in the form of a formal endorsement, in particular from the 
unions, or informal influence. This influence can also be seen at the earlier stage, where support from 
these institutional players can be decisive in getting individuals onto the selection shortlist. Some of 
these institutional players are also involved in the factional conflicts within the party, however the 
factions also act as an institutional player in their own right.  
Factions and selection in the Labour Party.  
Within the Labour Party there are ideological factions, in a similar fashion to the SPD. The full depth 
of the factionalism in the Labour Party is more thoroughly unpacked in chapter six, but it is relevant 
here to discuss how the different factions relate to the selection process.  
The first past the post system means that the Labour Party involves a broader array of ideological 
positions than the German system, covering individuals who in Germany might be involved in Die Linke 
rather than the SPD. The Labour factions also have more formal institutionalised organisations. There 
are four main broad factions within the party, though with some internal divisions. These were 
described by GB10: 
“So, starting from, or going from right to left, first of all there’s the New Labour 
right. The main organ for that is obviously Progress. You then have the old Labour 
right, the main organisation there is Labour First. There is a strong connection with 
the trade unions, or the old trade union right. I should point out by Old Labour right 
I mean pre-New Labour, that part of the party. They’re the main traditional centre-
left of the party, they’re more communitarian in outlook. Then you have the soft 
left, and the main organisation there at the moment would be a group called Open 
Labour. They have been since 2017 more or less supportive of the Corbyn project 
on most issues. They have some fairly good connections with the trade union left. 
It’s not necessarily the avowedly Corbynite trade union left, Unite, FBU and so on, 
but what’s left of what was called the Broad Left. Then you have Momentum which 
was formed out of the Corbyn project. Has very strong links with certain of the 
current trade union leaderships, especially Unite. They are supportive of the Corbyn 
project, they’re broadly speaking left on economics, but it’s complicated by the fact 
of wanting to support the current leadership and the current project that is in place 
in the party regardless.” 
GB10, senior activist in Young Labour and the Young Fabians. 
The organisations change over time, and there are other organisations which sub-divide these 
categories, such as the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy, the Labour Representation Committee 
and the Alliance for Workers Liberty on the hard-left, Labour Together and the Tribune Group on the 
soft left, and Blue Labour very loosely within the old Labour right.  There have been other divisions 
not necessarily based on ideology such as those within New Labour between ‘Blairites’ and 
‘Brownites’617 and also temporary policy divisions such that provoked by Brexit. Nevertheless, the 
broad, rough groupings of New Labour right, old Labour right, soft left and hard left (referred to by 
GB10 as Momentum) remain somewhat similar across time. Those broad divisions have been the same 
 
617 Minkin L. 2014. The Blair Supremacy: A study in the politics of Labour’s party management. Manchester, 




for the duration of this study, with the exception of the ‘third way’ groupings on the New Labour right 
which came about in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The relative strength and influence of these 
factions varies across time and place, for example the hard left was powerful in Liverpool in the 1980s, 
the Old Right has its heartland in the West Midlands etc. 
It is also worth noting in the context of the youth wings that Labour Students are seen as ideologically 
moderate and centre-left, whereas Young Labour is seen as being on the left. Labour Students are 
taken more seriously within the party than Young Labour, which is often perceived as unprofessional. 
GB03 commented on this, and noted the similarity to the Tories, the UK Conservative Party.  
“I distinguish between the youth and student element is, partly because a lot of 
people who are involved do distinguish between the two of them, partly because 
it’s actually more like the Tories in this country in that the youth wing is the 
provisional nutters sort of thing and the student wing is seen as a bit more serious 
and organised. And I suppose partly the fact that Labour Clubs exist in Universities 
which have got quite strong safeguarding policies and all the rest of it so you don’t 
get the same sorts of mad shit that you get in the youth wings.” 
GB03, former senior party employee. 
The Young Fabians, like their parent society, are committed by their constitution to being neutral in 
terms of their factional leanings but tend to be perceived as technocratic and on the moderate side.  
The influence of factionalism, both in the party and in the youth wings, does however vary over time. 
It was strong in the 1980s during the conflict between the previous hard-left organisation, Militant, 
and in particular the old right of the party.618 In the years since the election of Jeremy Corbyn as leader 
in 2015 the factional conflict has increased again. This more recent development was set out by GB03. 
“I’d have said in terms of factionalism - organised groups of members as distinct 
from the institutional players - until the Corbyn years I’d have said their impact was 
not massive. The hard left never got its candidates selected, or did so very rarely, 
and so in most selections having a factional backing was not a big deal. The 
factional barriers on the centre-right of the party were a lot more fungible. It didn’t 
used to be hugely significant. Now it is key. Although actually in a sense it’s started 
to eat itself in that there’s always a big fight as to who is the Momentum candidate, 
and the Momentum candidate doesn’t always win by any means but it’s introduced 
a pre-selection element to the selection process that is not as rigid as in say, 
Australia, but is a much bigger element of the competition than it was. It’s a bigger 
factor now but it’s still not as defined as people would expect. In a Parliamentary 
selection where most candidates who’ve got any sense will be trying to appeal 
beyond their immediate cohort, it’s a situation where people are more likely to vote 
outside of the way you might expect them to.” 
GB03, former senior party employee. 
 
618 See Hayter D. 2005. Fightback! Labour’s Traditional Right in the 1970s and 1980s. Manchester, Manchester 
University Press, Golding J. 2003. Hammer of the Left: Defeating Tony Benn, Eric Heffer and Militant in the Battle 
for the Labour Party. London, Politico’s Publishing, Davis J. and McWilliam R. (eds). 2018. Labour and the Left in 
the 1980s. Manchester, Manchester University Press and Koelble T. A. 1991. The Left Unravelled: Social 




This was also the perspective of GB05, an MP with a background in the youth movement. They 
referenced the influence of Momentum, the hard left factional grouping dominant in the era of Jeremy 
Corbyn. To them this new factionalism has made it harder for individuals not involved in that to be 
selected. 
“Now that we have different groups within the Labour Party that are stronger in 
terms of determining the process it would be quite a lot harder I think, and I 
suppose for somebody like me who has always traditionally been on the left of the 
party but who’s not involved explicitly with Momentum, I think it might be harder 
for someone like me to end up being supported by large numbers of members in 
the way that I was because I think those groups, a lot of the more recent selections 
have indicated that if you’re in one of those groups you’re much more likely to be 
successful. Before that period it was possible for graft to have quite an impact.” 
GB05, MP with a youth wing background. 
These factions, like the institutional players within the party and the unions, exert influence on the 
membership in a continually shifting dynamic that varies significantly between different times and 
places. When factional conflict is high within the party, as during the 1980s and again since 2015, the 
factions exert great influence over both sets of gatekeepers. When factionalism is low, as during the 
1990s and 2000s, it does not.  
GB03 characterises a situation where there are multiple competing gatekeepers with different levels 
of influence in the process in different contexts. 
“In terms of gatekeepers, the honest thing is that selections vary so much in terms 
of who the key players in a selection are, it’s difficult to sort of say that one 
particular group or groups is critical. Certainly, in the past party officials and trade 
union machines would have been very significant in that process, these days it 
tends to vary a little bit in that different selections have their own dynamics. Often 
seats with larger memberships tend to have a bit of a dynamic of their own and it’s 
more likely to be a candidate whose got a bit of a profile within that constituency. 
In seats with smaller memberships or there’s a bit more influence by some of the 
big power players you might get an individual who has more influence through 
that. But it would be difficult to say there’s a single answer to that question really. 
It depends on different points in the cycle as well.”  
GB03, former senior party employee. 
It can therefore be difficult to describe which group is the most important in any one particular 
selection contest. It will depend on the varying balance between membership numbers, trade union 
influence, the leadership and the effectiveness and factional make-up of the regional party officials 
and members, whether the selection is a normal one or a by-election at short notice and whether the 
seat is safe, marginal or unwinnable at the particular moment of the selection taking place. 
Nevertheless, the key gatekeepers are the party officials who draw up the shortlist, and the local 
members, as these are the groups whom the other players are attempting to influence.  
What are Labour’s gatekeepers looking for?  
What factors are these gatekeepers looking for in a potential electoral standard bearer? The 




interests. In the second stage they will attempt to influence the members to support their own 
candidate, but this influence is unlikely to be the only factor that is relevant to members when they 
act as gatekeepers by voting at the selection meeting. GB03 stated what they felt members were 
looking for: 
“I would say that when the members are looking at someone who could be a 
Parliamentary candidate, they are looking probably for three things. They are 
looking for somebody who, they agree with their politics, who they can see in 
Parliament and who they believe is up to the job. So, there’s a combination of 
politics, ability and almost a sense of what they’re due.” 
GB03, former senior party employee. 
The institutional players, particularly the factional groups, will advocate for their own candidates. But 
several of those interviewed highlighted the work a candidate was prepared to put in to meet 
members and campaign for the selection: 
“In terms of what gatekeepers are looking for, I think in terms of organised groups 
it would be what their organised group is suggesting, although often I’m sure 
people are making their own decisions as well. We’ve seen recent selections where 
it’s been people’s position on Europe that’s been key. Whether someone’s got a 
local connection. Whether they’ve met them. A few years ago a guy was selected 
for Reading West where they had eight different candidates on the shortlist which 
is not a way to organise a selection at all, he came up through middle and it was 
because he’d worked really really hard to meet as many people as he could. 
Someone did say to me after the selection process, one of the other potential 
candidates, can you teach me how to be good at networking because you seem to 
be really good at it. And I said to this person that’s really nice of you but what 
underlay me getting to the top of that ballot isn’t me being good at schmoozing, 
it’s the fact that for fifteen years before then I’d spent quite a lot of time – not with 
the anticipation of being a candidate,– but just being quite interested in helping 
people out [which] meant that I got to know quite a few people. And if you do turn 
up then people do tend to remember that you’ve done that. I think that is what 
made the difference actually because it meant that there were people I could ring 
up and say I’m sorry to bother you but do you remember when I came to help and 
that’s really what paid off.”  
GB05, MP from a youth wing background. 
“The biggest factor in getting selected, so why was I successful, what are the 
members looking for? That’s a really interesting question. Likeability. Some sense 
that you know what you’re after, that they are convinced by your reasons for 
wanting to become a Member of Parliament. An understanding of the 
constituency. Hard graft. Willingness to go and knock on the door of every single 
member and drink vast quantities of tea.” 
GB08, MP from a trade union background. 
Both GB05 and GB08, MPs from different types of backgrounds, emphasise meeting the members and 
convincing them that they would make a good MP, whether that is over a long period of time involved 




institutional interests are more applicable when a selection is taking place between candidates who 
are not well known to the members in the constituency, or when the members are side-lined. GB03 
concurred with this view:  
“In CLP AGMs where most people don’t know most of the candidates and there’s 
so many people you’re more likely to vote down the line, of whichever side you’re 
on, and you’re more likely to have turned up because you’ve got turned out by a 
group. Whereas in a Parliamentary selection where most candidates who’ve got 
any sense will be trying to appeal beyond their immediate cohort, it’s a situation 
where people are more likely to vote outside of the way you might expect them to.” 
GB03, former senior party employee. 
We can therefore see that campaigning skills and a sense of being known to the local members, though 
not necessarily being local, is vital in the second stage of the ordinary selections. These are also 
interlinked in that the factions and institutional organisations can provide a forum in which to meet 
members. 
A further point is that GB05 mentioned meeting people whilst ‘turning up’ to campaigning – during 
which an individual has to demonstrate campaigning abilities, and GB03 mentioned being ‘up to the 
job’. These are references to skills. As with the SPD then skills demonstration, showing members as 
well as to those who construct the shortlist that an individual has the skills to do the job, is important 
in the selection process. Other interviewees highlighted in particular communication and public 
speaking skills:  
“One of the things that drives me crazy is the level of oratory that we don’t have in 
our movement. I was at a TUC conference in the 90s and I got to hear Scargill speak. 
Now I disagreed with every word he said but it was a beautiful speech. He got a 
standing ovation and then we unanimously voted him down. But it was a beautiful 
speech because it was genuine oratory. Now you only learn oratory, unless you’re 
naturally blessed like Hillary Benn is naturally blessed, if you’ve had to earn your 
right to be heard on the shop floor. Because it’s a really tough thing to earn your 
right to be heard in a factory or in a hospital or in a big workplace. And yes you’ve 
got not dissimilar in terms of universities and trying to get people to listen, but 
actually the people that turn up at your hustings and that vote for you, they’re 
already engaged. Whereas on the shop floor you’re talking to people who are 
trying to get on with their lives and want to crack on. So the skill set that you earn 
in terms of public speaking, in terms of negotiating - the skillset that you get is 
extraordinarily important.” 
GB01, MP from a trade union background. 
“I think it was the skills, you know having to stand up and speak to a room of a 
hundred, two hundred students when you’re 21 or whatever. Those sorts of skills, 
I’m not sure where else I would have got that from. I can remember Labour Student 
public speaking training for example. We used to get people to come in and train 
us, you know we’d have Labour Student’s national committee weekend and we’d 
get someone to do sessions on public speaking and I mean I still get quite nervous 
speaking in the chamber and so on, I wouldn’t naturally consider myself to be a 




but I do think that the confidence that those experiences gave me really have 
helped shape my ability to then put myself forward for things further down the line, 
for Parliament later on.” 
GB04, MP from a youth wing background. 
Both interviewees indicate how public speaking skills were learned in the different routes they took 
to their selection. GB03 made the point that the actual fact of having been involved in a youth wing, 
even in a senior role, was not something which was highlighted by potential candidates in the selection 
process, unlike in the case of the JUSOS.  
“I can’t think that I’ve ever had a selection where somebody has made a big deal 
of their role as a young person, because quite a lot of predominantly older members 
see it as a little bit cliquey or elitist, as not necessarily being a recommendation. I 
think its seen as sort of fine but it’s not anything I’ve ever seen anyone make a big 
play of in a selection contest, although it’s helpful background for them to get to 
that place.” 
GB03, former senior party employee. 
GB03 also elaborated on the youth wings being helpful background for an individual to get to the point 
of being considered by the membership to stand for office, placing an emphasis on the networking 
opportunities.  
“It’s the networks that stand out to me a little bit more. With Labour students a lot 
of people come out of that with very strong networks which are not unhelpful when 
it comes to seeking selection. Having a Labour Students background on your CV is 
probably either neutral or unhelpful when it comes to most selections. Whereas 
you get a lot of people leaving those organisations who are very well-networked, 
who have had more contact with senior people earlier in their careers than they 
would otherwise have done. So, you get a lot of them going into staff and official 
roles, of whom some will become MPs. I think it’s more the networks that come out 
of it are the key thing really. It varies a lot with levels of involvement. Something 
like being the Youth Rep on the Labour NEC619 which is a two-year role and you are 
actually a member of the NEC, serious people care about it, so it’s contested. Jonny 
Reynolds,620 Ellie Reeves,621 Steph Peacock622 all just in the last few years and I think 
that’s partly because at that very early stage you are doing things at that very high 
level, so it’s not a surprise that those people do disproportionately well.” 
GB03, former senior party employee. 
GB03 here indicates that the networking gained from the senior levels of the youth and student wing 
are a factor. This is likely to be both by leading to opportunities to get a job in the political ecosystem 
and by enabling them to build links with party elites who perform the shortlisting stage. As with the 
 
619 National Executive Committee, the party’s main governing body. 
620 NEC youth rep 2003-05, MP for Stalybridge and Hyde since 2010.  
621 Ellie Reeves was not actually the Youth Rep on the Labour NEC, she was elected as one of the Constituency 
Representatives but at a young age. When she was elected to the NEC she was young enough that she would 
have been eligible to stand as the Youth Rep and was therefore often mistakenly believed to be the Youth Rep 
even by party insiders. She has been MP for Lewisham West and Penge since 2017.  




SPD however the importance of an individual’s past roles amongst the members in the second stage 
is the development of the skills needed to win selection, in particular communication skills, and then 
the networking skills required to be able to demonstrate those skills to them.  
Current youth wing activists GB06, GB07 and GB10 all placed a heavy emphasis on networking. GB06 
described the networking process, using the Young Fabians as an example: 
“If you want to work in Westminster or in public affairs, or a think tank, a lot of it 
is about your personal networks and the people you know. A lot of the people who 
got involved in the Young Fabians had the skills, they were very academically 
bright, great communicators, very smart, but often they knew they lacked the 
networks. So you go along to a Young Fabians event, you’d be speaking to a Young 
Fabians member, you’d find out that they’re working for a Shadow Secretary of 
State or a Labour Member of Parliament. So, you formulate a relationship with that 
person, you learn from them skills and tools, they tell you how they got there and 
that’s something, that sort of networking. You know how to go about making an 
application for a particular job in that particular sector because you met someone 
through a Young Fabians event. Or you organise an event, and as part of organising 
the event you come into contact with people and organisations who then you form 
a relationship with that then helps you down the line. The networking is super 
crucial. If I think about friends they got their first job in Parliament or working for 
a think-tank because of the work they did in the Young Fabians. It gave them that 
kudos, or that vetting power. So networking is a crucial part of it.”   
GB06, senior activist in Labour Students and the Young Fabians 
“If you look at Labour students you see Tom Watson,623 Gloria de Piero,624 they 
were Labour Students. Looking at the Young Fabians you have John Mann,625 
Seema Malhotra,626 these people used to be members of the executive and really 
involved in youth politics. Joining the youth wing can provide you with 
opportunities. Some people are not blessed with having connections, having family 
connections, so certainly for them the youth organisations would be a way to get 
those networks. Certainly, you need some connections to go into politics so joining 
a youth organisation can give you a way to get that.”  
GB07, senior activist in Young Labour, Labour Students and the Young Fabians. 
“For a lot of people this is their gateway into being involved in party politics more 
generally. There are obviously many opportunities to network, particularly if you’re 
in an area that has a high concentration of members of the youth wing. I can’t say 
 
623 President of the University of Hull Student’s Union 1991-92, Chair of the National Organisation of Labour 
Students 1992-93, Labour Party National Development Officer for Youth 1993-97, MP for West Bromwich East 
2001-2019 and Deputy-Leader of the Labour Party 2015-2019.  
624 Labour Student’s national officer 1996-97, MP for Ashfield 2010-2019.  
625 Chair of the National Organisation of Labour Students 1983-84, as a member of the Young Fabians co-
authored a pamphlet (with fellow future MP Phil Woolas) titled ‘Labour and the Youth Vote: The Missing 
Generation’ the proposals in which were the basis for the reorganisation of Young Labour in 1993. He was MP 
for Bassetlaw from 2001 to 2019.  




personally in terms of what it’s like at constituency level but with city wide areas 
or university wide areas, there is actually the ability to network.”  
GB10, senior activist with Young Labour and the Young Fabians 
The different focuses of these interviewees highlight both a key similarity and a key difference with 
the SPD. In the SPD the route to the Bundestag can be EITHER via being placed on the party list by 
party elites, OR via selection by a local party in a winnable district. Networking is more important for 
the former, skills development for the latter and whilst both are important an individual can be more 
focused on one than the other. In the Labour Party however the system requires BOTH being placed 
on the shortlist by party elites AND then selection by a local Party. This means an individual needs 
both networks and skills development. As the skills development often comes from the political 
ecosystem however, rather than the youth wings directly, the networking is the crucial first stage. This 
may explain why the MPs who have been through the whole process emphasise the skills that they 
could use to get final selection from the members, whereas the current youth wing members highlight 
the networks required to get into the political ecosystem. 
5.6: The youth wings and Labour’s legislative recruitment.  
As with chapter four this chapter is primarily concerned with whether the case study demonstrates 
that the youth wings have increased as a source of recruitment for social democratic parliamentarians 
as laid out in chapter one. It also explores whether this has been at the expense of the trade union 
movement. This is detailed in Hypothesis 1, which states: 
H1: Youth organisations have grown in prominence as sources of social democratic 
parliamentarian recruitment since the 1980s, filling a vacuum created by the 
decline of the trade unions. 
This hypothesis was tested via a quantitative analysis of the backgrounds of Parliamentarians. A 
database was created in which Labour members of the House of Commons were listed by election 
cycle with their backgrounds in relation to youth wings and trade unions codified. The database coded 
whether they had held elected office in the Labour youth wing, the Labour student wing – at the 
national or the university club level - or the Young Fabians. It also coded whether they had been a 
trade union employee or elected union representative and whether they had worked as a Labour 
staffer, that is to say been employed either by the party or by an elected representative.  
As discussed in chapter three there was an issue with the data collection. There was no available 
archive which recorded the memberships of the youth wing’s committees. Therefore, eight individuals 
who were active in the youth wings from the 1950s until the present day were given a list of all Labour 
MPs from the 1979 General Election until the Peterborough by-election of 6th June 2019.627 These 
individuals had all been involved either by serving in elected office or in some cases acting as the 
‘fixers’ – those who would balance interests and be involved in factional conflict within the youth 
organisation. They were asked to record which of the MPs from the lists prepared had been involved 
in which youth wings alongside them. This was the main origin of the data encoded in the database. 
 
627 This by-election, which returned Lisa Forbes of the Labour Party, was the last datapoint. There was one further 
by-election in this Parliament, in the Brecon and Radnorshire constituency on 1st August 2019, which was won 
by the Liberal Democrat Jane Dodds. This would not have been counted for this study as it did not return a 
Labour MP to Parliament and therefore this study does include the data for all Labour MPs for the 2017 to 2019 
Parliament. This study does NOT include data for the General Election of 12th December 2019, in which both Lisa 




To this was added the data on trade union employment or elected union representative or 
employment by the Party or one of their elected representatives taken from the Who’s Who and Who 
Was Who archive.628 All of this data was then cross-referenced with other available sources, including 
candidates own websites, published obituaries and newspaper articles.629  
The data collected for MPs active in a youth wing in a formal elected role may therefore be less reliable 
than the data utilised for the SPD case study in chapter four, although by using multiple sources and 
comparing them the data was made as reliable as possible. The data for the trade union and Labour 
staff positions is reliable, coming predominantly from one source – the Who’s Who archive – and 
therefore being easily comparable across the timeframe.  
Again, as with the SPD the data was looking at those who were active in the youth wings or trade 
union movement at any stage and does not take into account the length of time between service in a 
youth wing and election to Parliament.  
Further, as with the SPD, the number of deselections taking place is small, and the majority of the 
changes are via replacement of retiring MPs or via electoral churn – winning or losing seats to other 
parties – rather than via deselection of sitting MPs and their replacement.  
Findings from the empirical data.  
The first finding from the data is that there has been a dramatic increase in the number of MPs who 
come from a youth wing background with some fluctuation but a steadily upward trend. There was a 
big drop between 1979 and 1983, in line with the drop in total Labour MPs between those two 
elections, before a steady increase up until 1997 where it maintains a stable level until the 2010 
election, despite a drop in the number of Labour MPs between 1997 and 2010. There is a drop in 2015, 
in line with a further decrease in the total number of Labour MPs elected, and then an uptick in 2017 
when Labour increased it’s numbers. This is shown in fig. 6.2.630  
 
 
628 Available at https://www.ukwhoswho.com/  
629 A complete list of sources is available in the appendices.  
630 Figs. 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 show total number of individuals who served in at least one youth wing, those 

























These figures, like the SPD, do not track the electoral fortunes of the Labour Party exactly but they are 
closer than the SPD. Further, although the ratchet effect seen in the SPD is less obvious in the Labour 
Party numbers, it does still exist. Following the elections when the Labour Party lost members in 1983, 
2005, 2010 and 2015 the number of MPs from a youth wing background did not decline in proportion 
to the losses suffered by the party. Although the number from a youth wing background did decline 
in 1983 and 2015 in particular, the youth wing MPs did still outperform their peers. This becomes 
more obvious when the figures are plotted as a percentage of the total number of Labour MPs elected 
across the election cycle631 as demonstrated in fig. 6.3.   
 
Here we can see that despite the drop in pure numbers seen in 1983 and 2015 the percentage of MPs 
from a youth wing in the Parliamentary Labour Party actually slightly increased in those election cycles. 
There has been a steady increase in the percentage of Labour MPs who had previously served in a 
youth wing in every election cycle except two, in 1997 and 2017.  
One possible explanation for the drop in 1997 could be simply the sheer number of seats which the 
party won. Labour did not expect to win by such a large landslide. The number of individuals who 
emerge from the youth wings and become viable candidates is finite and will focus their efforts on 
seats perceived to be winnable. When the party then wins seats it did not expect to the percentage of 
its MPs with a youth wing background drops as people who did not expect to become MPs join the 
ranks in the Commons. Supporting evidence for this possibility is in the way the percentage increases 
sharply in 2005 and 2010 when the party lost seats. The seats lost in those two election cycles were 
the more vulnerable ones, the ones the party had not expected to win in 1997 but managed to hold 
in 2001. There is of course a level of churn beneath the headline figures as MPs retire and are replaced, 
as well as the party losing and gaining seats, so this is unlikely to be a complete explanation and more 
 
631 A reminder that this relates to the cycle – for example the day of the 1987 general election to the day before 
the election of 1992 – not just the election itself, and therefore includes MPs who took up their role as a result 
of by-elections between the general elections that bookend each cycle. It is the number of individuals who have 





























research would be required to confirm it, nevertheless it is the most likely explanation based on the 
available data.  
The situation was similar in 2017, in that Labour expected to do poorly in that election but did better 
than expected and won a number of seats, such as Sheffield Hallam, Kensington and Canterbury, that 
it had no expectation of winning. It was a snap election in which those who had previously stood in 
vacant seats in 2015 were given first refusal on being the candidate again. The expectation that Labour 
would lose, combined with the factional conflict within the party, led a number of those who had 
come from the ‘usual’ routes to decline to stand again. One of the interviewees, GB09, specifically 
addressed this in comments made during their interview: 
“I’m not sure if there’s been an increase in the numbers coming from the youth 
wings recently. If you look at the new intake, you’d have to look at the new intake 
that came in in 2017. I think that’s quite mixed. I think if anything there was a real 
surge before then, and I’d have thought it’s tailed off slightly. Partly because people 
got selected for seats nobody thought they’d win! Had anybody thought that the 
Tories were going to do so badly, which was the key question the woman who stood 
in Lincoln in 2015 would have run, the fellow who stood in Sheffield Hallam would 
have run. Karen Lee632 and Jared O’Mara633 would never have troubled the public 
consciousness, so you had a number like that.” 
GB09, MP with a youth wing and trade union background. 
The specific circumstances around those two elections – with Labour winning seats it did not expect 
to in both634 – may explain why in those two election cycles there were drops in the percentage of 
MPs coming from a youth wing background compared to other election cycles. With those two 
exceptions there has been a steady increase in the numbers coming from a background in one of the 
youth wings. Fig. 6.4 shows the exact numbers of Labour MPs from a youth wing background and Fig. 
6.5 shows the exact percentages of the total elected Labour MPs from that background.  
Election cycle 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 
Youth wing role 49 40 53 67 95 
 2001 2005 2010 2015 2017 
Fig.6.4 102 102 99 88 94 
 
Election cycle 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 
Youth wing role 17.69% 18.78% 21.63% 23.84% 22.46% 
 2001 2005 2010 2015 2017 
Fig.6.5 24.82% 28.57% 37.79% 38.43% 36.19% 
 
 
632 Labour MP for Lincoln, elected in 2017, lost the seat to the Conservatives in 2019. 
633 MP for Sheffield Hallam. Elected as a Labour MP in 2017, had the whip removed for disciplinary reasons, then 
restored, then resigned the Labour whip 9 days later to sit as an independent, stood down in 2019.  
634 Those who become highly active in the party, whether via the youth wings or the trade unions, target seats 
which they expect to win. The competition for seats perceived to be unwinnable is much less intense and figures 
with less institutional influence or political capital can be selected in those seats. Those who therefore come into 





Consequently, what becomes clear from this data is that the first part of Hypothesis 1 is indeed proved 
correct by the case study of the UK Labour Party. The number of MPs from a youth wing background 
has indeed increased, both in real numbers and in percentage terms. One further point to explore 
before looking at the second part of the hypothesis – the number of MPs from a trade union 
background – is to compare the different organisations involved in the Labour youth movements and 
to see whether the rise has come from any of them in particular.  
Comparing the impact of Labour’s different youth organisations.  
Whilst this tells us that the number of MPs coming from a youth wing background has increased it 
does not unpack the details of which of the three relevant youth wings are responsible for the rise or 
whether it is across the board. In addition to the three Labour youth wings discussed (counting the 
historical predecessors of Young Labour and Labour Students in the same typology as those 
contemporary organisation) there were also a handful of individuals who served in similar 
organisations for other political parties – either for the Conservatives or Liberals / Liberal Democrats 
or more commonly, perhaps due to the factional conflicts of the 1970s and 80s, in far-left youth or 
student movements. Fig. 6.6 shows the numbers of these five possible youth wing origin points across 
the time period under investigation.  
 
The first point to note is that Labour Students is and has always been the predominant source of MPs 
from a youth wing background. It is also the source of most of the increase in the number of MPs, 
albeit with big drops in the two most recent elections of 2015 and 2017. Young Labour has increased 
gradually. The Young Fabians, having been barely relevant through the 1980s dramatically increased 
in 1997 to being on a par with Young Labour and have been either level or only slightly behind Young 






















Comparison of # of MPs from different youth wings
Young Labour Non-Labour youth wing Labour Students




Meanwhile the number of Labour MPs who were active in a non-Labour youth wing is negligible, 
tracking at one individual for the whole timeframe with the exception of 1997 – 2005 when there are 
two. Those who came from a non-Labour student wing did increase in the late 1980s – to a high point 
of nine MPs - and have fallen back since 2005. This would fit with the concept of them coming into the 
Labour Party during the factional battles of the 1970s and 1980s, getting to the point of assuming 
office in the 1987 election, increasing until 1997 and then falling back as the defeat of Militant meant 
that those routes into the party were no longer there and the incumbents retired. 
The story is not much changed when we look at these numbers as a percentage of total Labour MPs 
elected, as in Fig. 6.7. Labour Students are still both the biggest group and the biggest increase, still 
with drops in 2015 and 2017, alongside a percentage drop similar to that for all youth wings in 1997 
as already discussed above. Young Labour actually has a slight dip during the 1990s but has increased 
overall, roughly doubling as a percentage since 1979. The Young Fabians were not relevant until 1997 
when they tracked upwards and have increased overall since then, albeit with dips in 2005, 2015 and 
2017. The non-Labour youth wing origins and non-Labour student wing origins are a small percentage, 
with the latter slightly higher.  
 
The exact numbers and percentages are laid out below in Fig. 6.8 and Fig. 6.9 respectively. It is 
important to note that some individuals are members of more than one youth wing, in particular in 
the three Labour affiliated youth wings, and as such the total number of individuals who have a youth 






















Comparison of % of MPs from different youth wings
Young Labour Non-Labour youth wing Labour Students






From this we can see that the youth wings added together have accounted for over a third of Labour’s 
MPs since 2010. This is not as high as the percentage of SPD MdBs seen in chapter four but is still a 
significant block. As UK MPs have a lower turnover rate than Members of the Bundestag there may 
simply be a delay in how quickly individuals move through.  
The Labour Party youth wings have less prestige and fewer resources than the JUSOS, which may also 
have an effect. This is an important distinction. The biggest source, Labour Students, is largely from 
ages 18 to 22. Young Labour has a cut off of 26 and the Young Fabians, which has a generally older 
profile than both the others, of 31. The JUSOS however is 35. This allows individuals in the JUSOS to 
live and breath the organisation for over a decade, sometimes for twenty years. The JUSOS also has 
much greater resources and political clout and is generally a deeper organisation than any of the 
Labour Party youth wings. All of this is relevant when it comes to understanding why the Labour youth 
wings, although still highly significant, are behind their German counterparts when it comes to the 
numbers of MPs they account for.  
Additionally, the Labour Party is historically closer to the trade union movement than the SPD, 






Labour N/L YW 
Labour 
Students N/L SW 
Young 
Fabians 
1979 49 12 1 35 2 4 
1983 40 12 1 28 1 2 
1987 53 13 1 35 4 4 
1992 67 12 1 48 7 6 
1997 95 16 2 65 9 16 
2001 102 20 2 70 9 19 
2005 102 19 2 72 9 14 
2010 99 19 1 74 6 19 
2015 88 19 1 62 5 16 
2017 94 21 1 66 5 16 
Fig. 6.8       
 














1979 17.69% 4.33% 0.36% 12.64% 0.72% 1.44% 
1983 18.78% 5.63% 0.47% 13.15% 0.47% 0.94% 
1987 21.63% 5.31% 0.41% 14.29% 1.63% 1.63% 
1992 23.84% 4.27% 0.36% 17.08% 2.49% 2.14% 
1997 22.46% 3.78% 0.47% 15.37% 2.13% 3.78% 
2001 24.82% 4.87% 0.49% 17.03% 2.19% 4.62% 
2005 28.57% 5.32% 0.56% 20.17% 2.52% 3.92% 
2010 37.79% 7.25% 0.38% 28.24% 2.29% 7.25% 
2015 38.43% 8.3% 0.44% 27.07% 2.18% 6.99% 
2017 36.19% 8.17% 0.39% 25.68% 1.95% 6.23% 




than their German counterparts. We also therefore need to understand what is happening in the trade 
unions to get a complete picture of Labours legislative recruitment.  
5.7: The trade unions and Labour’s legislative recruitment.  
The Labour Party was conceived and organised as the political arm of the trade union movement.635 
In its early form membership of the Labour Party could only be held by joining an affiliated union or 
socialist society. Consequently, the relationship between the trade unions and the Labour Party has 
been and is considerably closer than is the case with the post-war SPD and the German trade unions.  
It is not surprising therefore that trade unionists have traditionally formed a large percentage of 
Labour Party Members of Parliament.636 Rush637 found that between 1950 and 1966 three quarters of 
Labour Party candidates came from the trade union movement. At the 1966 election 132 of Labour’s 
364 MP’s (36.26%)638 were former Trade Union employees, 112 out of 288 (38.89%) in 1970639 and 
134 of the 301 (44.52%) MPs elected in the February 1974640 election. The trade unionists were also 
almost always in winnable seats. In the 1966 election the trade unions put forward 138 candidates for 
the Labour Party, 132 of them were elected.641 In 1970 they sponsored 137, and 112 were elected.642 
Further as of 1974 80% of Labour MPs at least belonged to a trade union643 even if they weren’t former 
employees.  
This reflected the strength of the trade union movement not just in the Labour Party but more broadly 
in society. However just as in Germany trade unions in the United Kingdom have been in decline. Fig. 
6.10 shows trade union density as a percentage of the UK workforce from 1979 until the most recent 
available data in 2016.644 As with Germany this decline is not in doubt.645  
 
635 For a detailed history of the relationship between the trade unions and the Labour Party see Minkin L. 1991. 
The Contentious Alliance: Trade Unions and the Labour Party. Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press.  
636 Ibid. 
637 Rush M. 1969. The Selection of Parliamentary Candidates. Edinburgh, Thomas Nelson.  




641 Butler D. and Pinto-Duschinsky M. 1971. The General Election of 1970. London, Macmillan.  
642 Ibid., with some additional data from Roth A. 1972. The Business Background of MPs. London, 
Parliamentary Profile Services.  
643 Ellis J. and Johnson R. W. 1974. Fabian Tract 316, Members from the Unions. London, The Fabian Society, 
p1. 
644 All data from OECD figures, available at https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TUD# accessed on 
29.08.2019 16:41. 
645 See for example Daniels G. and McIlroy J. (eds). 2009. Trade Unions in a Neoliberal World: British Trade 
Unions Under New Labour. New York, Routledge and McIlroy J. 1995. Trade Unions in Britain Today. 





The decline in membership means a decline in membership fees, and therefore political contributions. 
It also means a smaller pool of potential voters unions can influence both in elections and in internal 
Labour selection ballots. This would be expected to translate into a decline in influence within the 
Labour Party, manifested over time in a decrease in the number of Labour MPs from a trade union 
background, in line with the second part of Hypothesis 1.   
The number of Labour MPs who had a background as either an employee of a trade union or an elected 
union representative (shop steward) across the timeframe is shown in Fig. 6.11.  
 
To some extent these track Labour’s electoral fortunes. There are declines in 1983, 2005, 2010 and 
2015, with increases in 1992, 1997, and 2017. The outliers are 2001 – when the drop in Labour MPs 
was very minor, and therefore the slight increase in trade union MPs is not largely out of sync – and 
1987 where the number of trade union MPs dropped when the number of Labour MPs increased. 




















































overall number of Labour MPs. The percentages of Labour MPs who come from a trade union 
background is shown in Fig. 6.12.  
 
This shows that the numbers have indeed dropped across the timeframe under discussion. It increased 
in 1983, and then declined until 1997, when it increased again slightly in 2001 and 2005, before again 
dropping in 2010 and 2015, and slightly in 2017. Overall it has declined from over 40% to only slightly 
over a quarter. The exact numbers and percentages are laid out in Fig. 6.13 and Fig. 6.14 respectively.  
Election cycle 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 
Trade union role 116 92 87 93 122 
 2001 2005 2010 2015 2017 
Fig. 6.13 126 117 76 60 67 
      
      
Election cycle 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 
Trade union role 41.88% 43.19% 35.51% 33.1% 28.84% 
 2001 2005 2010 2015 2017 
Fig. 6.14 30.66% 32.77% 29.01% 26.2% 26.07% 
 
When doing a comparison of the percentages of Labour MPs who have come from a trade union and 
youth wing background, as in Fig. 6.15, we can see that the rise of the youth wings does seem to have 































The crossover point was the 2010 election, when there was a large increase in the number of MPs 
from a youth wing, which then took on a larger percentage than the trade unions have accounted for 
since 1983.  The trends are remarkably clear, with the MPs from a trade union on the decline and 
those from the youth wings on the rise. We can therefore conclude that the first part of Hypothesis 1 
is definitively proven – that youth wings have increased as a source of Parliamentarian recruitment. 
Further there is a rough correlation between the trends of an increase in the youth wings and a 
decrease in the trade unionist MPs. The question is whether this correlation is causality or coincidence.  
Is trade union influence in the Labour Party declining?  
One way to understand whether there is a causal relationship is to look at whether trade unionists 
perceive themselves to have lost influence. When asked GB08 commented that they did indeed 
believe there had been a decline in the influence of the trade union movement within the Labour 
Party:  
“The power of the trade unions is changing within the Labour Party, perhaps 
lessening. There’s more tension perhaps between constituency parties and the 
trade unions, and perhaps the trade unions are less powerful than they once were 
because of the changes to one member one vote and things like that.” 
GB08, MP from a trade union background. 
This perspective was also shared by GB01, who gave particular examples of a tension that now exists 
between the unions and the membership in the era under Jeremy Corbyn.   
“In my lifetime it’s changed. The perception if not the reality changes under every 
leadership and this is when it comes down to what is the trade union movement? 
Because you’ve got the extremes from the FBU and CWU and RMT646 within the 
 
646 The Fire Brigades Union, Communication Workers Union and the National Union of Rail, Maritime and 
Transport Workers – perceived as being on the far left of the Labour Party. RMT is not formally affiliated but 
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Labour context, to Community,647 and everything in between. And that’s not to 
insult any of them because there’s a reason behind their individual politics. I am 
really worried that certain parts of the Labour Party don’t understand the value or 
history of the trade union movement. So as much as we’ve got a leader of the party 
who is from the trade union movement or worked briefly for the trade union 
movement648 you’ve got a group of his supporters who publicly attack the trade 
unions and we saw that on the floor of conference. That was very disheartening 
because that was about who we are as a party and they don’t understand that. 
“Who are you?” Chanting that at the trade unions? Well they’re the ones who 
founded us, what are you talking about? So I found that really really difficult. It’s 
very difficult, you never know what’s happening in someone else’s relationship 
unless you’re in it. It’s the same with Labour and the unions. You really don’t know 
what’s going on between any of them unless you’re part of that conversation. So 
right now on the periphery, the shallow perception is that of course it’s a brilliant 
relationship between the trade unions and the Labour Party, but I think it’s actually 
quite unsettled. The efforts to remove the unions from the trigger ballot process, 
the chanting at conference, all of those things. From a personal, political 
perception, given that I am the political voice of the trade union movement, I find 
that very unsettling.” 
GB01, MP from a trade union background. 
It is unlikely that the attacks described by GB01 on the institutional roles of the trade unions within 
the Labour Party would happen if their influence was at the heights it was in the 1970s. This coupled 
with GB08’s outright statement that the influence of the trade unions within the Labour Party is 
lessening demonstrates that the influence, and therefore their ability to get their own people selected 
as candidates has declined in tandem with their declining numbers.  
The examples used by GB01 also suggest that the trade union influence within the party is declining 
in ways other than just the selection of candidates. This would fit with the findings from Allern and 
Bale649 which indicate that the relationship between the unions and the Labour Party has become less 
a case of shared values and more transactional since the New Labour era of Tony Blair. This also fits 
with the research of other scholars such as Hill.650 GB08 also referenced a sense of “mutual frustration” 
in the New Labour era between the party and the unions.  
“The relationship between Labour and the unions is one of mutual frustration 
probably! So probably during the Labour government of 97 – 2010 it felt like it was 
a relationship of frustration and disappointment on the part of the unions. The 
things that were achieved were incredible and delivered a huge amount for union 
 
647 The smallest of the ‘general unions’ formed by a merger of the Iron and Steel Trade Federation and the 
National Union of Knitwear, Footwear and Apparel Trades in 2004. Community is often perceived as being the 
most Centrist of the contemporary Labour affiliated trade unions and was often the union of choice for 
political advisors, Community is sometimes known in the movement as the “SPADs and steelworkers” union.  
648 During the 1970’s Jeremy Corbyn worked as a researcher for the National Union of Tailors and Garment 
Makers, then did the same job for the Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union (AEEU) and then became 
an area officer for the National Union of Public Employees (NUPE). 
649 Allern E. H. and Bale T. 2017. Left-of-Centre Parties and Trade Unions in the Twenty-First Century. Oxford; 
Oxford University Press. 
650 Hill E. R. 2018. It’s not what you know, it’s who you know: What are the implications of networks in U.K. 




members, but there was always frustration that it wasn’t everything that we 
wanted. Now I think it’s a bit different.” 
GB08, MP from a trade union background. 
Despite this however, it should be noted that the unions retain a high level of institutional influence 
within the Labour Party.651 They collectively hold 50% of votes at the Party Conference and have the 
largest block of delegates on the Party’s National Executive Committee. They are also the largest 
funders of the party and they control who can be nominated to stand for leader and deputy leader of 
the party. This gives them far greater sway than their German equivalents. Nevertheless, the data 
presented here shows that their influence has declined, at least in so far as it pertains to their ability 
to get their preferred choices selected as prospective parliamentary candidates in winnable seats.  
This would be expected to create a vacuum as the party still has a functional need for a flow of 
qualified potential candidates. This vacuum, the numbers suggest, has been filled in part by the 
affiliated youth wings, in particular by Labour Students. In consequence it is likely that Hypothesis 1 is 
correct in the case study for the Labour Party.  
5.8: Controlling for other factors – local government, party staffers 
and the rise in graduates in society.  
This section will look at other potential factors which may have a bearing on the rise of youth wings 
as origin points for Labour MPs. First it will look at two other potential recruiting grounds – local 
government and party staffers – and then it will look at the rise in the number of graduates in society 
and consider what bearing that has on the above data.  
When considering the two other possible legislative recruitment grounds – local government and 
those employed by the party or elected politicians – there were difficulties in getting data for local 
government service of the MPs as this was also not recorded in any central database. Some figures 
included this in their entries in Who’s Who,652 but others did not, and this was therefore an unreliable 
source for this purpose. As such this thesis was unable to perform a quantitative analysis. However, 
one interviewee did comment on the topic.  
“You’ve had parties parachuting candidates – again left and right, and the Tories 
as well – people who they know, into seats over and above people who are local 
worthies, and I don’t say worthies in a disparaging sense. For example, how many 
council leaders are there now in Parliament? Certainly, of sizeable authorities? It’s 
a limited number and they’re mainly in the older part of the spectrum. It used to 
almost be de rigueur that even if you were doing other things you spent some time 
in local government.” 
GB09, MP from a trade union and youth wing background. 
This would seem to indicate that those with experience of local government have declined as a source 
of recruitment for Labour MPs: but is only one comment from one perspective. Therefore, this thesis 
 
651 See Allern E. H. and Bale T. 2017. Left-of-Centre Parties and Trade Unions in the Twenty-First Century. 
Oxford; Oxford University Press and Minkin L. 1992. The Contentious Alliance: Trade Unions and the Labour 
Party. Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press. 





simply does not have the data to make any definitive statement with regards to whether local 
government has changed as a source of recruitment.   
With regards to those who have been employed either by the Labour Party directly or by elected 
representatives of the party however this data is recorded by Who’s Who and can therefore be 
analysed. The results are laid out in Fig. 6.16, with the percentage figures in Fig. 6.17.  
 
 
We can see from this that there has been a dramatic rise in the number of Labour MPs who have 
previously worked as either an employee of the Labour Party or as a staffer for an elected Labour Party 
representative. This can range from being a secretary or caseworker in the office of a local MP up to 
being a special advisor (SPAD) in the leaders office or even Number 10 Downing Street during the time 
when Labour was in government. In some cases these are individuals who worked for trade unions 
who were seconded to the Labour Party for specific purposes and timeframes, usually in relation to 
increasing the party’s capacity during an election period. Others came from the youth movement to 


















































“There seem to be as many people who’ve say, worked for members of Parliament 
who end up in those roles [Parliamentarians]. I wouldn’t criticise them for doing 
that because I think a lot of the time people end up doing those jobs because they’re 
interested in being involved with the party so it’s sometimes a bit unfair on them 
to say they’re career politicians because I mean they’ve done that and worked on 
quite a low wage actually for quite a long time as a caseworker or something 
because actually they want to improve people’s lives really.” 
GB04, MP from a youth wing background. 
The interesting phrase here is ‘they’re interested in being involved with the party’. There has been an 
expansion in the numbers of staff employed by both the party and its elected representatives as 
politics has professionalised. Therefore, people who would have been involved with the party on a 
voluntary basis previously are now being employed in a paid role by the party or an elected 
representative. This is a large part of the political ecosystem in which individuals earn a living from 
politics. This suggests that the increase in the number of MPs who had previously worked as a member 
of staff is down to the increased professionalisation within politics.  
This concept asserted by this thesis that individuals are coming from university into these political jobs 
from University and then on to electoral politics fits with the data here and is explored further in 
chapter six. Fig. 6.18 shows the number of ex-Staffer MPs and their origin point, either in one of the 
youth wings, in the trade unions, or neither.  
 
From this we can see that since 2001 the majority of MPs who had previously worked either for the 
party or for an elected representative had come from the youth wings originally. Although the 
numbers have increased for all three origin points it is far more marked for those from the youth wing, 
in particular since 2010. This supports the hypothesis that service as a staffer or party employee is 
more frequently an intermediate step on the career paths of contemporary MPs than an origin point 
in its own right, with the role forming part of the political ecosystem which recruits out of the youth 
wings as well as the trade unions.653 When broken down into the individual youth wings in Fig. 6.19 
 
653 There was also some crossover. Prior to 1997 no former staffer had both a youth wing and trade union role 























Ex-Staffer MPs and their origins




the picture is similar to the overall one, with Labour Students dominating the scene ahead of both 
Young Labour and the Young Fabians.   
 
This is further evidence that Labour Student’s is the dominant youth wing in terms of the origin point 
for those who move first into the political ecosystem and then become Parliamentarians and provides 
quantitative data to support the statement that individuals who are ‘career politicians’ – that is those 
who move into elected office having worked in a political role – often become politicised and start out 
on that journey at university.  
Controlling for the increase in tertiary education.  
Since the greatest increase is amongst those with a background in Labour Students it is possible that 
the increase in youth wing MPs is related to the increase in UK tertiary education. In other words, the 
increase in former Labour Students in the party’s Parliamentary ranks could simply be because there 
are now more graduates in UK society.654  
In 1960 the UK had just 24 Universities.655 A further 13 were already in the process of being granted 
their charter,656 before the Commission of Lord Lionel Robbins report657 recommended that the UK’s 
 
there were 5, in 2015 there were 4 and in 2017 there were 3. This shows that unions are becoming more a part 
of that ecosystem rather than just an origin point, something discussed further in chapter six. 
654 Jobbins D. 2013. UK higher education since Robbins – A timeline. University World News. Published on 
01.11.2013. Available at: https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20131028123008296 
accessed 21.03.2020 13:33.  
655 Oxford, Cambridge, St Andrews, Glasgow, Aberdeen, Edinburgh, London, Durham, Newcastle, the colleges 
of the University of Wales, Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds, Liverpool, Sheffield, Bristol, Dundee, Exeter, Hull, 
Leicester, Nottingham, Reading, Queen’s Belfast and Southampton. Taken from Ibid.  
656 Sussex (1961), Keele (1962), East Anglia (1963), York (1963), Lancaster (1964), Essex (1964-65), Strathclyde 
(1964), Kent (1965), Warwick (1965), Heriot-Watt (1966), Salford (1967), Stirling (1967) and Ulster (1968). 
Taken from Ibid.  
657 Robbins L. 1963. Higher Education: Report of the Committee appointed by the Prime Minister under the 
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10 Colleges of Advanced Technology also become Universities.658 At the same time more than 30 
degree-awarding non-University institutions – the Polytechnics – were created.659 A second and much 
greater expansion happened following the Further and Higher Education Act 1992660 when 34 
Polytechnics661 and 38 other institutions662 were converted into Universities, although this was more 
the unification of a binary system rather than a particular increase in graduate numbers.663 The 
implementation of the recommendations in the Dearing Report,664 whilst not founding new 
institutions, expanded the numbers at the existing Universities.  
The Office of National Statistics records665 that between 1992 and 2016 the student population 
roughly doubled, from 984,000 to 1.87 million,666 the latter figure being equivalent to a third of the 
18-24 year old population.667 This has been down to a steady increase, with one big jump in 2010, as 
can be seen in fig 6.20668 below. The percentage of the UK population which has graduated from 
tertiary education has also been increasing, according to the Office of National Statistics, from 24% on 
2002 to 42% in 2017.669  
 
658 Aston, Loughborough, City University London, Chelsea College of Science and Technology (originally part of 
the University of London then later subsumed into King's College), Surrey, Brunel, Bath, Cardiff (initially part of 
the University of Wales), Salford and Bradford. Taken from Jobbins D. 2013. UK higher education since Robbins 
– A timeline. University World News. Published on 01.11.2013. Available at: 
 https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20131028123008296 accessed 21.03.2020 13:33.  
659 Ibid.  
660 Further and Higher Education Act 1992. Available at: 
 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1992/13/contents. Accessed 21.03.2020 13:43.  
661 Anglia Ruskin, Birmingham City, Brighton, Bournemouth, Central Lancashire, Coventry, De Montfort, East 
London, Edinburgh Napier, Glamorgan, Glasgow Caledonian, Greenwich, Hertfordshire, Huddersfield, Kingston, 
Leeds Metropolitan, Lincoln, Liverpool John Moores, London Metropolitan, London South Bank, Manchester 
Metropolitan, Middlesex, Northumbria, Nottingham Trent, Oxford Brookes, Plymouth, Portsmouth, Sheffield 
Hallam, Staffordshire, Sunderland, Teesside, West of England, Westminster and Wolverhampton. 
662 Abertay Dundee, University of the Arts London, The Arts University Bournemouth, Bath Spa, Bedfordshire, 
Bishop Grosseteste, Bolton, BPP, Buckinghamshire New, Canterbury Christ Church, Chester, Chichester, 
Cranfield, Cumbria, Edge Hill, Falmouth, Gloucestershire, Glyndwr, Harper Adams, Highlands and Islands, Leeds 
Trinity, Liverpool Hope, Newman, Newport, Northampton, Norwich University of the Arts, Queen Margaret, 
Robert Gordon, Roehampton, Royal Agricultural, Southampton Solent, Swansea Metropolitan, University of 
Wales Institute Cardiff, West of Scotland, West London, Winchester, Worcester and York St John. 
663 Bathmaker A.M. 2003. The Expansion of Higher Education: A Consideration of Control, Funding and Quality 
IN Bartlett, S. and Burton, D. (eds) Education Studies. Essential Issues, London: Sage, pp.169-189. 
664 Dearing R. 1997. Higher Education in the learning society: The Main Report of The National Committee of 
Inquiry into Higher Education. London, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office. Available at: 
 http://www.educationengland.org.uk/documents/dearing1997/dearing1997.html.  
665 ONS. 2016. How has the student population changed? ONS.gov.uk. Published on 20.09.2016. Available at: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/livebirths/articles/howh
asthestudentpopulationchanged/2016-09-20. Accessed on 26.08.2020 12:14.  
666 Ibid.  
667 Ibid.  
668 Fig. 6.20 reproduced from Ibid.  
669 ONS. 2017. Graduates in the UK labour market: 2017. ONS.gov.uk. Published 24.11.2017. Available at: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/article





With such a large expansion of Universities and student numbers then you would expect a great 
increase in the number of graduates coming into the Labour Party. This increase in the graduate 
population however doesn’t match up with the increase in the percentages and numbers of Labour 
MPs from a youth wing background, which has been steadily increasing since the 1980s, including with 
a jump in 1992. It is certain that the increase in graduates in society has and will increase the number 
of graduates in Parliament, but Parliament was not short of graduates before the big increases in 
higher education in the 1960s, mid-1990s and early 2000s. There have always been considerably more 
graduates in the House of Commons than amongst the general population, including in the Labour 
Party.670 Fig. 6.21671 shows the number of total University graduates in the PLP compared to youth 
wing and trade union backgrounds.  
 
670 Audickas L. and Cracknell R. 2020. Briefing Paper CBP 7483 – Social Backgrounds of MPs 1979 – 2019. House 
of Commons Library. Published on 27th March 2020. Available at 
https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7483/CBP-7483.pdf. Accessed on 26.08.2020 
15:32.  





As can be seen in Fig. 6.21 the number of graduate MPs has always been well above the population 
and despite some variation do slowly tick up, although a comparison between 1979, when 59% of 
Labour MPs were graduates, and 2005 when 64% were shows it wasn’t particularly dramatic across 
those 26 years. The dramatic increase came in 2010, up to 72%, when the dramatic increase in those 
from a youth wing background also happened, although it has then continued to rise as the number 
of MPs from a youth wing background plateaued up to 84% in the 2017 Parliament.672  
Studies by Holmes,673 Roberts674 and Blanden and Machin675 confirm that even with the expansion of 
higher education those who attend university are still overwhelmingly middle-class when they arrive. 
Further, as Mayhew, Deer and Dua676 found although the raw numbers of less affluent students has 
increased, they form the same proportion of university attendees as they did in the early 1960s. 
Further, as discussed above, studies by Brynner and Egerton677 and Reay, Crozier and Clayton678 both 
found that those from a working-class background who attend university tend to adopt middle-class 
sensibilities in order to ‘blend in’. There is also some anecdotal evidence that Labour Students may be 
more active in the top universities who have a lower-still proportion of less-affluent students – all of 
the interviewees with a youth wing background had attended one of the 24 elite Russell Group 
universities. But this has not yet been explored by researchers so cannot be stated categorically.  
This means that Labour Students is likely to be a highly middle-class organisation, and that those who 
are from a less affluent background who join are likely to adopt those middle-class norms as part of 
 
672 Ibid.  
673 Holmes C. 2013. Has the expansion of higher education lead to greater economic growth? National Institute 
Economic Review. Vol. 224 No. 1, pp. 29 – 47.  
674 Roberts K. 2010. Expansion of higher education and the implications for demographic class formation in 
Britain. Twenty-First Century Society. Vol. 5 No. 3, pp. 215 – 228.  
675 Blanden J. and Machin S. 2004. Educational inequality and the expansion of UK higher education. Scottish 
Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 51 No. 2, pp. 230-249. 
676 Mayhew K., Deer C. and Dua M. 2004. The move to mass higher education in the UK: Many questions and 
some answers. Oxford Review of Education. Vol. 30 No. 1, pp. 65 – 82.  
677 Brynner J.M. and Egerton M. 2001. The Wider Benefits of Higher Education. London, Institute of Education. 
Available at https://dera.ioe.ac.uk//5993/ accessed 26.06.2019 11:49. 
678 Reay D., Crozier G. and Clayton J. 2010. ‘Fitting in’or ‘standing out’: Working‐class students in UK higher 
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the culture. Further given that the proportions of middle- and working-class students have not 
changed it is unlikely that the class make-up of Labour Students has shifted unduly. The main shift 
then evidenced by the above is an increase in the numbers for Labour Students.  
It is not surprising that as the number of graduates has risen in society, so it has risen in the House of 
Commons, nor is it surprising that the percentage of MPs with degrees is considerably higher than it 
is in the general public. As we have seen679 the dominant youth wing in terms of those who become 
MPs is Labour Students, so again it is not surprising that when the number of Labour Students 
increases so does the number of graduates, in particular because as discussed above the trade unions 
are now also increasingly selecting graduates rather than manual workers to stand for office. However, 
the number of youth wing MPs has been steadily increasing, including in years when the number of 
graduates dropped as a percentage such as 2005 and during the period from 1979 to 2005 when the 
number of graduates varied but broadly plateaued. That suggests that belonging to a youth movement 
gives an aspirant politician an advantage above and beyond that which they gain by being a graduate.   
In addition, the key point here is the politicisation process. That is to say it is not so important whether 
an individual holds a degree or not but that the manner in which they got involved led through the 
youth and student wing. It is an increase in those with the political culture of the youth wings which 
is important, not the number of those with a degree. And whereas the rise in the number of graduates 
would have occurred regardless of the youth wings as the number of graduates rose in society the 
specifics of how those individuals think about and perform politics is shaped by the culture inculcated 
by the youth wings.  
5.9: Conclusion.  
The objective of this chapter was to investigate research question and hypothesis 1 in relation to the 
case study of the British Labour Party. Hypothesis 1 states that youth wings have risen as a source of 
Parliamentarian recruitment and that this has been at the expense of the trade union movement. The 
data presented in this chapter shows that this contention is correct. 
There has been a large rise in the number of MPs who come from a youth wing background, and that 
origin point is now more common than that of trade unions. When this rise is unpacked it becomes 
clear that the predominant origin point has in fact been Labour Students, which accounts for by far 
the largest number of MPs. Young Labour has increased as an origin point, but not to the same scale. 
Meanwhile the Young Fabians, who were irrelevant in the 1980s, have since the 1997 election 
emerged as a useful route into the party, and are now almost on a par with Young Labour as a route 
into elected politics.  
At the same time there has been a drop in the number of Labour MPs who come from a trade union 
background. The Labour Party’s historically closer relationship to the trade unions680 and the slower 
turnover of Parliamentarians in the British system means that trade unionist MPs were dominant for 
longer than their German counterparts and remain a significant block within the PLP. However, the 
trend has been for MPs from a youth wing background to increase and trade unionist MPs to decrease, 
with the former overtaking the latter in 2010. Correlation is not causality, however the interview data 
shows that the trade unions have become less influential within the Labour Party and it is highly likely 
that the decline in influence leads to a decline in their ability to get their own candidates adopted in 
 
679 See chapter five.  





winnable seats, this being one of the main objectives for trade unions when wielding influence within 
the party.   
There has also been a rise in the number of MPs who came from a background as either a party 
employee or a staffer for one of its elected representatives. Some of these are trade union staff who 
are seconded to the party for the duration of election campaigns to increase capacity. However there 
has been a large increase in the number of staffers who were previously active in a youth wing. This 
supports the theory, also proposed by interviewees, that these roles are an intermediate stage in the 
process, a part of the political ecosystem which provides politicised individuals with a means of 
support and a base from which to push for selection. There are still some staffers who do not come 
from either background, suggesting this can also be a route into elected politics in its own right, but 
this has declined over recent election cycles whereas those from a youth wing have continued to 
increase. When broken down we see a similar pattern with those from a youth wing, with Labour 
Students being most important followed by the Young Fabians and Young Labour.  
This links to the notions of professionalisation and an increase in the number of staffer and party 
employee roles as political activity became more sophisticated. This provided a career structure, with 
those who were active in youth or particularly student politics being able to access these roles more 
readily and therefore remaining within the political ecosystem. This provides benefits for selection in 
that party activity can be undertaken during work hours and also provides a sympathetic employer 
who can act as a mentor and supporter. Nevertheless, it is for most individuals not the entry point 
into politics, and it is those which this thesis is primarily concerned with. We can therefore conclude 
that hypothesis 1 is proven, and that youth wings have now overtaken trade unions as the main origin 





Chapter 6: The impact of youth wings on the legislative recruitment of 
the SPD and Labour Party.  
 
6.1 Introduction.  
 
Chapter four demonstrated that the youth wings of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands – 
and specifically the Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Jungsozialistinnen und Jungsozialisten in der SPD, the 
JUSOS – have indeed increased as the origin point for members of the SPD Bundestagsfraktion. In the 
same vein chapter five show that in the case study of the UK Labour Party there has been a rise in the 
number of MPs from a youth wing – in particular Labour Students – and a decrease in trade unionist 
MPs. The question then follows, why does this matter? In other words, how has this impacted on the 
parties in question? In order to explore that this chapter will investigate hypotheses 2 and 3. These 
are:  
Hypothesis 2: The youth organisations present significant practical barriers to entry 
which wealthier, middle class individuals are better able to negotiate. 
Hypothesis 3: The shift in recruitment patterns contributes to the gentrification of 
social democratic parties by creating a shift in the political culture of the party 
representatives and therefore a shift in the nature of the parties in question. 
Whilst exploring Hypothesis 2 this chapter will examine the role of the youth wings as the gateway to 
the political sphere. This consists of the political ecosystem of party employees, existing 
representative’s staffers, NGOs, think-tanks, trade union staff and lobbyists and the broader politics-
facilitating roles in fields such as the law, teaching, academia and in the German case the civil 
service.681 This intermediate phase provides an advantage in selection by giving individuals access to 
institutional resources and networking opportunities. In the case of the SPD it also helps to explain a 
curious phenomenon, that some of the interviewees were surprised at the increase in numbers 
coming from the JUSOS into the Bundestagsfraktion, although they could not agree on whether it was 
because they thought that the JUSOS had always provided numbers as high as in the contemporary 
party or because they didn’t think the numbers had got as high as the quantitative data shows.  
 
This chapter will first set out how that gateway phenomenon functions, and will then investigate the 
barriers to entry imposed by the youth wings in the case studies, first the practical barriers as 
referenced in Hypothesis 2 such as time and money, and then other, non-logistical barriers which were 
raised by the interviewees, in particular around the concept of class. Also explored is the concept of 
the motivation for individuals to join and persevere within youth wings to the point of being in a 
position to push for selection. The data shows that this is largely down to a socialisation process, rather 
than directly due to ambition – although that is important for some individuals – or to ideological 
commitment.  
 
The chapter will then ask how those barriers which have been identified continue to operate through 
an individual’s selection journey, expanding on the existing data which suggests that work in a politics-
facilitating job682 in the political ecosystem does provide an advantage in overcoming barriers to entry 
in the formal stage of selection. The data presented here suggests that by acting as the primary 
 
681 Cairney P. 2007. The Professionalisation of MPs: Refining the ‘Politics-Facilitating’ Explanation. 
Parliamentary Affairs. Vol. 60 No. 2. pp 212-233. 
682 See for example ibid, Allen P. 2018. The Political Class: Why it matters who our politicians are. Oxford, 
Oxford University Press and Ashe J. 2020. Political Candidate Selection: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Under-




gateway to this ecosystem the youth wings can play a role in reducing barriers to entry at that selection 
stage if an individual overcomes the initial barriers to become active in the youth wings. From this we 
can conclude that the limited evidence so far presented does indicate prima facie that Hypothesis 2 
has some merit, which would benefit from further exploration.  
 
Having established this the chapter proceeds to explore Hypothesis 3, something perhaps more 
difficult to prove than hypotheses 1 and 2, as the concept of political culture is more subjective. It 
does this by first unpacking two assumptions within the Hypothesis. One, that the parties have seen a 
shift in political culture and two, that this is linked to the rise in legislators socialised into the parties 
by youth wings. In both case studies there is initial evidence presented here that indicates that there 
has been a shift in the political culture of the SPD and the Labour Party, and that these are indeed 
linked to the rise of the youth wings as the origin point of many MPs.  
 
The chapter utilises the concept of ideological factionalism as a framing device to explore the political 
cultures of the parties and finds that in neither case is this the key divide. Rather the primary cleavage 
is a tension between an ‘older social democratic’683 and ‘trade unionist’684 part of the parties and a 
newer ‘citizen-led’685 and ‘more academic, middle-class’686 group of members. The data indicates that 
this latter group is often politicised at University and as such is likely to be active in the youth wings. 
Universities tend be dominated by middle-class individuals687 and those working-class individuals who 
attend tend to adopt middle-class sensibilities to fit in.688  
 
The evidence suggests that this phenomenon also applies to the youth wings. In the case of Labour, 
which has three competing youth wings rather than a single body such as the JUSOS, it is found that 
similar experiences lead to the different youth wings having a similar political culture to each other. 
Further, the data shows that this political culture has started to merge into trade unionist MPs as the 
Unions begin to send university educated individuals to Parliament, such as trade union political 
officers and industrial tribunal solicitors.  
 
Therefore, again the evidence suggests that the political culture of the youth wings has been imported 
to the parties’ legislators and there are some tentative clues towards this being causal. This would 
again imply that Hypothesis 3 contains a kernel of truth to it, which is worthy of more research.  
 
The objective of this chapter when unpacking these hypotheses is to seek to add depth to the case 
studies presented here and offer an interpretive first glance at the questions so raised. The findings 
are prima facie impressions based on a limited number of interviews and should be interpreted 




683 GB03 interview with the author. 
684 GB01 interview with the author. 
685 GB03 interview with the author. 
686 GB01 interview with the author. 
687 Brynner J.M. and Egerton M. 2001. The Wider Benefits of Higher Education. London, Institute of Education. 
Available at https://dera.ioe.ac.uk//5993/ accessed 26.06.2019 11:49. 
688 Reay D., Crozier G. and Clayton J. 2010. ‘Fitting in’or ‘standing out’: Working‐class students in UK higher 




6.2: Youth wings as political gateways.  
 
Prior to investigating the youth wings’ barriers to entry, we must ascertain where the youth wings fit 
into the legislative recruitment story. Wigbers689 identified three routes into politics for those who 
eventually became candidates – an interest in specific issues leading to them joining the party, an 
involvement in a grass roots organisation which evolved into party political involvement and a general 
interest in politics, often sparked by family socialisation. All three routes can potentially lead through 
a party-political youth organisation, and the youth wings are often the first section of the party that 
an individual encounters. GB08 specifically stated that the youth wings were the starting point for 
some Labour MPs.  
“I’m sure the youth wings are important as a source of MP recruitment for the 
party, they’re people’s way into the Labour Party. Lots of people have done other 
things as well, but lots of my colleagues tell me that they joined the party through 
Young Labour or Labour Students.”  
GB08, MP from a trade union background. 
The SPD’s youth wings are better organised than those of the Labour Party and have greater 
institutional strength.690 This allows, in rare cases, for an individual’s service in the youth wings to 
translate directly into a legislative career. They are however very uncommon. This was confirmed by 
DE01: 
“Some MdBs are coming into the Bundestag directly from the university groups. 
But that is a very small number of cases.”  
DE01, senior SPD Party Employee 
 
DE06 specified that they felt the notion of Senioritätsprinzip – the seniority principle – was the reason 
why it is rare for individuals to go straight from the JUSOS into the Bundestag: 
“When talking about the role of JUSOS as a recruitment base it’s a political struggle 
for JUSOS to get their candidates into mandates. They are pushed out by the party. 
You have Johanna Uekermann, who tried to be a candidate at the [2017] general 
election. She became a candidate, but she landed on a list place where it was clear 
she wouldn’t get into the parliament because of Senioritätsprinzip - the seniority 
principle. If you are already in the Bundestag you will always be reselected at the 
party level because you already won, and they don’t want to lose an active 
Parliamentarian. There is also a regional quota or regional representation. So, it’s 
hard to overcome these principles about seniority and about regional 
representation.” 
DE05, senior JUSOS activist. 
 
 
689 Wigbers D. 2012. Pathways to Parliament: Legislative recruitment in Germany and Great Britain. Doctoral 
Dissertation; Darwin College, University of Cambridge, p69. 
690 See Braunthal G. 1994. The German Social Democrats since 1969: A party in power and opposition. Second 




The Labour youth wings have less influence, resources and formal powers. They do not pre-select 
candidates to endorse or campaign for individuals in selections in the same way, as discussed by GB10.  
“Young Labour is just seen as the youth adjunct to the main party, it’s not really 
seen as a big, separate organisation. You don’t have that same culture of treating 
it as a professional body, it doesn’t have the same stature as say a trade union 
which in Sweden is exactly what you have, and indeed in other social democratic 
parties across Europe and elsewhere, Germany for example. It’s just not got the 
same level of prestige.” 
GB10, senior activist in Young Labour and the Young Fabians. 
It is therefore clear that for those legislators from the Labour youth wings and the large majority of 
the individuals from the JUSOS the youth wings are not a direct route into the legislature. Rather they 
act as a gateway, politicising individuals and bringing them into the political sphere. From there some 
will move through to work in the political ecosystem,691 stand for local government or undertake other 
roles which then place them into a position to stand for national office.692  
 
Youth wings as a political gateway.  
The concept of the youth wings as gateway simply means that they act as an entry point providing 
individuals who are active within them access to careers which provide political benefits, allowing an 
individual to build the political capital necessary to push for selection. This gateway takes two forms.  
 
Firstly, the political ecosystem itself – those working for the party, for elected representatives, in think-
tanks, NGOs, charities, lobbying organisations and the political media. These roles recruit politically 
engaged and motivated young people. Many of these will have demonstrated their political 
engagement via service in the youth wings, meaning it acts in a very direct way as a gateway to jobs 
in this ecosystem. This route into the political ecosystem was discussed by many of the interviewees, 
including DE05, GB02, GB03 and GB04.  
“I think the connections you get in JUSOS, if you want to stay in politics it will help 
you get a job. If you want to go into a different area, let’s say physics, the 
connections in that sense will not help you. So, if you want to stay in politics the 
networking, the connections will help you.”  
DE05, senior JUSOS activist. 
“We’ve seen it, I mean we both know people who have been very involved, you 
know people would say oh that person used to be Young Labour Chair or that 
person used to be in Young Fabians. Obviously, the youth movement gives you 
profile, it gives you an opportunity if you wish to take it to do stuff. I think it does 
give an opportunity because it also upskills you in terms of understanding how 
politics works, you tend to make networks and connections with people who might 
be able to support you. It gives you kind of, I suppose an insight into a world that 
seems to be sort of bizarre to other people.” 
GB02 – Senior activist in Young Labour, Labour Students and the Young Fabians. 
 
691 Cairney P. 2007. The Professionalisation of MPs: Refining the ‘Politics-Facilitating’ Explanation. 
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“You get a lot of people leaving those [youth] organisations who are very well-
networked, who have had more contact with senior people earlier in their careers 
than they would otherwise have done. So, you get a lot of them going into staff and 
official roles, of whom some will become MPs. But I think it’s more the networks 
that come out of it are the key thing really. They’re exposed to politicians and senior 
politicians earlier on in their careers and it opens doors, and some people will take 
those opportunities and some people won’t.” 
GB03, former senior party employee 
“I think anyone that came into student politics thinking that they’re going to be an 
MP or thinking that it’s going to make them an MP is likely to be disappointed. 
What I think it does though is provide opportunities, I think in terms of 
opportunities yeah it does, of course it does open opportunities to you.”  
GB04, MP from a youth wing background. 
Secondly those working in the broader sphere, the politics-facilitating careers such as law, education, 
academia and the German civil service, use the youth wings as their point of contact to the political 
parties. As both Cairney693 and Mellors694 found working either in the political ecosystem or in the 
broader politics-facilitating sphere enables an individual to combine making a living with generating 
political capital. Again, this was a common factor brought up by interviewees from both the case 
studies. DE01 and DE03 laid out how the process works in the case of the SPD: 
“There are a lot of new candidates who were working in the political field. They 
were employees of politicians. And having worked for a mayor and they become 
the mayor, having worked for a Member of Parliament they become the Member 
of Parliament when the old Member retires. That is a new phenomenon. It is really 
logical because the political field as a career path is very much bigger than forty 
years ago. In 1970 the Bundestagfaktion had 30 employees. Nowadays they have 
350. In 1970 one Member of Parliament has one woman as a secretary and one 
man as a personal employee, and it was that way round back then. Nowadays a 
Member of Parliament has 10 or 12 people working for them. So, the number of 
people who are working for politicians has increased and its only normal I think 
that from this increased personnel group a lot of them stand for office themselves. 
That is not new, but it has increased.”  
DE01, Senior SPD party employee. 
“Every Member of Parliament has an office and what happens quite frequently is 
that the head of the MPs office when the MP they work for stands down then the 
staffer steps in. That happened for the guy who worked for Gerhard Schröder, Lars 
Klingbeil who is now the general secretary of the party. That was his way of getting 
in and this seems to be quite common these days. This is not specifically for the 
SPD, you see this in all parties, the former staffers of the Members of Parliament 
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becoming MPs. This book I just read had the CVs of these people and that seemed 
to be a very common way.” 
DE03, MdB from a trade union background. 
 
The key point here is the route through this political ecosystem has grown larger across the timeframe. 
In this instance both interviewees mention specifically working for existing legislators as the route. 
GB09 when discussing the Labour Party concurred and also mentions working in the NGO / Charity 
sector:  
“It’s an interesting topic, the shift in where MPs are coming from with the youth 
and student movements in particular. It’s part of the tertiarization of politics, the 
notion that you need to have done some form of tertiary education, attended 
university, to be in politics. You have people who just know each other through 
student politics and student politics became stronger. I think it’s happened like this. 
Expansion of tertiary education and progressively therefore greater opportunity. 
Also, the expansion of Parliamentary staffs. That created more opportunities for 
people to be assistants, and that created a career structure for people to maintain 
themselves. Now there is a career path through that and then to go and work for 
say the leader’s office. Short money provides funding then for people to move up 
and work in the Leader of the Opposition’s office. And then electoral politics. The 
people from the youth wings, a lot of them go and work in the NGO sector. Again, 
a lot of them and their big offices, and all their career structures are based in 
London. They come down, they work in the charity or NGO sector. This is very big 
business, it means they’ve got facilities, offices and all the rest of it from which they 
can conduct their activities. Again, not new. That was true in the 70s, but it was 
emerging at that stage. Now it’s just rampant.” 
GB09, MP from a youth wing and trade union background. 
This maps out that the Labour youth wings, in particular the student wing695 act as a gateway to a job 
in a political ecosystem formed of Party staff, NGOs and charities.  
 
With remarkable consistency then interviewees in both case studies viewed the youth wings as a 
gateway to further opportunities within that political ecosystem. The relevant point here is that these 
roles are intermediate stages, not origin points in and of themselves, with the youth wings acting as 
gatekeepers to bring individuals into the political ecosystem from which candidates are drawn.696  
 
This intermediate stage may also help to explain a curious phenomenon. Whereas the interviewees 
from the Labour Party case study recognised that the youth wings were an origin point for legislators, 
those from the SPD held very different perceptions as to the scale of how many MdBs came from a 




695 This also concurs with the data showing Labour Students as the dominant youth wing, see chapter five. 
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The rise of youth wing origin SPD MdBs: a hidden surge?  
Interviewees from the SPD case study had different perspectives of how important the youth wings 
had been as a source of recruitment, with all of them agreeing that it was a route into politics and an 
important one but different perceptions as to the scale. DE01 believed that the JUSOS was the main 
source of MdBs but felt that this had always been the case: 
“Of course, the JUSOS is a huge source of parliamentarians. But that’s also not new. 
Helmut Schmidt was the first chairman of Social Democratic Students after the 
Second World War. And Gerhard Schröder was chairman of the JUSOS in 1978, 79 
or something like that, and so on. It’s not new. Not new at all. I think we forget that 
most of the politicians we know from TV were active in the JUSOS when they were 
young, it’s normal. JUSOS were always a big source, in the 60s, the 70s. In the 60s 
it was the same, in the 70s it was a little bit less because of 1968 and the revolts. 
Andrea Nahles was Chairperson. Lars Klingbeil, our general secretary, was on the 
board, at the federal level. Our Minister for the Environment, Svenja Schulze, has 
been Chairperson of JUSOS in Northern Westphalia. And so I am sure you will find 
a lot of JUSOS functions in the biographies of our leading politicians.”  
DE01, senior SPD party employee. 
 
DE01’s view was however contradicted by other interviewees. DE02 felt the JUSOS was an important 
source but estimated it accounted for background of around 30% of the MdBs in their Land group, 
and that this was similar to the numbers coming from the Trade Unions: 
“The JUSOS is important as a source of Parliamentarians but it’s not the only way. 
There is a need for some different ways of socialisation of people who come into 
the Parliament. But you need these people who have the political skills they learn 
in the JUSOS. I think the numbers have stayed the same since the 90’s. In my Land 
party group, it’s a small number out of the overall total697 who have a JUSOS 
socialisation and we have a lot who come from trade unions. I don’t know how it is 
in the groups of the other Länder. Maybe you’ll get the impression from other 
interviewees that something has changed. A lot of young women come from the 
JUSOS because we want to be more female and more youth oriented. We have 
some young women in the group here in Berlin coming from the JUSOS but it’s not 
representative. My impression is that about thirty percent of our group have a 
trade union background and the same for the youth wing.”  
DE02, MdB from a JUSOS background. 
 
The most likely explanation for this however is simply that the numbers coming from the youth wings 
are unevenly distributed across the different Länder. DE02 may well be correct for their own Land 
group (the data was not separated by Land) but that other Länder groupings have much higher 
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Alternatively, it may also be that the intermediate stages are more obvious than the origin point. In 
other words, individual MdBs may be known as someone who came through as a party staffer, even 
though they did become socialised into the party through the youth wings. DE03 asked to see the 
quantitative data and commented that they believed it was correct, but that many didn’t come directly 
from the JUSOS: 
“I think your figures are roughly right, but there is some overlap between JUSOS 
and the trade unions. So, the gap might be slightly smaller. I don’t think that many 
came directly from JUSOS because not that many Members of Parliament are under 
35. But the people who are selecting recruit less out of the trade unions, that has 
got less over the years, distinctly less. The selection process has shifted a long way 
from the unions and its more from the people who are in the youth organisations.” 
DE03, MdB from a Trade Union background. 
There is disagreement then amongst interviewees as to whether the numbers had changed, but DE01 
and DE03 agreed that the contemporary picture was correct. DE02 disagreed but only for their Land 
group, and it is to be expected that the quantitative picture would differ from region to region.  The 
debate then was whether the JUSOS had always been as big a part of the picture as now.  The 
suggestion then is that the rise of the JUSOS seems to be in some respects a ‘hidden’ surge, perhaps 
masked by the intermediate stages which individuals go through. More research would be required 
to explore this further, but it is an interesting nuance to the data we have here.  
 
Ambition or socialisation?  
The motivation of an individual to seek public office plays a decisive role in the selection process,698 
even if it is a difficult one for academics to study.699  Wigbers700 identified three routes into politics for 
those who eventually became candidates and it has already been noted that these routes can all lead 
through the youth wings. But what motivates an individual to take up one of these routes? 
 
There are many possible reasons why someone might want to join a politically affiliated youth wing, 
but there is a key distinction for this study which is do they join with the aim of becoming an elected 
representative or not? In other words, is it a case of ambitious individuals joining youth wings to gain 
an advantage, or do they join for other reasons and become socialised into the political ecosystem 
and then electoral politics?  
 
Existing research suggests that political ambition is not the most common motivating factor. Norris 
and Lovenduski’s701 found that only 13% of Labour members would even be willing to stand for public 
office, never mind actively seek it. Rather, Bale, Webb and Poletti702 identified multiple motivating 
factors, such as support for specific policies or looking to oppose another parties policies, attachment 
to the parties principles or leadership, for altruistic reasons of supporting the democratic process, 
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Race and Class in the British Parliament. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.  
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because of the influence of friends or family, to socialise with like-minded individuals. They did 
however find that for some the primary motivation was to benefit their career or to seek to become 
an elected politician, but this group is a small percentage of those who join political parties. In the 
specific case of the Labour Party Bale et al703 found that only 2.13% joined to further their career, and 
only 2.52% joined seeking to become an elected politician.  
 
The evidence from the interviews with the current members of the youth wings concurs with this 
finding. The interviewees, both in the case of the Labour Party and the SPD, identified many of the 
same factors, particularly social groups and looking for a politicised peer group. 
“Some of it is just that they’re politically very interested, and they want to go to 
events where they can talk about politics with people who know about politics. 
Some people do it because they want a career in politics, and they think that that’s 
the way forward. Some people do it because they want a friendship circle that is 
political. But mainly I think it’s the common interest, there’s just this feeling 
sometimes in society more broadly that people aren’t engaging politically so they 
want a hub of like-minded individuals they can get involved with. And some people 
just like debating.” 
GB02, senior activist in Young Labour, Labour Students and the Young Fabians. 
“I think people get involved in the Young Fabians for three reasons. First, they have 
a genuine interest in the Fabian ideology, Labour history and the policy-making 
process, so they want to learn more. You have a second group who, it’s a very 
helpful platform professionally because it gives you very unique networks. You get 
to rub shoulders and talk to and network with very high-profile speakers and young 
people who tend to work in professions that are hard to break into such as public 
relations, working in Westminster or governmental organisations. It’s very good 
for other professions such as if you want to work in the law, work as a barrister, so 
it’s very attractive for those people who are thinking about their careers and 
forwarding their careers. Then you have a third type of people who go into it 
because in fact they see it as a pathway to get more involved in politics, to 
potentially develop a platform where they could move further, stand for 
Parliament, stand as a councillor.” 
GB06, senior activist in Labour Students and the Young Fabians 
“The reason why I joined basically was because I think I became political very young 
but didn’t find a way to express that at school because people of my age weren’t 
that interested in talking about politics. I wanted to get involved in anti-racism 
work but I didn’t see any opportunity to do this at my school. And then I met some 
JUSOS actually at an event for politically interested people and they said I could do 
anti-racism work with them, so I was just yes sounds great and I went to a couple 
of their events and I liked it and I joined, and I have been a member of the SPD and 
the JUSOS ever since.”  
DE05, senior JUSOS activist. 
 




“I was quite young when I became a member of the party and the JUSOS. It was a 
choice to do this, but on the other hand it was also because my parents are 
members of the SPD since the early 1970s, since Willy Brandt. So I was raised in an 
environment where social democratic topics and politics were discussed. I 
experimented with different organisations without joining but going to meetings 
sometimes, more specialised organisations. But then some friends of mine got into 
community work at JUSOS and I joined too.”  
DE06, senior JUSOS activist. 
Both Bruter and Harrison704 and Bale, Webb and Poletti705 found however that those who engage in 
high-intensity activity and get very involved in the parties are largely motivated either by personal 
ambition or, more commonly, by becoming integrated into a local social network. The evidence from 
the interviews however is that the individuals motivated from a sense of personal ambition, who join 
with the specific intention of becoming an elected representative, do often not achieve that aim.  
“I didn’t go into student politics thinking ‘Oh I want to be an MP so I’ll get involved 
in student politics because that will be a way to become an MP’ to me that’s not 
how it works. It’s certainly not why I got involved in student politics, I can’t think of 
anyone who went into it thinking I’m going to become an MP, and I think the ones 
who think that are the ones who won’t become an MP, to be perfectly honest.”  
GB04, MP from a youth wing background. 
“I think there are a small number of people who might try and do youth politics to 
get a political career, but I don’t think they have a lot of lasting power. Because 
there’s so much that you have to do where if you’re into that kind of gratification 
for want of a better word, there isn’t really a lot of it around. A lot of the activity of 
politics is talking to people on the doorsteps day after day, taking up their issues, 
sometimes having to deal with quite upset people and a lot of people who aren’t 
really in it to change the world get ground down by that pretty quickly and don’t 
last for very long. I think unless you have a passion for it you’re not going to last.” 
GB05, MP from a youth wing background. 
This, alongside the findings of Bruter and Harrison706 and Bale et al,707 would imply that what is driving 
an individual to get further involved in the political sphere and to keep working within the party is not 
ambition but rather a sense of being socialised into the party and then becoming more active.  
“There’s a socialisation process. People tend to be involved in the movement for 
years before becoming Members of Parliament. Most people I know have been 
involved for a very long time in one way or another before entering Parliament. 
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Student politics is a way of getting involved in the first instance, and a way of 
getting younger people involved.”  
GB04, MP from a youth wing background. 
“I think what happens is when you’re active in politics, often it becomes a big part 
of your life, it takes up many hours of your time and then you see an opportunity 
to go to the next level by becoming a parish councillor for example or a city 
councillor. I think that most people who become MPs or councillors didn’t join to 
become MPs. Some of them might have, to be honest, but I think that most people 
join and then they enjoy it and they get interested in maybe housing policy and 
then they think oh wow as a city councillor I can do a lot on housing policy so that’s 
what I’m going to do next. And then elections come up and people are looking to 
fill the list and then you get asked or you decide yourself to go for it. I think it is 
often feeling like a kind of natural progression from being active and just wanting 
to change something to then making the next step to becoming a politician. 
Ambitious people come in and feel it’s hard and they go.”  
DE05, senior JUSOS activist. 
Both the findings from this thesis and from the findings of researchers such as Bruter and Harrison,708 
Norris and Lovenduski709 and Bale, Webb and Poletti710 suggest that the main driver of an individual 
getting more involved having joined a political party is to be integrated into a social network. These 
motivational factors may of course also overlap and intertwine. An individual who wants to be well-
thought of by their peers in the party may also have some elements of ambition and have some 
ideological motivations as well.  
 
This section has identified the motivation for why an individual may want to get further involved to 
the point of standing for election but being motivated is a necessary but insufficient condition to 
generating the political capital necessary. The other condition is the logistical and practical 
wherewithal to perform those activities. The first section already discussed the concept of the youth 
wings acting as a gateway to a political sphere, and that this was of benefit to selection because it 
gave them access to resources and networks which aided them in overcoming the barriers to selection 
they faced. The next section will therefore take as its focus those barriers and the context in which 
they exist.  
 
6.3: Barriers to entry. 
  
The barriers to entry to the youth wings fall into two categories, practical ones, in particular time, 
money and (as with the JUSOS) the timing and at times the location of meetings. There are also non-
practical, or conceptual, barriers, such as the internal motivation to undertake the hard graft needed 
to gain the necessary political capital – the ‘grind’ alluded to in the previous subsection on ambition 
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or socialisation. Another one raised by the Labour Party interviewees, but not those of the SPD, was 
class, or perceptions of class. Some individuals raised this as a potential barrier to the youth wings, 
but other interviewees saw it as a barrier to selection which the youth wings help to overcome.  
All of these barriers, practical and conceptual, are not however something which an individual gets 
over once. They persist throughout the selection journey, as an individual moves through the political 
ecosystem and also in the formal selection process as found by Wigbers,711 Norris,712 and Norris and 
Lovenduski713 as well as being identified in the data for this study. 
  
This section will therefore explore practical and conceptual barriers to entry in the youth wings, and 
then analyse how those barriers persist through the recruitment journey including the selection 
process. Many of the practical barriers remain an issue at the formal selection stage, but there is some 
evidence from the interviews that the youth wings can help individuals overcome some of the 
conceptual barriers of the formal stage.  
 
Practical barriers to entry in the youth wings.  
The primary practical barrier to entry that was raised by those in the youth wings both in the case of 
the SPD and the Labour Party was time. Political activity requires a significant investment of time, in 
the form of campaigning, holding meetings, discussing policy, the production and dissemination of 
literature, the organisation of events etc, all of which takes up time. This issue was raised by 
interviewees across both case studies.  
“You need a lot of time to be politically active, if you want to have a career in the 
private sector you have to concentrate on it, you have to work 60 to 80 hours a 
week during your 20s and 30s, and if you want to have a family, you won’t have 
the time to be active in a way that leads to a political career.”  
DE02, MdB from a JUSOS background. 
“Time and money is a huge thing. If you’re working a job and not at university, or 
even if you’re at university and working a job, you do need an excessive amount of 
time to be involved in politics at a youth level. Often I find those that are most 
successful at youth level, I mean elected to certain positions or getting to very 
senior positions, are those who either did a job in politics or a think-tank or for an 
MP or are working for a trade union, so that if you do live outside London you can 
take half a day off to get to your meeting or you can go to a meeting and turn up 
to work a bit later the next morning. Whereas if you have a very demanding job or 
you have a job without enough money to pay for transport – there’s a huge amount 
of practical barriers. Huge amount.” 
GB06, senior activist in Labour Students and the Young Fabians. 
The issue here identified by both DE02 and GB06 is essentially the ‘opportunity cost’ of political 
activity. That is to say that the time spent on such activity detracts from work or family time. In this 
respect the ability of the youth wings to act as a gateway to the political sphere is both a positive and 
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negative for working-class individuals. If they can get sufficiently involved to use the youth wings as a 
stepping-stone to a politically involved career, where youth wing political activity is seen as an aspect 
or extension of their work, then they can in essence combine work hours and political hours.  
 
However, for those not working in the political ecosystem it wasn’t just about the number of hours 
that had to be spent undertaking political work. Interviewees also mentioned the times of the week 
when those hours fell. Most political activity takes place in the evenings or at weekends, which can 
exclude those who don’t have a 9 to 5 work pattern or who have caring responsibilities in the evenings 
or at weekends. Others may have studies during the week and be working in the evenings and/or at 
the weekend to earn enough to support themselves.  
“When you work in the public sector you begin work at 9 o’clock and end at 5 
o’clock and then you can go home and at 7pm you can go to a party evening. Those 
with shift patterns or caring responsibilities are excluded. It’s a giant problem, giant 
problem.” 
DE02, MdB from a JUSOS background. 
“The time we hold events has come up before. It’s come up when we have kind of 
big open days or conferences on the Saturdays and some people have said I work 
on a Saturday, it might be that they’re funding it as a postgraduate or they have 
shift work and they can’t make it. We try to make it accessible by doing our events 
late in the evenings, that’s why our events are at 7 but then again you’ve got issues 
around people being able to get home, if you’re from a working class background 
you might be reliant more on for example buses which take longer to get home, so 
yeah I think there are definitely still barriers.” 
GB02, senior activist in Young Labour, Labour Students and the Young Fabians. 
Therefore, in order to be involved in youth wing activity – or indeed party activity more broadly – a 
professional work pattern of 9 to 5 and a lack of caring responsibilities, or the ability to share caring 
responsibilities, are vital. It also means those who have to work over-time or multiple jobs will suffer. 
There is therefore a class element to this, in that those who can earn enough in a 9 to 5 workday to 
support themselves have a distinct advantage. However, money in and of itself was only mentioned 
as a barrier by the interviewees from the Labour case study.  
 
As with the JUSOS none of Young Labour, Labour Students or the Young Fabians require any additional 
joining fee in addition to the membership fee of the parent organisation, the Labour Party or the 
Fabian Society. Additionally, both organisations offer concessionary rates for young and student 
members. However, there are other financial costs involved with playing an active role in a youth wing. 
“There are barriers, if we consider trips or we consider conferences, and how 
accessible they are to people. There are bursaries and things but they are quite 
limited still. It’s something I’ve come up against, I’ve worked really hard to try and 
make things accessible but we do have some events where we ask for payment 
because they’re fundraisers etc and I know we’ve had lots of discussions about kind 
of, European delegations. And it is something I’ve found very difficult because there 
are events that we put on as a consequence of being affiliated to other 
organisations which I do think are exclusive. They exclude people who don’t have 
the income, we had one the other day and it was £100 to go on some seminar 




you that flexibility to have the time off, you’d have to not have other commitments. 
That would be a barrier.” 
GB02, senior activist in Young Labour, Labour Students and the Young Fabians. 
“With Labour Students if you want to go to the conference, I mean some money is 
provided to people, lots of people obviously don’t live in the area where the 
conference is so they provide some money, and the student’s union would provide 
some, but not always. So, I would say money could be an issue.” 
GB07, senior activist in Young Labour, Labour Students and the Young Fabians. 
Both GB02 and GB07 identified that the financial issue is not around involvement in local structures 
but rather it is with the big set-piece events such as youth or student conference or delegations abroad 
to other organisations - both Young Labour and the Young Fabians are members of the Young 
European Socialists and send delegations to YES events, for example. Given the importance placed on 
networking by interviewees in the sections above it is likely that these big set-piece events which 
attract existing MPs are one of the prime times and locations where this networking takes place, and 
therefore this barrier impacts on an individual’s ability to network with those gatekeepers.  
 
Given that the money cost is identified as being at big set piece events rather than locally by the UK 
interviewees one potential reason why money may be more of a barrier for those in the Labour Party 
youth wings and not for those in the JUSOS may be the more devolved nature of German politics. In 
Germany there are opportunities for young activists to engage at the Land level. In the UK, in contrast, 
politics is very centralised in London – an extremely expensive city to. Therefore, transport and 
accommodation costs may be much higher in the UK. This is however speculation and would require 
some additional research to explore.  
 
These barriers may also not be equal across time and in the UK case across the three youth wings, 
however. Those in the JUSOS Hochschulgruppen or Labour Students, being at university, will have 
more time and more flexibility with that time. However, they may have lower incomes or need to 
spend additional time working in shifts to earn money. On the other hand, those active later in the 
JUSOS, which goes up to 35, or in the Young Fabians with an older demographic up to 31, are more 
likely to be in full-time work and therefore have more income but less time. Further JUSOS, Labour 
Students and to some extent Young Labour are active in all areas of Germany and Britain respectively, 
whereas the Young Fabians are highly focused in London, placing geographical restrictions in terms of 
the time and cost of travel for their members who do not live in the capital. We can therefore see that 
the strength or relevance of each barrier can vary at different times in an individual’s journey, 
depending on their prevailing life circumstances.  
 
These barriers – time, timing and money – are all ones which more affluent individuals are better 
able to navigate by their practical or logistical nature. However, interviewees also raised other 
barriers to entry which are not based on logistics.  
 
Other barriers to entry to the youth wings.  
Interestingly, when it came to non-practical barriers to the youth wings there was a divergence 
between the two case studies. In the case of the JUSOS one interviewee mentioned the difficulty of 
sustaining internal motivation. The case of the Labour Party youth wings class and to some extent race 
and gender were raised. In both cases there was only a small amount of data presented – with the 
exception of class all the issues were raised only by one interviewee each – and therefore this must 





The barrier not to entry to the JUSOS but to a long and active career that generates political capital 
towards a selection bid is internal motivation. This also links somewhat to the conversation around 
ambition vs socialisation above, in that the interviewees identified that those who lack internal 
motivation leave because of the difficulties involved. DE06 described a career within the JUSOS as 
‘hard work’ and identified this as a reason why some individuals don’t stay involved.  
“You feel a little bit like Sisyphus rolling his stone up the hill and it’s all very, very 
small steps and you’re fighting for some policies, you’re fighting for these for ten 
years or something and sometimes you ask yourself ‘is it worth it?’ but yeah it is. 
It’s not an easy thing. It’s not always fun and you won’t always win. This is a 
euphemism, you mostly lose. But sometimes you change something. Over the years 
you change a lot. But it’s not like you are going to the JUSOS and you are being the 
hero and you change everything, no. I have to disappoint you because it’s hard 
work sometimes.”  
DE06, senior JUSOS activist. 
The kind of hard work identified here can be difficult to sustain over the length of time required to 
produce enough political capital to go on into the political ecosystem or to elected positions without 
a high level of internal motivation. It was also hinted at by GB04 and GB05 in quotes already discussed 
above and Bale et al714 have found that those who engage in high-intensity activity require a high level 
of internal motivation from either personal ambition or a social network. All of this means that it is 
likely that there is something here which requires further investigation.  
 
In contrast, during interviews with those from the Labour Party youth wings several respondents 
raised other barriers which could be termed cultural barriers. That is to say they are barriers which 
relate to the culture of the youth wings and whether an individual feels comfortable in that 
environment – race, gender and in particular class. GB02 and GB10 both raised class as a barrier to 
entry, emphasising the middle-class nature of the youth wings:  
“I have a middle-class upbringing, so I suppose that class has always been 
something that I’ve always known was a barrier because my family were all very 
much working classes who got out of it to some extent, is it a barrier in the youth 
movement? Yeah I suppose it is.”  
GB02, senior activist in Young Labour, Labour Students and the Young Fabians. 
“It is seen as something of a middle-class pursuit. In the sense that fundamentally 
party politics as a whole tends to be seen as a middle-class pursuit because it’s 
people who actually have the time or the inclination or a sense of where they want 
to be in the future, and the time and space to think about that and consider that. I 
would say that one of the barriers would be that particular kind of mentality and 
structure, kind of the conceptualisation of it.”   
GB10, senior activist in Young Labour and the Young Fabians. 
GB06 also discussed class as a major barrier to entry for the youth wings and went into detail as to 
why those from a more working-class background don’t feel comfortable within the more middle-class 
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environment of the youth wings. They make particular reference to the ‘language’ of politics which 
middle-class individuals learn at home but which is off-putting for those who don’t: 
“One barrier that is not spoken about, but people are aware of, is class. Class is a 
huge barrier to entry. When I got involved in the youth wings it was very clear to 
me that a lot of those that were involved were very middle-class. Upper middle-
class. Or they were working-class, but they were putting on a very, kind of, posh 
middle-class accent and trying to blend in. And often if you’re working-class, you 
come from a background where politics wasn’t spoken at the breakfast table daily, 
you didn’t have Radio 4 on in the morning, you may not be comfortable with certain 
things. When you come to an environment where everyone seems to know an MP, 
everyone seems to have an uncle or someone who is an MP or someone who is a 
councillor or significantly involved, it makes you feel out of place. It’s definitely a 
recurring factor. I think another barrier is the language of politics. In the Labour 
Party we often speak in another world, we have Labour-speak. So many acronyms, 
so many words that mean other things. I remember hearing the word faction for 
the first time and wondering what the heck that meant. Why are we talking about 
factions? That’s something you get in a video game. So, the language of politics is 
off-putting. And people never really adapt their language or think about if someone 
is new to politics. So that can be off-putting for someone who is involved for the 
first time. If you’re young, you’re working-class, you don’t understand that 
language, and then you go to an event and no-one is helping you get involved – 
there’s attrition, you just leave.” 
GB06, senior activist in Labour Students and the Young Fabians. 
This indicates that working-class individuals have to go through a socialisation process – described by 
GB06 as mimicking their middle-class peers – in order to access the opportunities presented by the 
youth wings. Reay, Crozier and Clayton715 found that working class students were underrepresented 
at Universities, even more underrepresented at elite universities, and that they often faced a pressure 
to conform to middle class norms and identities. They found that this means that even those who are 
coming from a childhood spent in the lower levels of social affluence are absorbing middle class 
sensibilities at University. Similarly, Brynner and Egerton716 and Hanley717 found that this mimicking 
takes place in working-class individuals who attend University, a similarly middle-class environment, 
and this would have obvious crossover with Labour Students, but GB06 doesn’t differentiate and is 
specifically referring to ‘the youth wings’ - plural. This is also relevant to why the shift to 
Parliamentarian recruitment from those who are first socialised into politics at university produces a 
gentrification effect. 
 
As discussed in chapter one this this thesis will not discuss in great detail issues around gender or 
ethnicity. These did not directly form part of the research questions and the thesis does not have the 
framework or research design to analyse the topic of race or gender in depth. In consequence neither 
the research questions nor the questions in the interviews were geared towards those issues. 
However, GB06 raised ethnicity and gender as potential barriers organically:  
 
715 Reay D., Crozier G. and Clayton J. 2010. ‘Fitting in’or ‘standing out’: Working‐class students in UK higher 
education. British Educational Research Journal. Vol. 36 No. 1, pp.107-124. 
716 Brynner J.M. and Egerton M. 2001. The Wider Benefits of Higher Education. London, Institute of Education. 
Available at https://dera.ioe.ac.uk//5993/ accessed 26.06.2019 11:49. 




“I think the last barrier, which isn’t so much of a barrier as it was, I think the massive 
racial disparity is a massive problem. In the youth movement, it has got a lot better, 
at the moment we have women who are often dominating leadership positions 
which is good, but in terms of the membership it is still very male. It’s still very much 
white, Caucasian, and middle-class. And if you’re an ethnic minority, or a woman 
or a religious minority, it can feel very difficult if there’s no-one like you there. If 
you don’t think the space belongs to you. As a result you may not be inclined to 
come to an event again.”  
GB06, senior activist in Labour Students and the Young Fabians. 
More data is needed before the role of ethnicity and gender in the youth wings can be understood,718 
however they are characterised by GB06 as being a similar barrier to class in that a lack of diversity 
can make an individual feel they don’t belong. GB06 does state that this is improving within the youth 
wings. This does however indicate that these are barriers to entry.  
 
The evidence then shows prima facie that these barriers can prevent an individual from a less affluent 
background from being actively involved in the youth wings. Some of these barriers are practical, in 
terms of time and the times of the week in which that time demand falls, and in the UK case money. 
Others are related to the internal motivation of the individual, and in the case of the Labour Party 
youth wings class and ‘fitting in’. There is also a suggestion of race and gender as a potential issue in 
the Labour Party case, but all of these contentions require more digging to say with absolute 
confidence that they are proven.  
 
We can therefore say that the data presented here is contributing evidence towards the contention 
that Hypotheses 2 is correct. It is therefore supporting the idea that the youth wings do present 
barriers to entry which more affluent individuals are better able to navigate, albeit with the caveat 
that the evidence is limited and requires more research to confirm.  This chapter will therefore move 
the discussion forward and investigate how these barriers sustain or diminish through time and what 
other, potentially interlinked, barriers are present at the moment of an individual actually pushing for 
selection.  
 
Practical barriers to entry for sel ection.  
Finding a job in a politics-facilitating career allows an individual to build political capital as part of their 
paid work, reducing the cost both in time and money for generating support that can later turn into a 
selection bid.719 Some of those roles can also provide institutional support such as printing leaflets, 
graphic design or those in the party or unions can even provide contact lists. Therefore, if service in 
the youth wing leads to one of those roles then they may reduce the existing barriers to selection. 
 
718 For a discussion on the impact of race and gender on the formal selection stage see for example Norris P. 
and Lovenduski J. 1995. Political Recruitment: Gender, Race and Class in the British Parliament. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press; Davidson-Schmich L. K. 2006. Implementation of Political Party Gender Quotas: 
Evidence from the German Länder 1990-2000. Party Politics, Vol. 12 No. 2, pp. 211-232; Mackay F. 2004. 
Gender and Political Representation in the UK: The state of the Discipline. British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations, Vol. 6, pp. 99-120; Audickas L. 2016. ‘Briefing Paper SN01156 – Ethnic Minorities in 
Politics and Public Life’ The House of Commons Library. Published on 15.06.2016 Available at 
http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN01156 accessed  08.12.16 11:14 and 
Geddes A. 1995. The ‘logic’ of positive action? Ethnic minority representation in Britain after the 1992 general 
election. Party Politics, Vol. 1 No. 2, pp.275-285.  
719 See for example Cairney P. 2007. The Professionalisation of MPs: Refining the ‘Politics-Facilitating’ 
Explanation. Parliamentary Affairs. Vol. 60 No. 2. pp 212-233 and Mellors C. 1978. The British MP: A 




Equally however, they may introduce new barriers into the system in that the barriers to involvement 
in the youth wing then become barriers to selection. This subsection will explore this dichotomy from 
a practical perspective; the following subsection will discuss the same issue from the perspective of 
other barriers.  
 
In both case studies the main barrier to entry, just as with the youth wings, was the time it takes to be 
politically active, as well as the times of the week in which those fall. In particular, in the SPD case, the 
fact that being active in the party to the point of being able to push for selection require time to be 
spent on that rather than on work, or requires a career which accommodates those time demands. 
“Since there are only a few lines of work from which you can be constantly active 
in the party our perspective is very narrow. We are talking about the life of workers, 
of those with little income, single parents – but we don’t know them very well. It’s 
a milieu we don’t know very well but we want to make policies for these people 
and that’s a gap.”  
DE02, MdB from a JUSOS background. 
“We discussed it some days ago, and all of us agreed that to serve on the city 
council or to try to be a candidate – it feels like a sacrifice. Because we all have our 
studies, our work, and we’d have to leave that. It’s really hard for many people. 
Maybe it’s one reason why the only people going into these mandates are those 
who are not that established in their career or in their workplace.”  
DE06, senior JUSOS activist. 
The same issue came up in the Labour Party case study, in particular time and the benefits of having 
a career and life circumstances which accommodate the time demands of political activity. In addition 
to this in the UK case money was also raised as a problem, and information on which winnable seats 
were likely to come up as available. GB03 summarised the key barriers from their perspective.  
“Time and money are probably the biggest barriers for selection. Doing a full 
Parliamentary selection process could run over a period of several months. If you’ve 
got your ear to the ground, you know what’s coming up you might have been 
involved for a long time before that. Now that’s one thing if it’s your constituency 
or one relatively close to you, but if you are going for a selection elsewhere in the 
country, that can be hard. People will be limited in how much time they can take, 
and it will be reasonably expensive, so really most people can only really go for one 
or two selections, if that. That’s the maximum. The other thing it’s linked to, one of 
the other barriers, is probably knowledge about when it’s going to be. Generally, 
the best chance of selection has been to know it was coming and to start cultivating 
the seat in advance. So prior knowledge, money and time are probably the main 
barriers to entry for selection.” 
GB03, former senior party employee. 
GB05 agreed with these three issues of time, money and local knowledge as posing barriers to entry 
for selection to stand as an electoral candidate and emphasised the addition of caring and family 
commitments as being things which reduce the amount of time an individual has to spend on  activities 




“In terms of the practical barriers, it is a big time commitment. I think caring 
responsibilities, I know of one person who was pregnant during a selection process 
and had their first child, and I think maternity leave helped them fight their election 
but not their selection. Traditionally funding has been an issue, there are quite a 
few different mechanisms to help people though with that, so Labour Women’s 
Network for example will give grants to women candidates. But if you’re able to go 
around and talk to people that can compensate for glossy leaflets. As a candidate 
I spent quite a lot less than some of the other candidates, I think because my stuff 
was targeted and reflected some local knowledge it was fine. One thing realistically 
that is a barrier is just if people haven’t had any engagement or been an officer, 
things like that, I think that does help you during a selection because you 
understand the system more, you know people better.” 
GB05, MP from a youth wing background. 
GB05 does however state that local knowledge can reduce cost by allowing targeting of material, the 
same issue of information that was identified by GB03. GB05 also gives examples of engagement or 
being a local party officer, which roles also require an extensive time commitment over an extended 
time frame. If this engagement can be done in ways which are part of paid employment this would 
allow an individual to overcome some of this issue. GB08 confirmed this, arguing that resources, 
including time, are a key barrier but that working for a sympathetic organisation – in their case a trade 
union – do allow an individual to overcome those:  
“Resources is definitely one of the barriers. Much more so now: at the time that I 
was selected I’m trying to remember how many members there were who had a 
vote, probably 400, maybe less, about 300. If you were seeking selection now 
there’d be 1200 members or so, if you were seeking selection in some local parties 
it would be many more than that. I’m sure we did have email back then, but it 
wasn’t the thing, paper communication was still really important. I was seeking 
selection nearby to where I lived so that cost wasn’t there. Time was though. 
Having time to do it was a big benefit from working for a sympathetic organisation 
that provided a bit of flexibility. When you’re seeking selection being part of an 
established trade union does help you have those connections. Its access to 
connections and its access to resources. And there’s also something about 
authenticity, it gives you a story or an authenticity. The Labour Party is founded on 
the trade union movement so it’s a natural thing to call on that when making your 
pitch to members. But access to resources was hugely important at the time. Say 
you want to do a leaflet that you’re going to send out to all members, well if you’re 
in a union regional office and there’s someone who can design a leaflet for you and 
print it for you and it not cost you anything, things like that are hugely important. 
And being able to get time off, and get union nominations, all those things are 
hugely important.”  
GB08, MP from a trade union background. 
Trade unions are one example of an organisation which can provide ‘access to connections and access 
to resources’ as GB08 identifies, but working for the party, an existing elected representative or a 





This data then suggests that the barriers to entry which could prevent people from being involved at 
the youth wing stage continue throughout the selection journey. Specifically, the time commitment 
to being involved, and the times of the week in which that falls, continue to be a major impediment, 
discouraging if not outright preventing those with caring responsibilities or shift work from being 
involved. This means that those working in the political ecosystem have access to support in terms of 
time and resources which puts them in a privileged position for selection. 
 
In terms of the youth wings then what is shown here is that when they act as a gateway to a career in 
the political ecosystem, they can allow an individual to overcome some of the barriers of time and 
cost. It is work in that ecosystem which provides the resources, including time, to make a difference.  
 
Other barriers to entry for selection.  
There are further barriers to entry for the selection of candidates which are not based on the logistical 
practicalities of political activity, the main one being a conceptual barrier, a notion that politics is not 
for working-class individuals. This was stated outright in the case of the Labour Party interviewees. 
“It’s thinking that politics is something that I can get involved in, not just something 
for a particular elite or anything like that. Youth and student politics is an accessible 
way of getting involved as opposed to going to these meetings that aren’t always 
that accessible for newish members and there’s a lot of discussion of the minutes, 
that sort of thing. Things tend to be a bit different in student politics, they do things 
in a more accessible way for people to get involved.”  
GB04, MP from a youth wing background. 
“I would say that it is seen as something of a middle-class pursuit, to an extent. 
Fundamentally these things, party politics, tend to be seen as a middle-class pursuit 
because it’s people who actually have the time or the inclination or the perception, 
that’s not necessarily the right word, but a sense of where they want to be in the 
future, and the time and space to think about that and consider that. I would say 
that one of the barriers would be that particular kind of mentality and structure, 
kind of the conceptualisation of it.” 
GB10, senior activist in Young Labour and the Young Fabians. 
Both of these individuals raised this issue of a conceptualisation of politics, of politics being ‘something 
that I can get involved in’ as a barrier. GB04 further argued that youth and student politics is more 
accessible and therefore a way of overcoming this barrier to selection.  
 
In the case of the SPD interviewees the evidence is less clear. Some interviewees referenced that the 
perception had changed towards the party being for public sector individuals or professionals, which 
had changed who could become an MdB. This may be evidence of the same issue of perception, of 
those not in those careers not considering a career in politics, or even political activity in general, as a 
possible option for them to pursue. This is however, largely conjecture and would require some 
further additional research to confirm. Nevertheless, it is included here to potentially spark interest in 
such a study.  
“We are exclusively now a group with a higher-level education. We have some who 
came from the working class, but very few. Very few come from the working class 




of us have been working in the public sector. The SPD is known as the party of public 
services, teachers, professors, scientific staff, lawyers, judges.” 
DE02, MdB with a JUSOS background. 
“It used to be that we would look at the factories, and we would see there is a good 
guy on the workers council. But these days the focus is more on people who can 
talk well, who can sell themselves, meaning people like teachers, lawyers, people 
that studied politics. A long time ago August Bebel said that we have to get 
teachers to come into the SPD. The Party has never recovered from that success. 
We have a joke amongst the heretics, sometimes the Parliament is full, sometimes 
the Parliament is empty, but it is always full of teachers!”720   
DE03, MdB from a trade union background. 
A further point highlighted here is that of higher education. DE02 states outright that those getting 
through the barriers have been through higher education, and all of the careers mentioned by DE03 
also require a degree. The evidence presented in chapter five that Labour Students is by far the most 
common youth wing origin for Labour MPs is suggestive of this too. This is an important indicator 
towards the concept that those who are more affluent – with a career requiring degree-level entry – 
are at an advantage when it comes to being able to undertake the levels of political activity required 
to push for selection. 
 
One factor which presents a potential barrier to selection which is present in the case of the JUSOS 
but not the Labour Party youth wings is an element of pre-selection. That is to say, since the JUSOS 
push their own candidates within the SPD there is a competition within the JUSOS to feature on the 
lists of people that they will push for selection. The next subsection will explore this pre-selection 
element.  
 
The JUSOS internal selection process.  
The JUSOS have the institutional strength to push for their own policies and goals – including the 
selection of candidates – within the structures of the main SPD as DE06 stated. 
“I have some insight into this because for several years I have been a member of 
the SPD’s board in my city. That’s the playground we all play on, the JUSOS have to 
go there and we have to fight there for our goals.”  
DE06, Senior JUSOS activist. 
What this means is that the JUSOS has to decide which individuals to put up or to support for selection 
within those structures, which introduces an element of pre-selection into the equation. The 
individual who can pass through the pre-selection processes of the JUSOS will have the advantage of 
their institutionalised support for the formal selection at the party itself. DE05 explained this process: 
 “The JUSOS at the local level every time elections come up will push for their JUSOS 
slate to be accepted. They have a listing of who is their candidate number one, 
number two and so on, it’s always woman, man, woman, man or man, woman, 
and so on. There are internal discussions within the JUSOS, people present 
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themselves who want to be listed and then there is a conference when we decide 
on our listing. Then we push within the SPD for our set of candidates. There is a 
democratic process. There’s a conference of delegates, the same delegates who 
will decide on policy positions, elect the board and so on, and they are the ones 
who are doing the listing. There are obviously talks beforehand. There are certain 
discussions who will be number one, number two, number three, number four.” 
DE05, senior JUSOS activist. 
It would be expected that those who are well-known and active within the JUSOS would be those who 
can gather most support from delegates to the conference. DE06 confirmed this supposition:  
“When you look at the internal organisation of the JUSOS the same seniority 
principles are sometimes at work as the main party. We are fighting about those 
principles when preparing the lists and sometimes we act similarly to the Party. But 
I think it’s normal.”  
DE06, Senior JUSOS activist. 
Those who are most senior are, as discussed above, are those who have the time to devote to being 
active in the organisation. There is a further factor which is a barrier at this stage of the pre-selection 
of candidates by the JUSOS which is the factional conflict within the organisation. This will be discussed 
in more depth in the next section. What is important to note here is that there is an element of pre-
selection which is formalised in the case of the JUSOS when it comes to determining whom they will 
support for selection in the main party. This pre-selection process is then a barrier to entry, something 
which an individual who wants the backing of the JUSOS needs to get past in order to secure entry to 
the formal selection stage of the process for the mother party. 
Discussion.  
Hypothesis 2 contends that youth organisations present significant practical barriers to entry which 
wealthier, middle class individuals are better able to negotiate. There is nothing in the interview data 
which disproves that assertion, and the evidence presented supports it in so far as it goes. This data 
shows that the topic is worthy of further study and provides depth to the quantitative data presented 
in the previous two chapters.  
The data explores the journey individuals who come up through the youth wings often take to be in a 
position to put themselves in contention to be selected as a candidate, either in a winnable seat or in 
the case of the SPD sufficiently high up the party lists. Whilst for many legislators the origin point is 
the youth wings in Germany very few individuals can move straight from service in the JUSOS to a 
winnable candidacy at the national level and in the UK, there were no examples of individuals doing 
so. Rather for the vast majority of people there is an intermediate stage, which often leads through 
either the political ecosystem of party employees, legislator’s staffers, NGOs or other such roles, or 
through politics-facilitating careers such as teaching, academia, law, journalism or in Germany the civil 
service.  
Local structures of the youth wings are open and do not require a great deal of resources to participate 
in, especially in Germany with its federal system. This is to some extent true in the UK, however the 
larger set-piece events, which provide the best networking opportunities do involve costs. Whilst 





However, the key barrier to entry for the youth wings in both case studies is time. Many interviewees 
mentioned that being politically active within the youth wings takes up a lot of time and that this is 
something that prevents individuals from being involved. This means that an individual has to sacrifice 
time spent on professional advancement or family time. Further it is not simply the number of hours 
that have to be put in, but also the timing of the meetings during the week. In particular individuals 
who have shift work, are single parents or have other carer roles are referenced as being excluded. 
These are often individuals who are less affluent. In addition, the roles which are referenced as 
facilitating work in the youth wings are all ones which require a university education to enter.  
 
There are also barriers that are not practical, around the level of ‘grind’ that high-intensity youth 
activists have to go through to achieve things. In the Labour Party there is also identified a middle-
class culture in the youth wings, which working-class individuals need to adapt to in order to succeed, 
which fits with the findings of Brynner and Egerton,721 Hanley722 and Reay, Crozier and Clayton. 723  
These barriers to the youth wings can prevent a less affluent individual from accessing the 
opportunities in the political ecosystem724 that several interviewees identified as highly advantageous 
when pushing for selection.  
 
Therefore, if an individual can access the resources to be highly involved in the youth wings to open 
those opportunities of working in the political ecosystem it can lower the barriers to entry for selection 
later in the recruitment journey. It does so by providing opportunities to network as part of paid 
employment, as well as access to advance knowledge of open seats, and providing resources during 
the formal selection process, in particular time and flexibility as well as money. Additionally, there is 
a small amount of evidence, in particular from GB04, that serving in the youth wings can also help an 
individual overcome conceptual barriers by making them feel that politics is ‘for them’.  
 
Further, the evidence from the data implies that these barriers largely persist through the journey to 
candidacy. The issue of time and timing in particular continues, means that an individual will struggle 
to build the necessary political capital for selection if they do not have evenings and weekends free to 
spend on political activity. The issue of motivation is also present, and the interviewers all confirmed 
the findings of Bale et al725 that for the majority of high-intensity activists the move through the 
journey is a socialisation process, with relatively few moving through out of ambition. 
 
The issue of time and resources is much easier to overcome for those who go through an intermediate 
stage whereby they are working within the political ecosystem and thus combining political activity 
with sufficient income to live on. These intermediates stage also masks to some within the SPD the 
extent to which the JUSOS has become the main mechanism for politicisation and apprenticeship-
serving within the party, although this dynamic was not mentioned by interviewees from the Labour 
Party case study. 
 
This helps to explain why the youth wings have increased as a source of recruitment.726 The initial 
barriers to the youth wings can exclude an individual but they may also lower the barriers later on by 
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providing access to the political ecosystem. This means that an individual who doesn’t have a high 
level of engagement is at a disadvantage when trying to break into that ecosystem, and without doing 
that they are then at an even greater disadvantage in the formal selection process.  
 
Therefore, if an individual can get past the barriers to the youth wing, that can act as a bridge to 
eventually get past the barriers to selection. These barriers, time and money and timing based on a 9 
to 5 work pattern, privilege those who come from a more affluent background and/or work in the 
professions.  
 
When also coupled with the evidence that individuals involved in the youth wings are either middle-
class or have to adopt middle-class sensibilities and practices to ‘blend in’ as GB06 suggested and 
Brynner and Egerton,727 Henley728 and Reay, Crozier and Clayton729 found this also offers some 
evidence towards Hypothesis 3. The next section will explore that question.  
 
6.4: Shifts in the political culture of social democratic parties. 
 
Having explored hypothesis 1 in chapters four and five and hypothesis 2 above the thesis will now turn 
to hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 2 stated that the youth wings present barriers to entry which more 
affluent individuals can more easily overcome. The question therefore is what effect this has on the 
nature of contemporary social democratic parties. This is the subject of hypothesis 3:  
Hypothesis 3: The shift in recruitment patterns contributes to the gentrification of 
social democratic parties by creating a shift in the political culture of the party 
representatives and therefore a shift in the nature of the parties in question. 
This section will unpack this question. Before this hypothesis can be tested however there are two 
basic assumptions which need to be interrogated. First, that the political culture of the SPD and the 
Labour Party has changed since the 1970s and second, that the youth wings have their own political 
cultures distinct from the traditional political culture of the mother parties as a whole. Therefore, this 
section will explore whether the political culture of the party has changed. It will investigate whether 
this is linked to ideological factionalism within the parties, or whether there is a starker divide between 
the trade unionist parts of the party and the newer members who have come into the party via the 
youth wings.  
 
The data in this section finds that indeed the political culture of the parties has changed across the 
timeframe under discussion, and that there are different cultures within the youth wings. Further, it 
presents evidence that this culture is not linked to ideological factionalism but rather to a divide in 
what could be termed the rules of engagement of political activity, in perceptions of how politics is 
performed, between those from trade unionist and youth wing backgrounds. It is therefore worth 
recalling that this study defines political culture as those assumptions, ideas, norms, customs and 
beliefs found within a certain group or sub-group which has political aims or effects, maintained and 
evidenced in group shibboleths, self-perceptions, espoused priorities and principles of right action and 
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Shifts in the political culture of the SPD and Labour Party.  
When exploring the concept of whether shifts in the political cultures of the two case study parties 
are linked to the rise of their youth wings as a source of legislative recruitment the first question to 
ask is whether in point of fact there has been a shift in their political cultures.  
 
The evidence presented by the SPD interviewees was that there had indeed been a shift, and they 
highlighted different ways in which it has changed. DE01 linked it to shifts in the broader social 
context: 
“In the last 15 years I do not see much change but if you say between 1980 and 
2018, then really the party and society has changed a lot. Because of digitalisation, 
globalisation, individualisation. Everything which Richard Sennett says in The 
Flexible Human Being, you know? In German his book is called The Flexible Human 
Being,730 everything he says.” 
DE01, senior SPD party employee. 
The argument of Sennett’s book is that capitalism has changed to be focused on white collar work and 
professions, on individuals, flexibility, risk and short-termism731 and that this has had profound and 
negative cultural changes for modern Western societies. DE01 is then referring to a shift in the nature 
of individuals in German society which has the knock-on effect of changing the SPD.  
 
Both DE03 and DE04 made similar references, but stated that it was a shift in the nature of the 
individuals but rather argued that it was a shift in the party membership and therefore a shift in the 
priorities that the SPD focused on and the nature of the party’s internal conversation that had caused 
this. They both identified a shift in the SPDs political culture away from the traditional focus of 
economic politics towards identity politics issues: 
“The thing that’s changed between 1970 and now, in that period a lot of people 
who were usually members, like people who were on workers councils, people who 
were employees not employers, lots of these people stopped being party members. 
That has changed the culture of the party itself. Members came from all walks of 
life, all industries, even pensioners and that has changed a lot. Due to the huge loss 
of membership the social mix within the party, and because of that the Members 
of Parliament, has changed a lot. People who worked in public services became 
dominant within the party and then dominant within the Bundestagsfraktion itself. 
Because of the change of the membership within the party and within the 
Parliament the topics of our discussions changed from sheer politics more to topical 
things and that changed the political culture of exchange within the members.” 
DE03, MdB from a trade union background. 
“The culture has changed completely. When I entered parliament, the SPD was the 
party of the future, of progress. It was the party of equality of life chances. 
Previously it was your parent’s income and status that decided what career and 
 
730 Sennett R. 2000. Der Flexible Mensch: Die kultur des neuen Kapitalismus. Berlin, Btb. This is a translation of 
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York, W.W. Norton & Co.  
731 Sennett R. 1998. The Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism. 




what sort of life you would live. Then it was about state interference to improve life 
chances, with education and so on. Later on, after reunification it was about the 
nation-state organising the equality of life chances between East and West. Now 
the SPD puts a focus on social and environmental politics but if you ask people in 
Germany they’ll say the SPD don’t have an answer to the really important 
questions: What is my pension worth? What about healthcare and welfare? What 
are the chances for my children, the education of the younger generation?” 
DE04, former MdB from a JUSOS background. 
Both DE03 and DE04 then identify a shift in the culture away from “sheer politics” – the bread and 
butter political issues of economics, life chances, pensions, healthcare and education and towards 
“topical issues” of “social and environmental politics.” DE03 expressly links this to a shift in the class 
make-up of the SPD, both in terms of its membership and of the MdBs. This shift in the focuses of the 
party, what DE03 termed “the political culture of exchange” is a shift in the cultural bias and shared 
fundamental beliefs of the SPD membership732 - it is in short, a gentrification process. In terms of 
Hypothesis 3 then, the data supports the view that there has been a shift in the political culture of the 
SPD and that this is linked to the issue of gentrification of the party.  
 
When it comes to the Labour Party the evidence from the interviews also supports the notion that 
there had been a shift, and further that this had a class basis. GB01 described the development of a 
‘professional class’ of politicians and contrasted this with the working-class, which provides specific 
evidence of a gentrification effect.  
“Yes, there has been a shift. We’re a professional class. We went through a 
generation of identikit politicians. If you ticked the right boxes, if you looked or if 
you dressed like this, and you talked like that, then you’re going to get elected. 
Selected and then elected. We developed a professional class of politicians. We’ve 
got some working-class individuals and some constituencies know they’ve got 
working-class MPs but increasingly, and it’s not just in the last few years, this has 
been a twenty-year experiment, we’ve been seen as paternalistic at best, which 
made us not working class. We’re the elite trying to look after everybody. The party 
has always been a coalition, we’ve talked about the Fabians and the trade union 
movement and student politics, we’re very squarely a coalition, it’s at various times 
in our history which bit of that coalition has been in the ascendancy. Right now it 
is the elite, urban, Guardian reading liberal part.” 
GB01, MP from a trade union background. 
GB01 in this discusses a shift to being ‘paternalistic’ taking place over the last twenty years, and talks 
about the ascendency of the ‘elite, urban, Guardian reading liberal part’ of Labour’s internal coalition 
within the elected representatives. This shows a perceived cultural shift within Labour MPs towards 
that more middle-class part of the party, with a different ‘paternalistic’ political culture associated 
with that.  
 
Although GB01 referred to the Parliamentary Labour Party, other respondents referred to the party 
as a whole. GB08 described a gentrification of the Parliamentarians, but in particular of the party 
membership:  
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“The party is increasingly middle-class. If you’re a Member of Parliament you’re by 
definition middle-class are you not? Even people who have a working-class 
background would probably say that they’ve transitioned into the middle-class. The 
party is undoubtedly becoming more middle-class, it has become more middle-
class. If I think about our membership in my constituency, we’ve gone from roughly 
500 members to roughly 1200, probably up to roughly 1500 a couple of years back, 
and when you look at where the growth came it didn’t come in our working-class 
areas. It’s grown everywhere, but it’s grown disproportionately in the middle-class, 
well-educated, higher average educational attainment wards. Undoubtedly the 
ward close by the university, not the university student area but the university staff 
one, senior public sector workers that’s the one that’s grown the biggest. The 
places that have grown the least are white working-class estates.” 
GB08, MP with a trade union background. 
GB10 also concurred, highlighting that this is the opinion both of academics such as Prof. John Curtice 
but also of those within the youth movement: 
“We had an event recently with John Curtice and he had a wonderful aside where 
he said demographically where Labour is now, it’s shifting from being the party of 
the working man to being the party of the working academic and the only thing we 
could say was, as members of the Young Fabians, yeah we agree!” 
GB10, senior activist in Young Labour and the Young Fabians. 
GB09 gave a slightly different answer, confirming that the culture had changed but with a geographical 
split, specifically between London and the rest of the country: 
“Yeah I would say the culture has changed. I would say you’ve got great regional 
variations though. You do have a level of political activity in London where you’ve 
got a large critical mass of these people who do seem to get out on doorsteps and 
all the rest of it. I think the organisational structure of the party elsewhere has 
eroded. The party is not as well organised now out in the country.” 
GB09, MP with both a youth wing and trade union background. 
GB04 also raised the issue of being a ‘London party’ but queried whether or not this was linked to the 
rise of student politics: 
“I do worry that sometimes we’re seen as a bit too much of a ‘London party’, that 
is something we need to be quite careful of, in terms of being a bit London-centric. 
It would be interesting to look at of those in Parliament who have been involved in 
student politics where they’re actually from and where they represent. Whether 
that contributes to being London centric or not. Vicky Foxcroft is a London MP but 
she’s originally from the north, Gloria is a Nottinghamshire MP, Steph Peacock 
she’s Barnsley MP, she’s from the West Midlands. Jon Ashworth he’s from 
Manchester, he’s a Leicester MP. So I’m not sure that the whole student politics 
thing makes it a London party, you know other people who were in Parliament like 
Michael Dugher, he was Barnsley as well. That would be interesting to see, whether 




whether you’ve got a bit of a range of people or not. I don’t know the answer to 
that. John Mann and Phil Woolas from a previous era, they’re not London.” 
GB04, MP from a youth wing background. 
A point of interest here is that although the examples GB04 gives are not necessarily from, or once in 
Parliament don’t necessarily represent, London the intermediate phases they went through were all 
London-based. Vicky Foxcroft was employed in the London HQ of the AEEU Union, which merged with 
other unions to form Amicus and then Unite. She was also a local councillor in Lewisham. Gloria de 
Piero was a journalist first at the BBC and then with ITV’s GMTV programme based from their London 
Studios on the South Bank. Stephanie Peacock was the Political Officer for the GMB Trade Union, 
based at their national headquarters Mary Turner House in London. Jon Ashworth was a party 
employee based in the head office in London and an advisor to Gordon Brown in the Treasury and at 
Number 10 Downing Street. Michael Dugher worked as a special advisor to several Ministers during 
Labour’s time in government, including Gordon Brown in Number 10, before becoming an MP. John 
Mann also worked at the AEEU Union HQ in London and at the TUC’s National Education Centre, also 
in London. Phil Woolas also worked for the BBC and ITV, before working for the GMB, again all London-
based roles.  
 
It is an important point that the vast majority of the politics-facilitating roles which form the career 
path between serving in a youth wing and selection and then election are based in London, unlike 
historical trade union roles which would be based around the country wherever their industry was, 
such as mining areas or the West Midlands manufacturing areas. This would suggest that GB04’s 
reference to Labour being seen as a London party is linked to notions of the gentrification of the party 
and the rise of politicians from a youth wing background, as the journey of those individuals usually 
leads through the capital. GB09 made this link explicit: 
“The people from the youth wings, a lot of them, go and work in the NGO sector. 
Again, a lot of them and their big offices, and all their career structures are based 
in London. They come down, they work in the charity or NGO sector. This is very big 
business, it also means they’ve got facilities, offices and all the rest of it from which 
they can conduct their activities. That was true in the 70s, but it was emerging at 
that stage. Now it’s just rampant.” 
GB09, MP from both a youth wing and trade union background. 
The data from the interviews then does show that there is likely to be a gentrification process 
happening in both case studies. This, the evidence suggests, is happening both amongst 
Parliamentarians and within the party membership, and the evidence supports the view that this is 
changing the political culture of the party. Further in the UK, though this was not brought up in the 
German case study, there is evidence that this is geographically varied, and that the concept of 
gentrification is also linked to being a ‘London Party.’  
 
The qualitative data when put together with the quantitative data from chapters four and five suggests 
that this has been happening at the same time as the rise in Parliamentarians from a youth wing 
background and a decrease in those from a trade union background. Correlation is not however proof 
of causality, and the question therefore needs to be unpacked further.  
 
One of the potential reasons for different cultures could be ideological factionalism. The following 




party. In most instances’ ‘factionalism’ refers to ideological conflict733 although there can be other 
divisions, such as personality-based factions. The different factions within the parties could have 
different political cultures to each other,734 and a change in the dominant faction could be one 
potential explanation of the shift in the party’s political culture as a whole. These factions are often 
seen as having different political cultures to each other. 
 
Factional conflict exists in both case study parties during the 1980s.735 In the contemporary SPD, as 
discussed below, the JUSOS itself acts as a faction. However, in the Labour Party there has been 
intense conflict between different factions,736 or wings, of the party in recent years. This subsection 
will therefore explore the Labour case study first, as the higher intensity can shed more light on the 
situation than might be seen in the less intense debates in the SPD.  
 
Factionalism in the Labour Party.  
It is important to note from the outset that the British first-past-the-post electoral system means that 
the Labour Party has a potentially broader ideological base than the SPD. Activists who in Germany 
would find their ideological home in Die Linke or the Greens are in the UK within the Labour Party. 
This greater scope of ideologies means that the factions within Labour are more disparate than in the 
SPD. GB01 and GB03 both raised the issue of the different factional groupings in the Labour Party 
having their own political culture: 
“Every different wing of the Labour Party has its own culture. And that isn’t a bad 
thing because we’re a broad church and we’ve always been a broad church. Each 
section is culturally very very different.” 
GB01, MP from a trade union background. 
“I think that the culture of Labour is pretty varied really. You’ve essentially got a 
number of sub-groups within the Labour Party that have their own cultural norms 
that come into conflict. Some of that is political and some of it isn’t.” 
GB03, former senior party employee. 
GB01 references ‘every different wing’ and GB03 mentions ‘a number of sub-groups’, both being a 
reference to factions within the party. We therefore need to understand the nature of the factions 
within the party and whether the differences in political culture mentioned here are relevant to the 
shifts in the political culture of the party. Some of this was done previously in this thesis, in chapter 
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five,737 and therefore this section will not attempt to repeat the data presented there, but rather 
explore whether the shifting factional landscape connects to the shift in political culture. 
 
The intensity of factionalism within the Labour Party varies. In the late 1970s, through the 1980s 
ideological factionalism was very strong738 before being replaced by personality driven factionalism 
during the New Labour era with the ‘Tee-Bee Gee-Bees’ conflict between supporters of Tony Blair and 
Gordon Brown.739 Ideological factionalism re-emerged strongly in 2015.740 
 
Up until the early 1990s the Labour Party had three main factional groupings – the hard-left (also 
called the new left),741 the soft left742 and what was then known as the Labour right.743 In the 1990s 
another faction emerged, linked to New Labour.744 Because of this the Labour right began to be 
referred to as the ‘old right’ or the ‘traditional right’.745 These four factions remain, broadly, the same 
in the contemporary Labour Party,746 although there are other organisations and sub-divisions.  
 
The old right and the New Labour right have in recent years worked together and have come to be 
collectively known as Labour’s ‘moderates’, also referred to as the ‘right’ or ‘centre-right’ of the 
party.747 However the organisations which represent each faction do change over time, during the 
1980s the soft left was organised via the Tribune Group and prior to Jeremy Corbyn’s election the 
main hard-left group was the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy.748 The strength of each faction 
also varies over time.  
 
This brings us to a particular point, which is the impact on this study of the rise of Corbynism. In 2015 
the hard-left figure Jeremy Corbyn was elected as leader of the Labour Party on the back of a flood of 
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new members coming into the party.749 In 2016, 47 of his frontbench shadow cabinet members 
resigned in protest at his handling of the Brexit referendum, and the MPs Margaret Hodge and Ann 
Coffey moved a motion of no confidence in him, which passed by 172 votes to 40.750 Even before this 
Corbyn’s office had drawn up a grid of MPs ranking them on their loyalty to him which was leaked to 
the press.751 The situation in the Labour Party from 2016 up until the end of the period discussed here 
has been characterised as ‘factional war’ driven by the Left in the Party.752  
 
This then was the context in the Labour Party during the time the interviews for this research were 
conducted in 2017 and 2018. As discussed in chapter five753 however the interviewees judgements of 
the impact of factionalism was minimal between the end of the 1980s and the election of Jeremy 
Corbyn in 2015. In the previous section GB01 referred to the cultural shift as a ‘twenty-year 
experiment’ and GB09 stated it was ‘emergent’ in the 1970s before becoming ‘rampant’ in recent 
years.  
 
Therefore, the Labour cultural shift is not linked to factional dominance, as it has happened both under 
the ‘new Labour right’ Tony Blair and under the ‘hard left’ Jeremy Corbyn as well as other leaders who 
fall between them ideologically: Michael Foot, Neil Kinnock, John Smith, Gordon Brown and Ed 
Miliband. These leaders represent the entire spectrum of ideological groupings and therefore if the 
political culture shifted alongside the factionalism of the leadership you would have expected far more 
volatility. This would suggest that factionalism was not a particular driver of the gentrification dynamic 
referred to in Hypothesis 3 when it comes to the Labour Party.  
 
Factionalism in the SPD.  
The evidence from the interviews is that factionalism is also not a satisfactory explanation for the 
cultural shift in the SPD either. Since the retirement of Gerhard Schröder as Chancellor the SPD has 
had a volatile series of leaders.754 This suggest that there has not been ideological hegemony for any 
one faction, during this time. This was confirmed by DE04: 
“The SPD has no really strong leaders at the moment, like Helmut Schmidt or Willy 
Brandt. At the regional level we have some, but not national. And this is not only 
the view of the public, it’s also the view inside the party as well. This means that 
discussions are continued extensively, and they aren’t resolved. Even if there’s a 
ballot on an issue the debate is still ongoing. You never come to a resolution which 
everybody is content with. This gives the public the impression that the SPD has 
internal infighting, that there are differences within the party.”  
DE04, former MdB from a JUSOS background. 
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DE02 also referenced this, referring to the factional infighting as a “very diffuse situation” and DE06 
who simply stated that the factions in the SPD are “very weak”: 
“Actually, I couldn’t really characterise the SPD. It’s a very diffuse situation. We are 
left and middle, sometimes more left and sometimes more middle but we don’t 
have a clear profile. The SPD never decided which way to go and we are 
characterised as a neither / nor party. We have two, at least two, wings, I guess 
we’ve more wings and sometimes the one wing is winning and sometimes the other 
is winning. So we have a permanent swing in one or the other direction.” 
DE02, MdB from a JUSOS background. 
“You have very weak factions within the party in general, within the SPD.” 
DE06, senior JUSOS activist. 
This also suggests that the shift in the political culture of the SPD, as with the Labour Party, doesn’t 
map onto the shift in ideological factionalism. Therefore, again, factionalism is not a satisfactory 
explanation for the cultural shift suggested by the evidence described above. 
 
What was of most interest however during the interviews that when asked about factionalism within 
the SPD the respondents didn’t mention ideological groupings such as the Seeheimers755 or the 
Parlamentarische Linke756 but rather they spoke about the JUSOS and the trade unions as factions 
themselves. Both Koelble757 and Braunthal758 also described the JUSOS as a faction, specifically the 
left-wing faction of the SPD, in their studies of the SPD in the 1980s. If the JUSOS are a faction 
themselves then the factionalism there may shape the different culture that is then imported to the 
main parties. The next sub-section will explore that, before the following sub-section examines the 
situation with the Labour youth wings.  
 
The JUSOS as a faction.  
The concept of the JUSOS as being their own faction was articulated most clearly by DE06, who stated 
unequivocally that that is how the JUSOS function within the SPD.  
“Are the JUSOS linked to any one particular faction in the party? No, no not at all. 
We are on our own, we are our own faction. The JUSOS has 70,000 members, most 
of whom are members of the party as well. So, we can proudly say we can be on 
our own, and this is a good thing and we can change things. Kevin759 showed this.”   
DE06, senior JUSOS activist. 
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However, this was also some discussion from several interviewees that the JUSOS isn’t a solid block 
and has its own internal factions, which have changed and evolved over time. DE04 described the 
situation in the 1970s:  
“There were three groups within JUSOS when I joined in the 1970s, Reformers, 
Revisionists and Stamokaps. There was a deep conflict between the Stamokaps and 
the Reformers. I was a member of the Reformers. The majority in the region were 
members of Stamokaps.”  
DE04, former MdB from a JUSOS background. 
The reformers were the comparatively undogmatic centre-left of the JUSOS,760 in contrast the left 
wing Stamokaps placed an emphasis on the Marxist-Leninist theory of state monopoly capitalism761 
and the Revisionists were also on the left of the JUSOS.762 The labels have changed but these rough 
groupings can also be seen in DE06’s description of contemporary factions within the JUSOS: 
“You have three main factions. There are the traditionalists, ‘Traddies’, who as the 
name suggests have a traditional left-wing viewpoint. They are strong in the 
Eastern Länder and also Bavaria, they’re a loose collection of organisations 
working together. On a more formalised level on the left within JUSOS you have 
NWLZ – Network Left Centre, Netzwerk Linkes Zentrum – which is dominated by 
JUSOS Nordrhein-Westfalen. Quite left wing as well, slightly more centrist. These 
two organisations work together within the Gesamtlinke the ‘total-left’. Then there 
is the more centrist group, they are called PL, Pragmatic Left, which is mainly 
dominated by JUSOS Hamburg and JUSOS Baden-Württemberg. These are the main 
factions. The Gesamtlinke factions are about two-thirds of the JUSOS.”  
DE06, senior JUSOS activist. 
This situation of two more left-wing groups co-operating and a more centrist JUSOS grouping being in 
the minority is a repeat of the factions identified by DE04 above and by Braunthal.763 DE05 also 
confirmed this pattern: 
“The JUSOS have factions, absolutely. We have our own factions. The main divide 
between the JUSOS I would say is between the JUSOS left and the ones who call 
themselves the pragmatic JUSOS. Pragmatic JUSOS are mainly in Hamburg and 
Baden-Württemberg. And the rest are different forms of the left basically, there 
are differences but for me it was always more this divide.”  
DE05, senior JUSOS activist. 
We can see therefore that although the JUSOS does indeed have factions the left, in the two different 
forms of the Traddies and NWLZ are dominant within the organisation. This means that they can 
control the federal structures, as well as many of the Land structures outside of those identified by 
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Overall then the position of the JUSOS and its graduates as being the left-wing of the SPD has been 
remarkably stable across the timeframe of this study.764 Further it is very clear that this is still the 
position the JUSOS see themselves in.  
“Overall, the majority of the JUSOS are left wing, we have defined ourselves within 
our statutes as a left-wing organisation within the SPD so we clearly are defined as 
left wing within the SPD. We are not neutral, on the right of the party, or the middle 
of the SPD, we are the left wing within the SPD.”  
DE05, senior JUSOS activist. 
With regards to hypothesis 3 and whether the youth wing culture is imported to the main party the 
question then is whether these internal sub-factions of the JUSOS share a common political culture 
with each other, or whether they are different enough that their culture is different. In other words is 
the culture of the more centrist Pragmatic Left JUSOS closer to the centrist groupings of the SPD as a 
whole, or to their young comrades in the more left-wing elements of the JUSOS. That question will be 
addressed further below, but first this section will explore whether the Labour youth wings also act as 
a faction in and of themselves.  
 
Factionalism in the Labour youth movement.  
The data suggests that, unlike the JUSOS, the youth wings in the Labour Party do not have the 
institutionalised prestige, resources and organisation to act as a faction in their own right. Rather the 
different youth wings are associated with different factions. Young Labour is currently seen to be 
associated with the left of the party, whereas Labour Students and the Young Fabians are more 
associated with the ‘moderates’. This was described by GB06 and GB10: 
“The youth wings are linked to factions. For example, the Young Fabians tends to 
be associated with the centre-left part of the party. A lot of that is historical, back 
in the 1990s the people involved in the Young Fabians played a role in the 
foundation of New Labour. Peter Mandelson,765 Liam Byrne,766 Tom Watson,767 Jack 
Straw,768 Ed Balls,769 those kinds of figures. A lot of those involved in the Young 
Fabians went on to work for New Labour, or work for the Labour Party in 
government. A lot of them went on to become MPs who were involved in 
government. Labour Students historically is linked to the centre-left again. That’s 
because if you look at the fact that it worked traditionally within the Labour Party, 
it’s based at Labour Party HQ, and traditionally if you look at their ex-Chairs they’ve 
come from that centre-right faction. Whereas Young Labour has attracted people 
who are more left-wing. Even though today it’s chaired by what you’d describe as 
 
764 Ibid. and Koelble T. 1991. The Left Unravelled: Social Democracy and the New Left Challenge in Britain and 
West Germany. Durham NC, Duke University Press, p81 – 84. 
765 Young Fabians committee member, Labour’s Director of Communications 1985-92, MP for Hartlepool 1992-
2004.  
766 Founding editor of the Young Fabians magazine Anticipations, MP for Birmingham Hodge Hill since 2004.  
767 Young Fabians committee member, President of the University of Hull Student’s Union 1991-92, Chair of 
the National Organisation of Labour Students 1992-93, Labour Party National Development Officer for Youth 
1993-97, MP for West Bromwich East 2001-2019 and Deputy-Leader of the Labour Party 2015-2019. 
768 Young Fabians committee member, President of Leeds University Student’s Union 1966-67, President of the 
National Union of Students 1969-71, MP for Blackburn 1979-2015.  
769 Young Fabians committee member, Special Advisor to Gordon Brown, 1994 – 2005, MP for Normanton 




a centre-left Chair770 the actual institution itself is very left-wing, because they’re a 
campaigning organisation, because they’re thinking about issues more than what’s 
happening on the ground. So, the youth wings are linked to factions definitely.” 
GB06, senior activist in Labour Students and the Young Fabians. 
“The youth wings have become more avowedly linked to different factions. Labour 
Students now is seen through a factional lens, it’s whether or not you’re sceptical 
of the moderate cause within Labour really. Young Labour recently have a funny 
position in terms of their factionalism because every member of Young Labour exec 
is a member of the Momentum slate, the Left slate, except the Chair. Which is a 
very curious position to be in. Overall, obviously at the moment the factionalism is 
a lot more pronounced. The Young Fabians historically have a position of non-
alignment but broadly speaking the membership of the Young Fabians tends to 
hew towards the moderate edge of the party. It was always more of an historically 
moderate place. Now the Young Fabians are still more or less seen as on the right 
but they’re not necessarily avowedly so. You still get people in the membership who 
are from all hues of opinion within the party but the people who actively go to 
events, get elected to the main roles and run the organisation all hew more or less 
to the moderate edge of the party.” 
GB10, senior activist in Young Labour and the Young Fabians. 
The final point made by GB10 is important, each organisation still includes individuals from different 
ideological groupings, but each has a dominant faction which sets the tone and controls the 
organisation and its resources.771 It is also important again to note that the level of factionalism in the 
youth wings is currently very high, whereas in the recent past it was not such an important dynamic. 
GB04 explained: 
“Labour Students wasn’t particularly factional when I was involved. We even had 
uncontested elections for Chair. I mean there had been factions in the past, in the 
very recent past to when I was involved, but my understanding was they were more 
personality based rather than policy based. It wasn’t a left-right thing it was people 
had fallen out over a choice of candidate or something like that, there had been a 
falling out rather than a big policy debate or policy fallout. It wasn’t a time when 
there were particular factions on things.”  
GB04, MP from a youth wing background. 
Given then that the level of factionalism has fluctuated widely across the time frame, and that which 
faction is in the ascendancy has also shifted,772 this would suggest that factionalism is not closely 
related to the political culture of the Labour youth wings.  
 
770 The current Chair of Young Labour is Miriam Mirwitch, who has also been a long-standing member of the 
Young Fabians national executive committee.  
771 See for example Cassalicchio E. 2019. Revealed: How the ruling body of Labour’s youth wing is tearing itself 
apart. PoliticsHome. Published 6th March 2019. Available at https://www.politicshome.com/news/uk/political-
parties/labour-party/jeremy-corbyn/analysis/102324/revealed-how-ruling-body, accessed 12.09.2019 10:54 
772 See Golding J. 2003. Hammer of the Left: Defeating Tony Benn, Eric Heffer and Militant in the Battle for the 
Labour Party. London, Politico’s, Minkin L. 2014. The Blair Supremacy: A Study in the Politics of Labour’s Party 
Management. Manchester, Manchester University Press and Gould P. 2011. The Unfinished Revolution: How 





With that being so, and with the JUSOS being seen as a faction in and of itself, on the left of the SPD, 
this thesis needs to explore whether the political culture of the youth wings in both case studies is 
different to their mother parties, and therefore whether the ‘importing’ of that culture into the main 
party by parliamentarians with a youth wing background is happening and linked to the shift in the 
party’s political cultures already identified.  
 
6.5: The youth wings, political culture and gentrification. 
 
If it is not factionalism driving the dynamic of a shifting political culture within Labour, then is there a 
more direct link to the rise of the youth wings and the decline of the trade unions? When looking at 
the political culture of the JUSOS we have to keep in the mind the definition of political culture used 
for this research. As discussed in chapter one political culture is defined as those assumptions, ideas, 
norms, customs and beliefs found within a certain group or sub-group which has political aims or 
effects, maintained and evidenced in group shibboleths, self-perceptions, espoused priorities and 
principles of right action and interaction which govern social behaviour both within the group and 
towards outsiders. In essence it is the ‘rules of the game’ that individuals adopt.  
 
This section will explore the question of the youth wings political culture and whether the evidence 
suggests that this is a concept shared across the individuals within the youth wings, in particular in the 
Labour Party case study where there are three separate youth organisations. The section finds that 
there is indeed a shared culture. Next it will explore whether the key divide in the SPD and Labour is 
between youth wingers and trade unionists and finds that there is suggested a significant cleavage 
there, but that more research is needed.  
 
The following subsection will then explore the notion of individuals socialised into the political culture 
of the youth wings importing that culture to the senior sections of the mother parties. Finally the last 
subsection will explore a nuance within the Labour case study, with evidence presented that the trade 
unions are increasingly sending individuals socialised in the youth wings to Parliament, rather than 
shop-stewards or those socialised from the workplace, contributing to the gentrification dynamic 
within the Labour Party.  
 
The political culture of social democratic youth wings.  
The first question to ask then is do youth wingers share a political culture, across the factional and 
organisational divides within the youth movement, before exploring whether that culture is separate 
to the political cultures of the mother parties.  
 
With regards to the SPD DE06 confirmed that the JUSOS do indeed have a political culture which is 
shared across the sub-factions within the organisation: 
“You have a very specific culture you can say which you can almost smell with these 
people, you can tell these people have been socialised with the JUSOS, you feel it, 
it’s very different. Even if you are not of the same opinion, we have a common 
battleground for discussion.”  
DE06, senior JUSOS activist. 
However, if the political culture is the same across the JUSOS the second question is whether they are 
different to the SPD as a whole or whether they share their political culture with the mother party. 
Both DE05 and DE06 confirmed that the culture of the JUSOS is different to that of the main SPD, and 




“The JUSOS are much younger and I think you can see this in the way they 
campaign, but also we define ourselves as the left wing within the SPD so this 
clearly plays a role as well. We have more of a culture of questioning our leadership, 
the SPD leadership. SPD Chairs who come to JUSOS conferences don’t always have 
an easy ride, they get a difficult one. It’s in the JUSOS’s DNA to do this. I think the 
JUSOS are a bit more outspoken on issues they care about. The JUSOS have been 
very instrumental in the anti-Hartz IV campaign, to both of the anti-Grand Coalition 
campaigns. The JUSOS were THE force, at least as I see it, behind those campaigns.”  
DE05, senior JUSOS activist. 
“In my city actually we are very interconnected, we have a very good network of 
graduates from the JUSOS, who are still very connected to us. Even when the 
necessities of political work make us adversaries, we stay connected. You always 
feel with these people the special education that we had with the JUSOS, and the 
special political viewpoint, and you feel when people from outside the JUSOS are 
talking to you, someone who joined the party at the age of forty or came from other 
organisations or something, you always feel they have a different political 
education, or political viewpoint. We are not on shared ground sometimes. There 
is a different culture. The JUSOS will always see themselves as the avant garde of 
the SPD. They will always feel that they are young, idealistic people who are 
fighting for the right political decisions. They will always perceive themselves to be 
rebellious against the old people in the SPD who they think are not pursuing the 
right political goals. This is normal, I think. This is the normal way of political self-
perception of any youth organisation.”  
DE06, senior JUSOS activist. 
Both DE05 and DE06 identify that the JUSOS is different to the SPD and state that they do not have 
‘shared ground’ on which to debate political issues with those from other backgrounds in the SPD. 
This is evidence that the political culture of the JUSOS is different to the main SPD, and indeed DE06 
states outright that ‘there is a different culture.’ Therefore, the evidence seen here shows that the 
JUSOS are not only operating as a faction, but as a faction with a different political culture to the 
mainstream of the SPD. Further, it suggests that despite the internal divisions of sub-factions the 
JUSOS have a coherent culture which crosses those factional divides – the ‘common ground to fight 
on’ that DE06 references.  
 
When it comes to the Labour Party’s three youth wings – Labour Students, Young Labour and the 
Young Fabians – is there also a common ground for them to fight on? The evidence from the data 
below suggests that they all have very similar political cultures to each other. Many of those involved 
in Young Labour and the Young Fabians were also students when they first got involved in the Labour 
Party and its youth wings – indeed many got involved in the Party through Labour Students – and 
many individuals are active in several of the youth wings. All of those interviewed for this study had 
been active in at least two and it is unusual to find an individual who has only been active in one 
(though the present author is one such).  
 
This is in large part because of the membership age ranges. Labour Students are typically aged 
between 18 and 21 or 22, the ages most people attend university.773 For Young Labour the upper age 
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limit is 27774 and for the Young Fabians it is 31.775 As with most organisations the ones who are on the 
organisations top committee are those who tend to have been involved for some time. This means 
that they skew towards the upper age limits, meaning Young Labour and the Young Fabians have a 
large number of members who were politicised at University or via Labour Students and then moved 
into the other youth wings when their studies came to an end to continue their involvement in youth 
politics. This was confirmed by GB06: 
“We’ve got three components of the youth wings. You’ve got Labour Students 
which is mainly focused on student issues, which as a result they mainly focus on 
the NUS. You’ve got Young Labour, which are seen more as the campaigning 
component. It tends to attract those who are more issues based. Then you’ve got 
the Young Fabians which sits in an interesting place. One thing to mention is Labour 
Students, well you can only be a member if you’re a student, so the age tends to be 
very low there, up to 21 plus postgraduates, and then you have Young Labour in 
which their cut-off is 27, whereas the Young Fabians cut-off is 31. So, the Young 
Fabians fills this gap between those who have gone to university and got involved 
in Labour stuff, then they have graduated and gone into the workplace but still 
want to be politically engaged and active.” 
GB06, senior activist in Labour Students and the Young Fabians 
You can also see this activity across youth wings in that the current NEC youth representative, which 
is a position now controlled by Young Labour, is Lara McNeill, a former Vice-Chair of Labour 
Students.776 The current Chair of Young Labour is Miriam Mirwitch, who got involved in politics at the 
London School of Economics and who also sat for several years on the Young Fabians executive 
committee.777 As a result many of the activists in Young Labour and the Young Fabians became 
politicised at University, and/or became active originally in Labour Students.  
 
This similarity of experience leads to similarity of political culture. GB07, who was active in senior roles 
in all three youth wings, specifically confirmed they have similar political cultures:  
“The first organisation that I joined was Labour Students, before that I was involved 
in the Labour Students club at my university, so I actually started there, involved in 
student politics in my university Labour club, which is affiliated to Labour Students 
nationally, so I was involved in those organisations at the same time. After that I 
joined Young Labour, I was involved there for a while, and after that I joined the 
Young Fabians. So, I joined Labour Students, I joined Young Labour, I joined Young 
Fabians, the culture is often the same.” 
GB07, senior activist in Young Labour, Labour Students and the Young Fabians. 
This suggests that the political cultures of the youth wings are indeed similar to each other, even 
though they link to different factions. The data suggests that this is via Labour Students or at least that 
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most individuals are now being politicised at University. This means that it is happening in a 
predominantly middle-class environment778 and in which those individuals from working-class 
backgrounds face pressure to conform to middle-class sensibilities779 and is supporting evidence that 
the rise in the number of youth wing origin MPs is a driving force behind the gentrification dynamic 
seen in the Labour Party.  
 
Trade unionists Vs youth wingers – the key divide? 
If the youth wings have a different culture to the main mother parties, and which is the same across 
factional divides within the youth wings – and in Labour’s case across the different youth wings – is 
the key divide once between those socialised in the youth wings and those socialised in the trade 
unions? The evidence from the interviews suggests this is indeed the case, in both case studies.  
“The JUSOS is the school of the SPD for young members, this was my school. So are 
the unions, especially the IG Metall, the metalworker’s union. That’s the biggest 
union, and really strong in the DGB. Sometimes we have had conflicts between the 
unions and JUSOS, JUSOS are on the left and the unions are a little bit more 
pragmatic. But whenever a JUSOS is a candidate for selection there was a second 
candidate from the unions. So, we have a real competition. This competition is the 
actual school of the SPD!” 
DE04, former MdB with a JUSOS background. 
“The JUSOS say we should be critical and act in solidarity with the party and this is 
true. I feel this myself. The SPD is the place we have to fight, it’s not our political 
home. We are factional against the Trade Unions, sometimes. Sometimes we are 
more consequential than the trade unionist guys who are on the board now. 
Because they are quite problematic as well. Sometimes we have a difficult 
development there, because you have IG Metall the big trade union for metal and 
electro industries, which is dominating the political questions within the German 
union family. We have a quite weak ver.di, the services union, which is not acting 
very cool sometimes as well. We always try to push them. Sometimes these unions 
act quite conservative.”  
DE06, senior JUSOS activist. 
Here both DE04 and DE06 identify conflicts between those from the youth wings and those from the 
main SPD, directly saying it is a conflict between those from the JUSOS and those socialised via the 
trade union movement, in particular the IG Metall. The data from the Labour Party interviews also 
found a conflict between these two groups.  
 “My bit of the party was the white working-class industrial trade union bit. We 
were probably curry and a pint. That would be what we would do. I mean I can 
drink other things with the best of them but going for a curry and a pint was 
absolutely fine. The more intellectual Fabian part of the movement they would be 
Prosecco. You’ve got those different parts of our movement and if we’re doing 
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them all as drinks they would all be different. Our definition of class is so skewed. 
It’s why I dislike being patronised by people who are academic. You might know 
the thing, are you Daily Mirror or are you The Guardian? Now I’m Daily Mirror. The 
Fabians are the Guardian. I think that’s also the different bits of the movement. 
The trade union movement – there is a problem, fix it. Negotiate your way, find a 
fix, job done. We’re not going to sit in a room and have a chat about it and a policy 
paper where we’ll research it. It’s why I was crap at academic stuff. There is a place 
in our movement for it but not me, I was crap at it.”  
GB01, MP from a trade union background. 
GB01 here draws a class distinction between the working class ‘curry and a pint / Daily Mirror’ part of 
the party which they associated with the trade unions, and the middle class ‘prosecco / Guardian’ part 
of the party which they associated with the Fabians and ‘people who are academic’. Given that Labour 
Students is the predominant source of youth wing origin MPs, with the Young Fabians also an origin 
point, and that Trade Unionist MPs are declining, this suggests a shift in those origin points will also 
lead to a shift in the political culture of the party. This supports Hypothesis 3, that there is a different 
culture in the youth organisations which is resulting in a gentrification of the party as they come to 
dominate the Parliamentary Labour Party. 
 
GB03 emphasised the same split, between those from a trade unionist background which they 
characterised as ‘old traditional social democratic members’ and a new group of members with a 
‘citizen lead’ political culture: 
“Pretty much you’d distinguish between people from a trade unionist background, 
the old traditional social democratic members and then the newer intake of the 
slightly more, sort of anarchists, that’s not quite right, but shall we say citizen lead 
politics. Those are two quite different cultural groups that don’t actually have very 
much in common. But you know the Labour Party has always been a bit of a 
coalition and that’s broadly what the coalition is at the moment.” 
GB03, former senior party employee. 
This again speaks to a binary divide between trade unionists and the newer intake of members. 
Coupled with the comments of GB08 and others above that the party is becoming ‘increasingly middle-
class’ then and with the concept that those who attend University adopt more middle-class 
sensibilities780 we can say there is a likelihood that these new members are more highly-educated and 
underwent a politicisation process at University rather than in the workplace. GB03 confirmed that 
this is correct: 
“A larger proportion of young people’s first exposure to organised politics is going 
to be in a student or youth organisation, or a student environment, than it once 
was. So, a proportion of people who would have been more likely to have been 
institutionally politicised at work are now having their first institutional political 
experience at university. You’ll get a large number of people who had an 
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experience of student politics at some level even if they don’t get that involved in 
it.” 
GB03, former senior party employee. 
This would suggest then that the divide which matters in terms of hypothesis 3 is not between 
different factions but this divide between trade unionists politicised in the workplace, and those 
members who are politicised at university or in youth politics. Given the earlier comments, discussed 
above, that the youth wings are a ‘middle-class’ environment and that this presents a barrier to entry 
to working-class individuals the data hints at the possibility of a gentrification of the Labour Party via 
the importation of a ‘middle-class’ political culture from the youth wings to the national 
representatives. The next section will explore this.  
 
Importing youth wing political  culture to the main party.  
The final question then is one of establishing causality, rather than merely correlation. In other words, 
are those socialised in the youth wings bringing the political culture they learned in the youth wings 
into the senior parties when they graduate into them? The evidence is that yes, they are, and this 
holds true across both the case studies.  
 
In the previous subsection we have already seen that DE04 described the JUSOS as their school. The 
other MdB from a JUSOS background, DE02, also stated that the experiences they had in the JUSOS 
shaped them and their view of politics, saying that they learnt ‘the craft of politics’ in the JUSOS and 
that they still use that in their current work in the Bundestag: 
“For me being in JUSOS was the definite thing for a career in the SPD, it was really 
a determining factor. It was there that I learnt all about politics. Not only about the 
subjects but also about the techniques and the way to impose your ideas. I learnt 
the craft of politics. I’m still profiting today from what I learnt at the JUSOS.” 
DE02, MdB with a JUSOS background. 
They specifically state that they use the way they learnt how to do politics – their political culture – 
from the JUSOS in the way in which they perform politics in the Bundestag. Similarly, DE06 described 
how they try to directly import their political culture – that of the JUSOS – into the main party within 
their city.  
“I got some insight into this because for some years I am a member of the board of 
SPD in my city as well so I am there for campaigning and for education of the 
members and so on. I am doing a lot of work there and it’s different, it has its 
weaknesses, but I like it too as well. It’s the playground we all play on, the JUSOS 
have to go there as well and have to fight there for their policy and I will fight there, 
also when I am no longer in the JUSOS any more I will fight there still. And I will 
have the label on me, well they are a left-wing JUSO. It’s ok. There is a difference 
in the cultures as well, in JUSOS in my city our culture is about empowering yourself, 
your comrades, to change politics and within the SPD you don’t have this culture. 
We try to bring it sometimes; we try to implement our culture. I do within the board 
of the SPD in my city, I try to establish some sort of political seminars and so on to 
try to educate new people who are too old for JUSOS as well but it’s not the culture 
of the SPD. The culture of the SPD is more like controlling the political notions or 
the political impulses you have there. I didn’t join the SPD because it was a socialist 




an organisation where you can fight for a better society, for a better future, for 
progressive politics and so on.” 
DE06, senior JUSOS activist. 
This passage is particularly instructive. First, DE06 states that they ‘try to implement [their] culture’ 
within the main SPD, they also give some examples of how they do so, with seminars and political 
education. Second, they specifically state that this will continue after they are no longer in the JUSOS, 
having grown too old, and that they will still be known as being someone from the JUSOS when they 
are doing so. This is direct evidence that the culture of the JUSOS is being imported to the main SPD 
by graduates of the youth wing, and intentionally so as well as organically.  
 
The data from the Labour Party interviews told a similar story, but perhaps not as clearly. GB04 and 
GB09 discussed the way in which those who were socialised in the youth wings move up through the 
party and how their youth wing experiences shape the way in which they perform politics at the senior 
level, albeit in different ways. 
 “Your local party isn’t the same, Labour Students and your local party are two very 
different bodies of people. They’re just completely different entities, and so it isn’t 
like if I did a good job in Labour Students someone should spot me and think oh you 
should be an MP, it doesn’t work like that. It goes back to that point where It’s the 
experiences that you get, to become an MP you need to be able to stand in front of 
a room of people at a hustings event and answer questions and make a speech, 
you’ve got to do that. So a lot of the stuff that we did in Labour Students was 
political education, we’d run political education weekends where politicians would 
come along and speak or non-profits would come along and do workshops, so you 
have all of those sorts of things which gives you skills. You don’t have a lot of 
political education a lot of the time and those were useful events. So, it’s a bit of 
training, a bit of confidence building, a bit of networking involved as well for sure. 
If you look at Vicky Foxcroft for example, who was Chair of Labour Students, being 
chair of that per se didn’t enable her to become the candidate in Lewisham 
Deptford, no-one thought oh you did a good job in Labour Students twenty years 
ago or whatever, fifteen years ago, so you can be the candidate in Lewisham 
Deptford, no. She had to speak to the several thousand members in Lewisham 
Deptford and convince them why she should be the next Labour candidate there. I 
suspect some of the training, the politicisation that she got in Labour Students 
would have helped in that process, I can’t speak for her, but I think that’s probably 
right.”  
GB04, MP from a youth wing background. 
GB04 here identifies the politicisation from Labour Students and the political education and skills 
learnt there as a factor in how they and another MP, Vicky Foxcroft, perform politics at the senior 
level. GB09 also referenced a continuation of behaviour, but in the form of political feuds. 
“You have a lot of politicians now who know each other through student politics. 
And of course, their feuds carry on from when they were at university. So that 
becomes the professionalisation of politics. People who come into politics earlier 
and for whom it is a career.”  




Again, this is a continuation of the political culture of the youth wings. This has now advance to a point 
that GB06 described the cultures of the youth wings and main party as a mirror of each other and 
described how this has caused a gentrification effect.  
 “I think the culture in the youth wings is a mirror of the wider Labour movement. 
It is an exaggeration of what is happening elsewhere. When you look at the main 
Labour Party you see what was happening in the youth wings now happening in 
the main Labour Party. Right now, they’ve become very much a mirror of each 
other. The youth movement is a reflection of the features of the political party. And 
I think in the UK there was a big bruhaha about professional politicians, especially 
at the time of the 2015 General Election because we had a whole class of politicians 
who came up through the youth wings, through the Young Fabians or Labour 
Students, who then became MPs and who then when they became more prominent 
it became clear that they were all very much identical. They all did PPE, they all 
spent time in London, worked in politics. I think it narrows the spectrum of political 
thought, or the spectrum of thinking. What I mean by that is that right now even 
those of my friends who are left-wing, we all went to the same universities, we all 
still know each other even though we have different views on policy areas we all 
still think the same, but we don’t have any different perspectives, because we’re 
people who all went to the same universities, who went to the same events, who 
were involved in the same youth movements, who battled each other in the youth 
movements.” 
GB06, senior activist in Labour Students and the Young Fabians. 
This narrowing of political thought that GB06 references is another way of saying that the political 
culture of the youth wings is now crowding out other cultures, and they also state that this happened 
at the main party level as individuals moved up from the youth wings to the Parliamentary Labour 
Party.  
 
It is the contention of this thesis that the political culture being crowded out is that of the trade union 
movement. Evidence for this was offered by GB09 who felt it was linked to the notion of decision-
making within the trade union movement, which was different to the culture in the youth wings: 
“What you learn in Labour Students and what you learn in a trade union are 
different things, hugely. And a different thing from what you learn in local 
government as well. Because in a youth wing like Labour students, it’s the Denis 
Healey dictum: In academia you argue towards a conclusion, in politics you argue 
towards a decision. And you see a big difference with those people who go on to 
be ministers who’ve actually been involved in decision-making, which is very very 
different from policy-making.” 
GB09, MP from a youth wing and trade union background. 
GB09 here identifies that the culture of decision-making in the trade unions (and local government) is 
different to the culture of policy-making in the youth wings. This is more evidence that the political 
culture of those socialised in the youth wings is different to that of those socialised in the trade unions 





However, during the course of the interviews for the Labour Party case study evidence emerged that 
trade unionist MPs are beginning to adopt the culture of the youth wing, because there has been a 
shift in the types of individuals the unions are promoting for selection.  
 
A shift in Labour’s trade unionist MPs.  
One of the issues which arose from the interview process was a shift in what type of individual the 
trade unions were putting forward for public office, away from shop stewards and activists and 
towards lawyers, staff and other individuals who had been through university. This results in the trade 
unions recruiting people out of the Labour youth wings as well, who then go onto public office. This 
was identified by all three interviewees who had come up via the trade union route. GB09 discussed 
this shift, and compared it to the situation previously whereby workplace organisers would be selected 
as candidates:  
“The problem with that is the old joke that what we need is more working-class 
solicitors. Because what the Unions are tending to do, what too many of them are 
tending to do, is to send their local solicitor who does their industrial tribunal cases, 
and they’re appointing them rather than saying ‘who’s the convener of the local 
factory’ who may be suitable. To try and run a factor you have to have some skill, 
but now they send people like Richard Burgon and a number of others, their 
lawyers.”  
GB09, MP from a youth wing and trade union background. 
GB01 agreed, although they linked the change to those who were political officers for the union’s 
before becoming an MP rather than necessarily a trade union lawyer:  
“The unions don’t push working class candidates for selection anymore. I think that 
we say we do, but actually I’m not sure what working class is any more. I consider 
myself a working-class trade union MP. Everything I’ve got was because of graft. 
From my family and from me. But if you think about people like Angela Rayner, 781 
she’s genuinely worked her way up through the movement and come in, in the 
same way that Ernie Bevin did. So, there are some who are working their way 
through. But there are others who call themselves trade unionist MPs – in the nicest 
possible way they were a political officer for a bit. That is not the same.”  
GB01, MP from a trade union background. 
GB08 also concurred, describing a gentrification process within the union movement as the unions 
merged together, and then drew a distinction, like GB09 and GB01, between union activists and union 
employees:  
“One of the things I’m worried about in my union, it was a blue-collar union, it 
represented the manual grades, literally, they were called the manual grades, 
within the places we were active. When the union merged a lot of them got pushed 
out by people in the officer grades who thought they were more senior, or who 
couldn’t imagine having someone who was a low-status worker running their 
branch because they were a senior worker or whatever. I wonder to what extent 
that’s happened. I don’t know whether that’s happened in the Labour Party, but I 
think there’s a perception that’s happened. People have an expectation that 
 




someone who’s going to be their representative has been to university or is able to 
write in a kind of academic, to be more professionally qualified. I mean who are the 
obvious people who’ve come from a trade union background? There are people like 
Angela Rayner and Eleanor Smith782 who quite definitely came through as union 
activists. But I think a lot of my colleagues were union employees rather than union 
activists.” 
GB08, MP from a trade union background. 
This then was the unanimous opinion of the three trade unionist MPs interviewed. However, it is not 
necessarily new that a trade union’s political officer would be a likely candidate for selection. The 
opinion of the interviewees is that this has increased, not that it is a new phenomenon.  
 
The quantitative data can also be used to verify this. By charting the number of trade unionist MPs – 
those who had been employed by or held a senior voluntary position in a trade union – who had 
previously served as an elected officer in a youth wing. This data supports the opinions presented by 
the interviewees, with the percentage of trade unionist MPs who had previously served in the youth 
wings rising from 7.76% in 1979 to 25% in both 2010 and 2015, dropping slightly to 23.89% in 2017, 
as shown in Fig. 6.1.783 The drop in 2017 is in fact the first time the percentage has dropped between 
election cycles since 1979, although the rise between 1992 (19.67%) and 1997 (19.84%) is tiny and 




There has then been a shift in the type of individuals that the trade union movement are pushing for 
selection away from former shop stewards and grassroots activists – individuals such as Angela Rayner 
– and instead towards their political officers and the lawyers who take on their industrial tribunal cases 
such as Richard Burgon784 or Jo Stevens.785 This also contributes to the gentrification of the 
Parliamentary Labour Party, by crowding out one route for non-graduate individuals to push for 
 
782 A former nurse who became the first black president of Unison, MP for Wolverhampton South-West from 
2017 to 2019. 
783 Compiled by the author from research data. 
784 The former chair of Cambridge University Labour Club and an employment law solicitor with Thompson’s 
Solicitors, a firm with long-standing links to the British trade union movement. MP for Leeds East since 2015.  




























selection. It means the trade union movement is becoming one of the intermediate organisations in 
the political ecosystem between the youth organisations and elected political office, rather than its 
traditional role of politicising individuals in the workplace and promoting them into Parliament. The 
examples given of Angela Rayner and Eleanor Smith do show that this process is a squeezing of this 
route by graduate professionals, rather than a complete takeover, however.  
 
Discussion.  
In both case studies the decline in trade unions, in the UK’s case coupled with the external context of 
a dramatic rise in the number of students attending university,786 has seen many more individuals 
becoming politicised whilst a student rather than in the workplace. Even in the UK however the 
concomitant evidence is that the increase in the number of students hasn’t changed the class make-
up of those who become students787 and in Germany the increase is only slight. In both case studies 
the barriers to entry mean that graduate professionals make up the majority of people who are highly 
active within the parties. This is one of the factors driving up the numbers of middle-class individuals 
involved in the SPD and the Labour Party, combined with the drop in the numbers of trade union 
membership. The fact these individuals are going through their apprenticeship in the youth wings – 
especially JUSOS and  Labour Students – is more important for the gentrification process than simply 
the fact they hold a degree.  
 
This is linked to an individual’s moment of politicisation, when they become active in a political 
party.788 More often than not when an individual becomes active with the institutional structures of 
the contemporary SPD and Labour Party it is via a youth wing rather than a trade union. Despite 
factional and, in Labour’s case organisational, differences the youth wings have a distinct political 
culture which they share. The adoption of these cultures forms a large part of an individual’s initial 
political apprenticeship, which also links to the gentrification effect of higher education.789  
 
This in turn leads the graduates of the youth wings take this culture with them into both the ecosystem 
of politics-facilitating jobs790 and the senior parties. In Labour’s case this is also feeding back into the 
trade union movement, which has begun to send more university-educated professionals than non-
graduates into Parliament, exacerbating the gentrification process of the nationally elected 
representatives of the Labour Party.  
 
In other words, the evidence from the interviews presented here imply that hypothesis 3 is correct. 
The shift in recruitment patterns, from the data shown here, does contribute to the gentrification of 
social democratic parties by creating a shift in the political culture of national legislators and therefore 




786 Roberts K. 2010. Expansion of higher education and the implications for demographic class formation in 
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787 Mayhew K., Deer C. and Dua M. 2004. The move to mass higher education in the UK: Many questions and 
some answers. Oxford Review of Education. Vol. 30 No. 1, pp. 65 – 82. 
788 Wigbers D. 2012. Pathways to Parliament: Legislative recruitment in Germany and Great Britain. Doctoral 
Dissertation; Darwin College, University of Cambridge, p69. 
789 See Brynner J. M. and Egerton M. 2001. The wider benefits of higher education. London, Institute of 
Education. Available at https://dera.ioe.uk//5993/ accessed 26.06.2019 11:49 and Reay D., Crozier G. and 
Clayton J. 2010. ‘Fitting in’or ‘standing out’: Working‐class students in UK higher education. British Educational 
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London, Penguin. 
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6.6: Conclusion.  
 
This evidence presented in this chapter sought to demonstrate the impact the rise of the youth wings 
as political training grounds has had on the SPD and the Labour Party. It did this by unpacking, 
exploring and demonstrating two hypotheses, these being:  
Hypothesis 2: The youth organisations present significant practical barriers to entry 
which wealthier, middle class individuals are better able to negotiate. 
Hypothesis 3: The shift in recruitment patterns contributes to the gentrification of 
social democratic parties by creating a shift in the political culture of the party 
representatives and therefore a shift in the nature of the parties in question. 
The evidence of the data set out in this chapter is supports the contention of Hypothesis 2. The youth 
wings, from the evidence presented here, do present barriers to entry, both practical and cultural, 
which people from a more affluent background are better able to overcome.  
 
The chapter set out the manner in which the youth wings act as the gateway to the political sphere. 
Firstly by providing a source of politically engaged people to be recruited to the political ecosystem of 
party employees, existing representatives staffers, NGO’s, think-tanks and lobbyists and secondly by 
acting as a contact point between the parties and the broader politics-facilitating roles in fields such 
as, law, teaching and academia.791 Further, the chapter speculated that in the SPD’s case this role as 
an origin point that still requires an intermediate phase helps to explain why the rise of the JUSOS is 
not as obvious to some insiders as the quantitative data demonstrated.  
 
The chapter then discussed the barriers to entry of the youth wings. It found that the youth wings are 
relatively cheap on a local level but the big, networking events such as conferences and trips abroad 
are more available to those with private resources and do provide a key advantage when pushing to 
move up through the youth wing’s structures to senior levels, both in the JUSOS and in the three 
Labour Party youth wings.  
 
The data showed that these barriers are therefore found in the practicalities of time and resources, 
and in particular on the times during the week when political activity takes place. This timing of 
political activity is based on an assumption of a 9 to 5 work professional work pattern. This excludes 
those with shift work, those who work longer hours – especially those in the private sector – and those 
who are single parents or who have other caring commitments. The sacrifice of both work and family 
time is a reason why the internal motivation of an individual to be involved is also a potential barrier. 
This issue of time and the fact that only those with a professional 9 to 5 work patter can surmount it 
is a potentially key driver behind the gentrification dynamic in the two parties. 
 
In Labour’s case, there is an additional focus on concepts of class and fitting in, matching the findings 
of Brynner and Egerton,792 Hanley793 and Reay, Crozier and Clayton794 that working-class individuals 
who go into higher education environments face strong pressures to adopt middle-class sensibilities. 
The findings of this study are that these pressures are also present in the Labour youth wings, feeding 
 
791 Cairney P. 2007. The Professionalisation of MPs: Refining the ‘Politics-Facilitating’ Explanation. 
Parliamentary Affairs. Vol. 60 No. 2. pp 212-233. 
792 Brynner J. M. and Egerton M. 2001. The wider benefits of higher education. London, Institute of Education. 
Available at https://dera.ioe.uk//5993/ accessed 26.06.2019 11:49. 
793 Hanley L. 2017. Respectable: Crossing the Class Divide. London, Penguin. 
794 Reay D., Crozier G. and Clayton J. 2010. ‘Fitting in’or ‘standing out’: Working‐class students in UK higher 




into the gentrification dynamic not only by presenting lower barriers to middle-class individuals but 
also by pushing working-class individuals to adopt middle-class attitudes. 
 
These barriers of time and resources are also the most significant barriers at the formal selection 
stage, however the evidence shows that serving in a politics-facilitating role795 provides significant 
advantages when pushing for selection. As the youth wings often act as the gatekeeper to this political 
ecosystem if an individual can overcome the barriers in the youth wings, they then have an advantage 
in looking to break into this ecosystem. In the SPD case the support of the JUSOS, having gone through 
an internal selection process, can be valuable when looking for selection or a place high on the SPD’s 
party lists, but it is rarely decisive.  
 
The evidence from the interview data also supports hypothesis 3. Respondents confirmed that there 
had been a change in the political culture of both the SPD and the Labour Party and that it had involved 
a gentrification process. They also confirmed that many more individuals now come both into the 
party and into national legislatures having started in a youth wing than previously.  
 
The chapter explored two assumptions which are necessary preconditions for Hypothesis 3 to be 
correct. The data indicated that the political culture of the two parties has changed in the timeframe 
under investigation in this thesis at the same time as the rise of legislators from a youth wing 
background identified in chapters four and five. Correlation is not proof of causality, but this is 
nevertheless at least suggestive. The evidence also shows this is not linked to ideological factionalism 
within the parties. 
 
The second assumption is that the youth wings have their own political culture which is distinct from 
that of the mother parties as a whole. Further, that this political culture is shared, in the SPD’s case 
across the ideological sub-factions within the JUSOS and in Labour’s case across the three youth 
organisations. Note that this does not mean that the JUSOS and the Labour youth wings have similar 
cultures, merely that the political culture of each party’s youth wing is shared across the youth 
movement of that party. Again, the evidence here – though limited – does support that assertion.  
 
There is also evidence here that those socialised into politics via the youth wings maintain that political 
culture throughout their career and do import that political culture to the main party as they move 
through the ranks. There is even some evidence, in the evidence offered by DE06, that this is 
intentional. The evidence here is only from a small sample of interviews and must be considered 
accordingly, but it does all point in the same direction.  
 
The chapter then discussed the notion that there is a cleavage within the two case study parties 
between an older, more pragmatic and more working class section of the parties – in which the trade 
unions are key players – and a group identified as ‘academic’, ‘citizen lead’ and middle-class of which 
the youth wings are emblematic. There is a nuance, in Labour’s case, in that the trade unions now 
seem to be sending more individuals who began in the youth wing movement into Parliament and 
thus are shifting towards being as much an intermediate stage as a recruitment pathway.  
 
Both hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 3 then find supporting evidence in the interview data from both 
case studies. Whilst there is not enough evidence in the data available here to state that these findings 
are anything more than a suggestion of this thesis, there is enough to make this a tantalising possible 
ground for new research.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion. 
 
7.1: Introduction.  
This thesis has investigated the role of affiliated youth organisations in West European social 
democratic parties when it comes to the selection of candidates to hold legislative office at the 
national level. In doing so it has examined two of the most important social democratic parties as case 
studies – the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands of Germany and the Labour Party of the United 
Kingdom. This concluding chapter will draw together the threads of this thesis to discuss the lessons 
that can be learned.  
The youth wings of political parties, with the exception of Rainsford796 are somewhat understudied797 
as objects of academic interest. This study is the first to explore what role party youth wings play in 
the recruitment process of legislators, and the first to explore how their role in politicising individuals 
into a party affects the culture of that party.  
Further the study has made some major findings. Firstly, party youth wings are now the most common 
origin point for social democratic legislators. In the case of the SPD more than half of the 
Bundestagsfraktion are now graduates of the JUSOS. The decline of the trade unions as a power in 
social democratic parties has been noted by scholars like Addison et al798 and Koelble799 in Britain and 
Germany, Allern et al800 and Aylott801 in Scandinavia and Alderman and Carter,802 Howell,803 and 
 
796 Rainsford E. 2013. What makes young people politically active? Comparing activists in political parties youth 
factions, youth councils and at demonstrations. Research paper presented at PSA General Conference, Cardiff. 
Centre for Citizenship, Globalisation and Governance, University of Southampton and Rainsford E. 2018. UK 
political parties youth factions: A glance at the future of political parties. Parliamentary affairs. Vol. 71, pp 783 
– 803.  
797 A few other notable exceptions are Brewis G. 2011. The Labour League of Youth: An account of the failure 
of the Labour Party to sustain a successful youth organisation. Contemporary British History. Vol. 25 No. 4, pp 
611 – 613; Hooghe M., Stolle D and Stouthuysen P. 2004. Head start in politics: The recruitment function of 
youth organisations of political parties in Belgium (Flanders). Party Politics. Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 193 – 212 and 
Malafaia C., Menezes I. and Neves T. 2018. Living, doing, and learning from politics in a youth wing of a 
political party. The Qualitative Report. Vol. 23 No. 1, pp. 49-79. 
798 Addison J. T., Bryson A., Teixeira P., and Pahnke A. 2011. Slip sliding away: Further union decline in Germany 
and Britain. Scottish Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 58 No. 4, pp 490-518.  
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the British Labour Party and the West German Social Democratic Party. Comparative Politics. Vol. 19 pp. 253-
266. 
800 Allern E.H., Aylott N. and Christiansen F.J. 2007. Social Democrats and trade unions in Scandinavia: The 
decline and persistence of institutional relationships. European Journal of Political Research. Vol. 46 No. 5, pp 
607-635. 
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802 Alderman K. and Carter N. 1994. The Labour Party and the Trade Unions: Loosening of Ties. Parliamentary 
Affairs. Vol. 47 pp. 321-337. 
803 Howell C. 1993. Family or Just Good Friends? The Changing Labour Party-Trade Union Relationship in Britain 
since 1979. International Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 22 pp. 17-35 and Howell C. 2001. The end of the 
relationship between Social Democratic Parties and Trade Unions? Studies in Political Economy, Vol. 65 No. 1, 




Minkin804 focused on the Labour Party. Until now however their replacement by youth wings as the 
social democratic recruiting ground has gone largely unnoticed.  
Secondly this study finds prima facie evidence that this could be a major driving factor behind the 
gentrification of the social democratic party family. The shifting of the entry point for the majority of 
those activists who go on to become legislators to the youth wings means that they are being 
politicised by ideology at university, not by incidents in the workplace. The evidence from the 
interviews conducted for this thesis indicate that barriers to entry have therefore changed and have 
done so in a way that means that the balance between working- and middle-class social democratic 
activists has been disrupted in favour of the latter.  
The data here, though limited, agrees that the youth wings act as an entry point to a political 
ecosystem of specifically politics-focused careers which has grown exponentially over recent decades. 
Further, it also suggests the youth wings can act as a contact point between the parties and those in 
a broader sphere of politics-facilitating professional careers.805 Work in those fields gives an individual 
a great advantage in accruing the political capital to push for selection. Therefore, the data suggests 
that those more affluent individuals who can overcome the barriers to entry in the youth wings have 
a distinct advantage when seeking to become a Parliamentarian and thus they are crowding out the 
less affluent from the corridors of power. The data that supports this is from a limited series of 
interviews, but indicates some interesting potential for future research.  
Thirdly the study finds some supporting evidence that this has changed the nature of the social 
democratic parties themselves. The implication of the data is that the SPD and Labour are moving 
further and further away from being the parties of the less well off in society and moving towards 
being a party of precisely those professions – often either in the public or legal sectors – which now 
make up the bulk of their legislators. The findings of the data here are that the university-developed 
culture of the youth wings has been imported into the mother parties by the rise in youth wing 
graduates at the very top level of party figures, disrupting that balance and changing the parties as 
political objects. It is speculation to link this to the oft-mentioned806 distancing between social 
democratic parties and their previous core of working-class voters. Both that speculation and the 
findings that this shift is causing a gentrification process require further academic scrutiny to explore, 
but the evidence here, though limited, is tantalising.  
This concluding chapter will therefore explore these findings in more detail in the next section, going 
into depth on the empirical data from the case studies of the German SPD and the British Labour Party 
through the lens of the research questions and hypotheses of this study.  
However, these findings are not the only important contribution from this research to the canon of 
political science. To carry out this study a major new dataset was created for the SPD which has not 
 
804 Minkin L. 1992. The Contentious Alliance: Trade Unions and the Labour Party. Edinburgh, Edinburgh 
University Press. 
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been done before. For the Labour Party some detective work was required to gather the information 
needed. These datasets are an important resource for future research and are discussed here. 
Next this chapter will look to place the findings from this study in the existing canon of political science 
literature. It will look at what contribution this thesis makes in particular to the fields of legislative 
recruitment, factionalism, discussions on the professionalisation of politics and the broader realm of 
elite theory.  
The third section will discuss the broader implications of this study outside academia. It will look at 
the place that professionalisation and gentrification has both on the public debate on the SPD and 
Labour Party, and on their internal debates, especially given the sharp leftward turn taken by Labour 
in 2015 and the SPD in 2019, and the struggle of both to find a solution both to their electoral problems 
and to their sense of who and what they are as a political entity.  
This chapter will then finish with some suggestions for future research to expand upon the findings of 
this study, in terms of looking in more depth at the initial findings here, at further case studies to 
explore more widely the dynamics of youth wings and their role in the parties and by adding research 
exploring the impact of these changed internal contexts on women and ethnic minorities.   
7.2: Summary of the findings.   
This thesis has been built around three research questions with their linked hypotheses which have 
then been applied to the two case studies. All three were explored, with the first demonstrated to be 
correct, and some promising initial confirmations for the second and third found. In this section the 
chapter will discuss these three hypotheses and the empirical findings related to them from both case 
studies.  
Research question and hypothesis 1.   
The first research question explored the impact of the youth wings on the legislative recruitment 
patterns of the social democratic parties utilised as case studies, with a hypothesis that they had 
become more relevant and that this had come at the expense of the trade union movement. 
Specifically, it stated: 
Research question 1: How have the youth wings of social democratic political 
parties impacted on the selection of national representatives since the elections of 
1979/80? 
Hypthesis1: Youth organisations have grown in prominence as sources of social 
democratic parliamentarian recruitment since the 1980s, filling a vacuum created 
by the decline of the trade unions. 
Chapter four looked at this question from the perspective of the SPD, and chapter five looked at it 
from the perspective of the Labour party. Both chapters found that hypothesis 1 is correct. In both 
the SPD since 1980 and the Labour Party since 1979 there has been a marked increase in the number 
of national legislators elected who came into the parties via their youth or student wing and who held 
a senior elected role within at least one of the youth wings looked at.  
In the SPD this was predominantly accounted for by the JUSOS, the official youth and student wing of 
the party. As of the 2017 election more than half – 52.90% - of the SPD Members in the Bundestag 




doubled from the 1980 total of 20.43%, although in the SPD case the numbers dropped as low as 
12.83% in 1994 before taking off dramatically from 1998 onwards.  
In the case of the SPD it is the official youth wing the JUSOS which accounts for these numbers. 
Historical predecessors were present at the beginning of the period being studied but disappeared 
from the ranks of MdBs through the simple process of time. The other relevant youth wing, the SJD-
Die Falken, has drifted away from being a source of recruitment, accounting for 14.58% of MdBs in 
1980 but a mere 2.45% in 2017.  
In the Labour Party the situation was more fractured, with three youth wings having some relevance. 
However, as a combined block those MPs who came from a background in a youth wing have risen 
from being 17.69% of the total in 1979 to 36.19% in 2017, slightly down from the 2015 peak of 38.43%. 
In Labour’s case the trend has been a steady rise, with just slight dips in 1997 and 2017, both elections 
when Labour won seats which it had considered unwinnable and where selections would have been 
consequently much less competitive.  
The official youth wing Young Labour was not the preeminent source of Parliamentarian recruitment 
however, that was Labour Students, the official student wing, who rose from 12.64% in 1980 to 25.68% 
in 2017, with a 2015 peak of 28.24% of Labour MPs. Young Labour in contrast accounted for just 4.33% 
of Labour MPs in 1980, rising to 8.17% in 2017, with a peak of 8.3% in 2015. The Young Fabians went 
from being nearly irrelevant, just 1.44% of Labour MPs in 1980 to being nearly equivalent to Young 
Labour in terms of the numbers of MPs from that background with 6.23% in 2017. In both 1997 and 
2010 the Young Fabians had identical numbers of MPs as Young Labour, with the 7.25% of MPs in 2010 
also being their peak.  
From these figures we can see that the first part of hypothesis 1 is proven. The youth wings have in 
both cases risen dramatically across the time period. This has been a steady process in the case of the 
Labour Party but a more dramatic one in the SPD. The different dynamics of the process can be 
explained by the different electoral systems producing a much higher turnover of parliamentarians in 
Germany than in the UK. Nevertheless, the trend is clear in both case studies, with MPs from a youth 
wing background more than doubling between 1979/1980 and 2017 in both the SPD and Labour.   
In both cases there was also a marked decline in the number of MPs who had worked for or been a 
shop steward of a trade union. In the SPD they have declined from accounting for almost a quarter – 
22.55% - of the SPD MdBs in 1980 to 12.9% in 2017, with a low point of 10.13% in 2005. In the Labour 
Party the number of trade unionist MPs was much higher, 41.88% in 1980 and a high point of 43.19% 
in 1983, reflecting the closer links between the Labour Party and the British trade union movement. 
From 1983 however the pattern in the Labour Party has been a steady decline dropping to its low 
point of 26.07% in 2017. Apart from slight rises in 2001 and 2005 this decline has been in evidence at 
every election cycle.  
As with the rise of the youth wings the general trend is a clear in both case studies, but with more 
volatility in Germany.  We can therefore say that hypothesis 1 is proven to be correct by the 
quantitative data. The youth wings have risen as a source of recruitment for parliamentarians in the 
two social democratic parties analysed.  
A further finding in this section was a stark increase in the number of parliamentarians in both parties 
who had previously worked as either a party employee or a staffer for one of the party’s existing 
elected representatives. This is linked to both the professionalisation of politics, in that the number of 
staff an elected representative and the parties have has increased to cope with the increased level of 




Research question and hypothesis 2.  
Research question and hypothesis 2 looked at the dynamics of the selection process and how the 
youth wings were involved in that. It was specifically interested in the barriers to entry that are 
presented and how they are overcome by individuals, and whether a higher level of affluence made 
that process easier to navigate. They stated: 
Research question 2: What are the dynamics of social democratic party youth 
wings in relation to the recruitment of national representatives?  
Hypothesis 2: The youth organisations present significant practical barriers to entry 
which wealthier, middle class individuals are better able to negotiate. 
In both case studies hypothesis 2 found evidence to support it, but as only a limited number of 
interviews were conducted this has to be seen as initial support to warrant additional investigation, 
rather than conclusive proof. The data drawn from the interviews shows that there is a dynamic of 
individuals getting politicised and socialised into the party structures at University via youth and 
student wings rather than in the workplace via the trade unions as previously, at the first stage of the 
recruitment journey discussed in chapter two. From there a proportion of them then move into a 
political ecosystem or the broader politics-facilitating sphere which gives significant advantages in 
terms of time, flexibility, resources, networking and access to information which provides a major 
advantage for those who wish to push for selection as a Parliamentarian. The data that is present 
indicates that this process allows these individuals to accumulate the necessary political capital by 
combining this with their source of income.  
The interviews further indicate that there are practical barriers to entry not so much to the youth 
wings but to the kind of effective participation within them required to succeed at gaining entry to the 
political ecosystem. In both case studies the barriers identified are focused around time commitments 
and the time of the week when youth wing activities occur, with money also identified as a factor in 
the case of the Labour Party. In both cases the youth wings do their best to reduce the financial 
commitments required with low membership fees and in some cases support funds for events – the 
evidence is that this is more successful in the SPD, possibly due to the federal system in contrast to 
the heavily London-centric nature of British politics. Time commitments and in particular the 
assumption of a 9 to 5 work pattern allowing evenings and weekends free for political activity is a 
barrier for those with shift patterns or caring responsibilities. Although student politics does provide 
greater time and flexibility it is often the case that students from a less affluent background work more 
during their studies, meaning this is not a barrier that is completely absent for working class individuals 
active in student politics.  
Further, the data suggests that the value of the youth wings is in the main their ability to network and 
demonstrate the required skills to move into the political ecosystem. Although the JUSOS has 
sufficient prestige, visibility and organisational capacity that serving in an elected role at the very top, 
Federal level can be enough to push for selection this is uncommon and most JUSOS origin MdBs went 
through an intermediate stage. The Labour youth wings, lacking the same stature within the party 
structures and a requirement always to be selected via local parties rather than party lists, are in all 
cases acting as the origin point of a pipeline that extends through an intermediate stage – the political 
ecosystem of employment with the party or an existing elected representative, an NGO or a trade 
union. The greatest networking opportunities such as youth or student conferences, summer schools 




There are also non-practical barriers to entry, in the form of internal motivation and the 
conceptualisation that party politics, including the youth wings is often perceived as a middle-class 
pursuit. Existing research such as Hanley,807 Brynner and Egerton808 and Reay, Crozier and Clayton809 
also backs up that individuals who attend university adopt middle-class sensibilities to blend in, so 
even those from working-class background who get involved get socialised into the middle-class at 
the same time as they get socialised into the political sphere. One of the reasons that this is important 
is that, as Bruter and Harrison810 and Bale et al811 found, socialisation is the main driver of an individual 
getting more involved in party politics, with personal ambition also being a driver for some.812   
Overall, the data that is present is supportive of the notion that hypothesis 2 is correct. It suggests 
that there are practical barriers to entry which are present in the youth wings, not to join them but to 
be sufficiently effectively involved to move into the political ecosystem afterwards, which provides a 
great advantage when an individual later wishes to be selected as a candidate for national office. This 
also fits with the existing literature and demonstrates that this is likely to be a fruitful area for future 
research to explore in more depth.  
Research question and hypothesis 3.   
Research question and hypothesis 3 are concerned with the concept of political culture and whether 
the political culture of the youth wings has been imported to the main parties, resulting in a 
gentrification effect. Specifically, they state: 
Research question 3: What is the impact of any shift in the recruitment of national 
representatives found on our understanding of modern western European social 
democratic parties? 
Hypothesis 3: The shift in recruitment patterns contributes to the gentrification of 
social democratic parties by creating a shift in the political culture of the party 
representatives and therefore a shift in the nature of the parties in question. 
This question was interested in exploring the concept of gentrification, as the supplanting of those 
with low levels of capital – financial or social – by their more affluent compatriots. The thesis drew an 
important distinction between this gentrification process – seen in the rise of so-called ‘career 
politicians’813 – and the process of professionalisation of politics, that is the importing of professional 
standards and markers into the world of politics, seen in the increasing number and specialisations of 
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party staff and legislators employees.814 This, the thesis argues, contributes to the exclusion of the 
working class from the political field, something explored by scholars such as Ainsley,815 Allen,816 Evans 
and Tilley,817 Goodhart818 and Norris and Lovenduski.819  
Political culture is a subjective concept, and this thesis explored the existing research from figures such 
as Bale,820 Duffield,821 Elkins and Simeon,822 Keesing823 and Shi824 before setting out the definition used 
in this research. This subjectivity made it more difficult to operationalise the research question. Unlike 
research question 1, which could be answered with numerical data, or research question 2 which 
involved clearly defined concepts such as time and money, research question 3 inevitably left more 
room for interpretation on the part of the interviewees. Nevertheless, the findings from this were 
interesting, suggesting that the culture of both parties has changed, and this is linked to the rise of the 
youth wings as origin points for legislators. Again, the basis for this was a limited series of interviews 
and more work is done to reach definitive conclusions, but the prima facie evidence shows that this 
hypothesis is worthy of further academic scrutiny.  
The interview data did reveal indications that there is a different political culture found in those 
parliamentarians who came from a youth wing background compared to those who came from a trade 
unionist background. There was also a sense particularly in the Labour Party, that these had a strong 
class element, with the political culture associated with the youth wings and their alumni displaying a 
more distinctly middle-class sensibility than those of the trade unionist Parliamentarians. This was 
held to be distinct from their ideological factional positions and so related more to the manner in 
which those individuals conceptualise and perform politics.  
In the SPD this was described as those who had been socialised into the party via the JUSOS having 
“common battlegrounds”825 or a recognised set of rules of engagement in which to play out political 
differences, including ideological ones. As discussed in chapter one the concept of political culture 
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refers to the rules of the game and the norms and assumptions which govern the actions and 
interactions of those individuals. Those interviewees who had been active within the SPD since the 
1970s argued that there had been a shift in the political culture during their time involved with a 
change in the way those within the party interacted with each other. Those who had been active since 
the 1990s however, when the JUSOS background MdBs began to increase in number, dwelt on the 
concept of an ideological conflict within the party utilising common rules of engagement. This is a 
strong indication that indeed the political culture did shift when the JUSOS began to become more 
dominant as an origin point for SPD parliamentarians.  
Within the Labour Party the interviewees discussed the fact that the party has always been a broader 
coalition of groups than its European sister parties because of the nature of the first past the post 
political system. This has meant a slightly different dynamic in that the youth wings operate not as 
their own faction but as subsidiaries of the broader ideological factions. Nevertheless, the data 
suggests that the Labour-affiliated youth organisations do have a common culture which differs from 
that of the trade unions. 
Some of the evidence for this is the simple fact that all of the youth wing activists interviewed had 
been involved in at least two of the three youth wings, and all had been first socialised into the party 
at University. Of the MPs from a youth wing background who were interviewed all had joined the 
party prior to attending university but it was their experiences as a student which politicised them and 
socialised them into the party more broadly. Further the quantitative data indicates that Labour 
Students was by a long way the most common of the three Labour youth organisations in terms of the 
backgrounds of Labour MPs. As most individuals attend university between the ages of 18 and 21 or 
22 Labour Students has the lowest cut-off point, leading to those who were active in it to move into 
Young Labour, which cuts off at 27, or the Young Fabians which cut off at 31. From this it seems likely 
that the political culture of Labour Students and the University Labour Clubs which make up that body 
are then transmitted to the other youth wings.  
This in turn means that as individuals from the youth wings become more dominant within the 
Parliamentary Labour Party their political culture is likely to be imported into it. Interviewees 
confirmed their own perceptions that this was the case and that this was leading to a gentrification 
process, again providing supporting evidence that hypothesis 3 is correct.  
The expansion of higher education means that the rise of graduates in the Labour Party would likely 
have happened regardless of the youth wings. However, research shows that although the absolute 
numbers of students have increased in the UK the class proportions have barely shifted.826 In Germany 
the rise in the numbers attending university is much more modest827 and is insufficient to explain the 
shift in Parliamentarians seen in the quantitative data.  
Further, they set the specifics of the culture that is being imported. That is, a more middle-class culture 
would have happened in the Labour Party, and possibly the SPD to a lesser extent, because of the rise 
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of graduates within society regardless, but the specific form it has taken is because of the youth wings, 
and in particular the JUSOS Hochschulgruppen and Labour Students.  
The interview data for both case studies supports the notion that there is indeed a different culture in 
the youth wings, which is being imported into the main parties. Further, it implies these youth wing 
political cultures are framed around more middle-class sensibilities than those of the trade unions or 
the historic culture of the mother parties.  
Discussion.  
Overall, there has been a narrative that has emerged from the data for this study regarding the role 
of the youth wings in the selection process of social democratic parties. Historically the trade union 
movement, to a greater or lesser degree depending on national context, politicised individuals in the 
workplace. This was particularly the case in the UK with the close relationship between the trade 
unions and the Labour Party but also occurred in Germany to a smaller but still significant extent. 
Other individuals may have been politicised in other ways but the youth and in particular the student 
wings politicised a smaller percentage of the overall parties.  
As trade unions declined in influence through the 1980s and early 1990s their ability to act as the 
origin points which politicised individuals and socialised them into social democratic party politics 
decreased. This led to a vacuum with the parties facing a functional need to find electoral standard 
bearers. At the same time student politics began to strengthen, in particular as more individuals began 
to attend tertiary education in both case studies but particularly in the UK. This meant an increasing 
number of individuals from the late 1990s until the present who came into the party did so having first 
been politicised or socialised into the parties at University rather than in the workplace.  
The data here, though from a small number of interviews, indicates that the youth and student wings 
of the parties have a different political culture to the trade unions or the historical culture of the main 
parties. The youth wing culture is framed around more middle-class sensibilities, in particular as 
University attendance is still overwhelmingly a middle-class phenomenon.828 Those who attend who 
are from less affluent backgrounds, both other studies and the evidence from this study suggest, tend 
to be socialised into a middle-class perspective during their studies.829  
At the same time as this has happened the professionalisation of politics, in the form of the increased 
specialisation required for a more sophisticated political world, has created a political ecosystem.830 
This is made up of greatly enlarged staffs both at the parties and in the offices of elected 
representatives, and also a large increase in the NGOs and think-tanks providing specialised lobbying 
or services around politics. This ecosystem has allowed for the creation of a career path and often 
recruits from those who were politically active at university in the youth and student wings, in 
particular the party employees and representative’s staffers come from this route. There is a broader 
sphere of politics-facilitating careers such as law, journalism and the public sector, and the youth wings 
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provide a contact point between individuals in these jobs and the parties. Employment in either this 
political ecosystem or the broader politics-facilitating professions gives individuals more time and 
especially more time at the relevant moments in the week when political activity occurs, as well as 
access to the resources required to push for selection. 
The thesis contends, with support from the limited number of interviews conducted, that once 
individuals from this background become Parliamentarians they import the political culture, the way 
they conceptualise, perform and enact political activity, that they learned when first being socialised 
in the youth wings into the Parliamentary body. As their numbers increase, the data suggests, this 
political culture becomes more dominant, leading to a gentrification of social democratic legislators.  
The quantitative data demonstrates that hypothesis 1 is correct. Further, although there is insufficient 
qualitative data here to state that hypotheses 2 and 3 are proven, there is enough prima facie evidence 
to suggest that they are potentially true and certainly that they are worthy of further academic 
exploration.  
7.3: The methodology of this thesis.  
This thesis utilised both quantitative and qualitative research methods. The usefulness of a mixed 
method approach in this instance was manifest. As an exploratory study the thesis first needed to 
establish whether in fact the youth wings had risen as a source of recruitment for the parties selected 
as case studies. This was best done quantitatively by an analysis of the biographies of the national 
representatives of the two parties. The validity of this approach was proven in the case study of the 
German SPD, which was the first database compiled. This produced a hugely valuable dataset which 
can be used for further study discussed more below. However, the issue that emerged was not the 
usefulness of the approach but rather the availability of the relevant data. In the case of the Swedish 
SAP this simply precluded the possibility of producing a dataset. In the UK however some detective 
work meant that a workaround was found. 
The researcher contacted party insiders who had been active in the youth wings from several decades 
and asking them to identify from a list of MPs which had been active with them. The responses were 
then combined and matched with any other available source, including obituaries, MPs own websites, 
newspaper reports and any other source that could be located to produce the dataset. This was 
somewhat dependent on the researchers own insider status. Firstly, because they were able to 
identify relevant individuals stretching back to the 1950s and secondly because they had already 
established relationships of trust with those individuals before undertaking the PhD. Unfortunately, 
the researcher lacked the relevant knowledge and relationships to pursue the same course in the case 
of the Swedish SAP.   
The importance of gathering this quantitative data, rather than only relying on qualitative techniques, 
was demonstrated by the finding, discussed in chapter six, that some of the SPD interviewees were 
surprised at the quantitative data results. The nature of the youth wings as being an origin point which 
then far more often than not led to an intermediate phase in the recruitment journey meant that it is 
not immediately obvious that the JUSOS has come to dominate in the manner it has. Interestingly 
none of the interviewees for the UK Labour Party was surprised by the quantitative data results, but 
rather felt it confirmed suspicions they already held.  
There is however no satisfactory method to quantify the impact of this change on the nature of the 
parties. For this the only useful method was semi-structured elite interviews. These allowed those on 
the inside of the SPD and Labour to discuss the topics presented and to raise new points, expand upon 




political culture, having no standardised unit of measurement, cannot be subjected to quantitative 
analysis. This produced some excellent and insightful responses and some highly valuable data both 
for this thesis and for future research.  
This quantitative dataset is important. Not only does it provide vital evidence for this thesis, but it is 
also rich on seams which have not been mined here. For example the data on the SPD coded the 
professional backgrounds of MdBs from 1980 to the present day, coded the ages of MdBs when first 
elected and even the – as it transpired, negligible – impact of the AWO (Arbeiterwohlfahrt, the 
Workers Welfare organisation connected to the SPD) on recruitment as well as their gender and 
whether they declared themselves to be from a BAME831 background. To the researcher’s knowledge 
it is the most extensive single database on the backgrounds and biographies of the SPD’s 
Parliamentarians currently in existence. Regrettably the Labour database, because of how the data 
had to be collected, is less richly varied, but it is still an important resource for future research.  
The interview data is also rich with themes not covered in this thesis. Interviewees were asked their 
views on the public’s perceptions of the parties, data not used here. Several also raised issues 
connected both to gender and race, of the 16 interviewees 8 were women, and 4 came from a BAME 
background. All of this data can be used in future to investigate further the themes identified here, 
which will be discussed further later in this chapter.  
7.4: What this study means for the study of parties and elites. 
There are four fields in the literature to which this study can provide a contribution, as discussed in 
chapter two. The primary areas to which this thesis will provide a contribution are legislative 
recruitment studies and the field of the professionalisation of politics, as these are topics which this 
thesis directly relates to. It also however has implications for the broader topic of elite theory, and for 
the literature on factionalism within the parties.  
The field of legislative recruitment primarily looks at factors which are to do with an individual’s 
identity, in particular gender,832 ethnicity833 and to some extent class834 and have primarily focused on 
the end stage of the recruitment journey, the formal rules and campaigning that govern the actual 
selection process.835 This study also looks at class as a dynamic but focuses on changes that take place 
within the early stages of an individual’s political career. Specifically, it looks at the moment of 
politicisation for those who eventually become candidates, when an individual moves from being a 
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general sympathiser, supporter or inactive members towards being an activist. In times past this was 
often taking place in the workplace,836 this study has shown that in the contemporary era it often takes 
place on the university campus. This shift has some profound implications for the nature of the parties 
and is a significant contribution to the literature on the recruitment of legislators. By exploring the 
manner in which these youth wings also act as a gateway for the political ecosystem and an 
intersection with the broader sphere of politics facilitating jobs this study also provides an insight into 
the intermediate stages of the recruitment journey.  
This means that this study also makes a contribution to the literature on the professionalisation of 
politics. Firstly it identifies two distinct ideas which are both labelled professionalisation – the concept 
of an increasing sophistication in politics837 requiring more skills, qualifications and specialisations and 
the manner in which more affluent, middle-class individuals are better able to navigate this changed 
context leading to their increased representation amongst the ranks of national legislators838 – and re-
terms the latter as gentrification, a term borrowed from Urban Studies.839 The thesis then provides an 
explanation of how these two factors intertwine in the form of the political ecosystem and the manner 
in which the youth wings feed into that. It also by so doing maps out how one of the key drivers of 
gentrification. By identifying the mechanism by which more middle-class individuals are crowding out 
their less affluent rivals across the selection journey this study can hopefully provide a stepping off 
point for further research into this process. As such, this thesis also builds on the work of scholars 
looking at the class make-up of parliamentarians, such as Ainsley,840 Allen,841 Evans and Tilley,842 
Goodhart,843 Norris and Lovenduski844 and Ting.845  
This study also provides a contribution to the literature on factions within political parties. Parties are 
not unitary actors846 and in the selection process is perhaps the most contested moment within a 
party.847 The factions are therefore vital to this. By exploring how youth wings act as or interact with 
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factions this study adds nuance to this discussion as well as providing an example of the arena in which 
factions play out.  
Finally, this thesis provides an example of how more affluent individuals have, unintentionally, 
captured a political space for themselves. The mechanisms by which this has happened were not 
designed to produce a gentrification effect, but the overall impact has been to crowd out less affluent 
individuals from the political elite. This thesis therefore provides a nuanced addition to the field of 
elite theory by exploring a mechanism by which this has happened.  
7.5: What this study means for the parties’ themselves. 
The findings from this study can also help inform the debates within social democratic parties about 
their role and identity. The decline of their traditional anchors the trade union movement848 and class-
based politics more broadly has precipitated an identity crisis in social democratic parties. 849 This was 
one factor which led to the Labour Party taking a sharply left-wing turn in 2015.850 The SPD, struggling 
with being “a neither-nor party”851 has followed suit, electing the left-wingers Norbert Walter-Borjans 
and Saskia Esken to the party leadership at the end of 2019. The Labour Party’s leftward turn resulted 
in its worst electoral performance in 85 years in 2019, and it is now again in the midst of deciding what 
it is and should be under new leader Sir Keir Starmer.852  
The gentrification of the party identified in this thesis may be one of the reasons why social democratic 
parties are facing a real decline in electoral support amongst their traditional working-class base.853 It 
is possible to speculate that those communities no longer see themselves reflected in the political 
parties they once supported.854 The recent rise of far-right parties in Germany and elsewhere, and of 
Brexit in the UK, have both been linked to this disaffection.855 As tendentious as this may be it is a real 
possibility that there is a link between the shifts in the parties culture and their public perception and 
therefore their electoral performance. There are debates going on within the parties as to whether 
they should continue to try and function as Volkspartei or whether they should move to positions 
which more reflect their new core coalition of public sector workers and metropolitan professionals. 
This thesis can help with that debate by noting how the parties have changed internally.  
 
848 See for example Minkin L. 1992. The Contentious Alliance: Trade Unions and the Labour Party. Edinburgh, 
Edinburgh University Press and Berger S. 2000. Social Democracy and the Working Class in Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Century Germany. London, Longman. 
849 Upchurch M., Taylor G. and Mathers A. 2009. The Crisis of Social Democratic Trade Unionism in Western 
Europe: The Search for Alternatives. London, Routledge.  
850 Kogan D. 2019. Protest and Power: The Battle for the Labour Party. London, Bloomsbury Publishing. 
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852 Mason R. 2020. Keir Starmer wins Labour leadership election. The Guardian. Published on 04.04.2020. 
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/apr/04/keir-starmer-wins-labour-leadership-
election. Accessed 18.10.2020 17:27.  
853 See for example Paterson W. E. and Sloam J. 2010. The SPD and the Debacle of the 2009 German Federal 
Election: An Opportunity for Renewal. German Politics and Society. Vol. 28 No. 3, pp. 65-81 and Berman S. and 
Sengovaya M. 2019. Populism and the Decline of Social Democracy. Journal of Democracy. Vol. 30 No. 3 pp. 5 – 
19.  
854 Davies L. J. 2018. ‘From flat caps to flat whites’. Fabian Review. Published on 18.05.2018. Available at 
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If the parties decide to remain the political representation of the least well off in society then this 
thesis, by mapping the barriers to entry that many face, can help to facilitate reform to those 
structures that allow working-class people to surmount those challenges.  
These debates are important. Social democracy, one of the great strands of political thought in the 
last century, is struggling towards its next incarnation. Those debates require the parties to look clearly 
at themselves. It is to be hoped that this research can form a part of that.  
7.6: Future research.  
This study was designed as an initial exploration of the role which youth and student wings have and 
do play in the recruitment of social democratic parliamentarians. It has therefore looked to establish 
the central premise of the argument as its main contribution. By necessity this has left many avenues 
unexplored which could fruitfully form the basis of further research which could expand both the 
breadth and depth of this work.  
The first example of future research to be born from this thesis would be a more in-depth exploration 
of hypotheses 2 and 3. The data explored here is rich in promise, and suggests that these two 
hypotheses have at least a grain of truth to them, but were drawn from a limited number of interviews. 
More data would doubtless yield more nuances, and it is to be hoped that this thesis can serve to 
spark this exploration.  
There is also ample space to broaden the scope of this research by applying the methodology utilised 
here to look at the youth wings of other social democratic parties. Indeed, the interviewees 
themselves have suggested possible alternative case studies in the form of the Swedish Sveriges 
Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti (SAP, Social Democratic Workers Party of Sweden) or the Australian 
Labor Party. Further possible examples could be the Norwegian Arbeiderpartiet (Labour Party) who 
also have a strong youth wing, or the Italian Partito Democratico (Democratic Party), delegates from 
whom often form the backbone of elected positions in international youth wings such as the Young 
European Socialists (YES) or IUSY (International Union of Socialist Youth). By expanding to other case 
studies further research can enhance the generalisability of the findings of this research by taking into 
account other contexts and scenarios.  
There is further scope to expand this research in terms of its impact on other characteristics of 
legislators that have shifted in recent decades as well. As discussed in chapter one this thesis focused 
on the implications of the shift in recruiting grounds in terms of class. A question well worth exploring 
would be the effect of this change for women and ethnic minorities. In the same timeframe as the 
youth wings have come to the fore in terms of the recruiting grounds there has been an increase in 
the number of female and ethnic minority Parliamentarians in both the SPD and the Labour Party. An 
exploration of whether there is any link or interplay between these two phenomena would be 
potentially highly fruitful. A further insight could be to look into the notion of an urban vs rural dynamic 
with regards to selection. Many mining communities for example were in comparatively rural areas, 
leading to rural social democratic MPs coming up through mining unions. As legislative recruitment 
journeys have begun to lead largely through Universities – overwhelmingly metropolitan in location – 
there may have been an impact on how many rural social democratic MPs get elected.  
This thesis has produced a strong suggestion that the moment of initial politicisation of social 
democratic party members has moved from the workplace to university, and/or from the trade union 
movement to the youth and student wings of the parties. Whilst this is strongly implied further 




Whilst this thesis has not sought to provide all of the answers around the gentrification of social 
democratic political parties it has sought to provide a basis for understanding one of if not the key 
mechanism by which this process has happened within the German SPD and the UK Labour Party. It is 
to be hoped that by so doing this thesis can be the basis not only of a greater understanding of the 
contemporary social democratic party family, but also provide a firm foundation from which reforms 












“A long time ago August Bebel said that we have to get teachers to come into the SPD.  
The Party has never recovered from that success.” 
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Appendix 3 – List of interviewees.  
 
The individuals interviewed for the study are listed below. Their names are withheld to preserve 
confidentiality and they appear here as the pseudonym utilised throughout the thesis with a 
description of their background.  
 
Interviewees from the SPD case study.  
DE01: Senior member of SPD party staff.  
DE02: Member of the Bundestag from a background in the JUSOS and sub-national level party chair.  
DE03: Member of the Bundestag from a background in the Trade Union movement.  
DE04: Former Member of the Bundestag from a background in the JUSOS.  
DE05: Current senior activist in the JUSOS and employee of an existing elected SPD legislator.  
DE06: Current senior activist in the JUSOS.  
 
Interviewees from the Labour Party case study.  
GB01: Member of Parliament from a background in the Trade Union movement.  
GB02: Current senior activist in Labour Students, Young Labour and the Young Fabians. 
GB03: Former senior member of Labour Party staff.  
GB04: Member of Parliament from a background in Labour Students. 
GB05: Member of Parliament from a background in Labour Students. 
GB06: Current senior activist in Young Labour and the Young Fabians. 
GB07: Current senior activist in Labour Students, Young Labour and the Young Fabians.  
GB08: Member of Parliament from a background in the Trade Union movement.  
GB09: Member of Parliament from a background in both Labour Students and the Trade Union 
Movement. 
GB10: Current senior activist in Young Labour and the Young Fabians.  
 
There were 8 male and 8 female respondents, and four respondents came from an ethnic minority 
background. These have been separated to maintain confidentiality.  
An additional 8 individuals were not interviewed but submitted data for the creation of the Labour 





Appendix 4 – Ethics documents.  
 
Below on the following pages are the consent form and participant information sheet given to the 





                                                               
 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM  
Title of research project: The impact of party youth wings on social democratic parliamentarian 
recruitment.  
Researchers: Mr Luke John Davies (Aston University) 
Supervision team: Dr Ed Turner (Principal supervisor, Aston University), Dr Jelena Obradovic- 
Wochnik (Associate supervisor, Aston University), Dr Patrycja Rozbicka (Associate supervisor, Aston 
University) 
 Please initial 
a) I confirm that I have been given and have read and understood the 
information sheet for the above study and have asked and received 
answers to any questions raised. 
 
b) I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time without giving a reason and without my rights being 
affected in any way. I am aware of how to withdraw if I so choose. 
 
c) I understand that the researcher will hold all information and data 
collected securely and in confidence and I give permission for the 
researchers to hold all relevant personal data. 
 
d) I was given an explanation on how the information will be used in any 
resulting publications and have asked and received answers to my 
questions in this respect. 
 
e) I am aware that whilst all data will be confidential the nature of the 
biographical data that is being collected means it is not possible to 
guarantee anonymity.  
 
f) I am happy for the interview to be recorded in audio form and a 
transcript to be produced. I am aware of how to request access to the 
audio recording and to the transcript. 
 
g) I agree to be quoted directly with the use of a pseudonym.    
h) I agree to take part in the above study.  
Name of the Participant   Signature   Date 





                                                             
 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM  
Titel des Forschungsprojekts: Der Einfluss von Jugendverbänden auf die Anwerbung von Nachwuchs 
für sozialdemokratische Parlamentarier.  
Forscher: Herr Luke John Davies (Aston University) 
Aufsicht: Dr Ed Turner (Hauptüberprüfung, Aston University), Dr Jelena Obradovic- Wochnik 
(Teilaufsicht, Aston University), Dr Patrycja Rozbicka (Teilaufsicht, Aston University) 
 Bitte abzeichnen 
a) Ich bestätige, dass mir das Informationsblatt für die oben genannte 
Forschung ausgehändigt worden ist, ich dieses gelesen und verstanden 
habe, alle diesbezüglich entstandenen Fragen gestellt und Antworten 
darauf gegeben worden sind.  
 
b) Ich verstehe, das meine Teilnahme freiwillig ist und ich ohne jegliche 
Beeinträchtigung meiner Rechte und ohne Angabe von Gründen jederzeit 
davon zurücktreten kann. Mir ist bekannt, wie ich meine Teilnahme ggf. 
widerrufen kann. 
 
c) Ich verstehe, dass der Forscher alle Informationen und gesammelten 
Daten sicher speichern und vertraulich behandeln wird und gebe mein 
Einverständnis, alle relevanten persönlichen Daten aufzunehmen und zu 
behalten. 
 
d) Ich habe eine Erklärung zur Nutzung und Verwendung der 
Informationen in resultierenden Veröffentlichungen erhalten, habe alle 
darauf bezüglich entstandenen Fragen gestellt und Antworten darauf 
erhalten. 
 
e) Mir ist bewusst, dass selbst die vertrauliche Behandlung der 
gesammelten Daten ihrer biographischen Eigenschaft nach keine 
Anonymität garantieren kann.  
 
f) Ich stimme der Audio-Aufnahme des Interviews und der Fertigung einer 
Transkription zu. Mir ist bekannt, wie ich Zugang zur Aufnahme und 
Transkription erfragen kann.   
 
g) Ich stimme zu, dass ich unter Nutzung eines Pseudonyms zitiert werde.    
h) Ich stimme zu, an der oben genannten Forschung teilzunehmen.   
Name des Teilnehmers   Unterschrift   Datum 




                                                       
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Title of research project: The impact of party youth wings on social democratic parliamentarian 
recruitment.  
 
Researchers: Mr Luke John Davies (Aston University) 
 
Supervision team: Dr Ed Turner (Principal supervisor, Aston University), Dr Jelena Obradovic- 
Wochnik (Associate supervisor, Aston University), Dr Patrycja Rozbicka (Associate supervisor, Aston 
University) 
 
What is the purpose of this project? 
Thank you for your interest in participating in this study. The research asks whether participation in 
party youth wings has risen as a factor in an individual successfully pursuing a political career to the 
point of becoming a national representative since the late 1970s. Further it seeks to understand how 
this potential shift in recruiting grounds for parliamentarians can impact on the nature, character 
and perception of social democratic political parties. “Social democratic” is used as a broad term to 
encompass the main centre-left party in each country, whether or not they or individuals within 
them self-define as such. 
 
Why is this project important? 
This project presents an attempt to understand how social democratic parties have changed in 
recent decades and one potential driver of that process.  
 
Why have I been chosen to participate?  
Because you have useful first-hand insights into the effect of party youth wings on social democratic 
parliamentarian recruitment, either through being part of a youth wing or a national representative 
of a social democratic party. 
 
Is my participation voluntary? 
Your participation is entirely voluntary and you can withdraw your data from the project at any time 
by writing to the email addresses below.  
 
What will happen if I take part? 
Your responses will be stored securely, both hand written notes and electronic and audio files. The 
data you give will be used in my PhD thesis and may be used in other academic publications, policy 
briefing papers, presentations or other publications. Data will be anonymised as far as possible but 
you must be aware that owing to the biographical nature of the data it is NOT possible to guarantee 
you will remain anonymous. If you are happy for the interview to be audio recorded, for quotes with 
pseudonyms to be used and/or for your name to appear in the acknowledgements of any 
publications please make this clear on the consent form.  
 
Who is organising and funding the study? 
The study forms part of my PhD research which is funded by the School of Languages and Social 
Sciences, Aston University, Birmingham, UK and conducted under the auspices of the Aston Centre 






Who has reviewed the study? 
The research has been approved by the Ethics Committee of Aston University.  
 
Who do I contact if I need further information? 
For further information on the study or any other details you can contact either the researcher, Mr 
Luke John Davies, or a member of the supervisory team. Their contact information is listed below.  
 
Who do I contact if I wish to make a complaint about the way in which the research is conducted? 
In the first instance you can contact a member of the supervisory team on the details below. If you 
do not feel you have a satisfactory response you can contact the Secretary of the Aston University 




Thank you for taking the time to be involved in this research. If you have any further questions or 
wish to withdraw from the research at a later date please contact the researcher or any of the 
supervisory team on the below email addresses.  
 
Mr Luke John Davies – daviesl3@aston.ac.uk  
Dr Ed Turner- e.turner@aston.ac.uk  
Dr Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik- j.obradovic-wochnik@aston.ac.uk  





                                                       
 
 
Informationsblatt für Teilnehmer 
 
Titel des Forschungsprojekts: Der Einfluss von Jugendverbänden auf die Anwerbung von Nachwuchs 
für sozialdemokratische Parlamentarier.  
 
Forscher: Herr Luke John Davies (Aston University) 
 
Aufsichtsteam: Dr Ed Turner (Leiter der Aufsicht, Aston University), Dr Jelena Obradovic- Wochnik 
(beigeordnete Aufsicht, Aston University), Dr Patrycja Rozbicka (beigeordnete Aufsicht, Aston 
University) 
 
Was ist der Zweck dieses Projekts? 
Danke für Ihr Interesse an der Teilnahme an dieser Studie. Sie beschäftigt sich damit, ob die 
Teilnahme in einem Jugendverband oder –organisation als Faktor für die individuell erfolgreiche 
Verfolgung einer politischen Karriere bis hin zur Ebene eines nationalen Repräsentanten seit den 
späten 1970er Jahren gesehen werden kann. Außerdem wird um Verständnis ersucht, ob und wie 
dieser potentielle Wechsel der Nachwuchssuche für Parlamentarier einen Einfluss auf die Natur, den 
Charakter und die Wahrnehmung sozialdemokratischer Partien hat.  
 
Weshalb ist dieses Projekt wichtig? 
Dieses Projekt stellt einen Versuch dar zu verstehen, wie sich sozialdemokratische Parteien in den 
letzten Jahrzehnten verändert haben und untersucht einen potentiell beitragenden Faktor dieses 
Prozesses.  
 
Weshalb wurde ich zur Teilnahme ausgewählt?  
Weil Sie nützliche Einsichten aus erster Hand haben, die sich auf den Effekt von Jugendverbänden 
auf die Nachwuchsgewinnung sozialdemokratischer Parteien haben. Dies entweder, weil Sie selbst 
Mitglied eines Jugendverbandes waren oder Repräsentant einer sozialdemokratischen Partei sind. 
 
Ist meine Teilnahme freiwillig? 
Ihre Teilnahme ist komplett freiwillig und alle Ihre gesammelten Daten können Sie jederzeit durch 
eine E-Mail an eine der unten genannten Mailadressen zurückrufen.  
 
Was geschieht, wenn ich teilnehme? 
Ihre Antworten werden sicher aufbewahrt, egal ob handschriftliche Notizen oder elektronische 
Audioaufnahme. Die Daten, die Sie geben, werden in meiner Doktorarbeit verwendet und eventuell 
in weiteren akademischen Veröffentlichungen, politischen Informationsunterlagen, Präsentationen 
oder anderen Veröffentlichungen genutzt. Die Daten werden so weit wie möglich anonymisiert, 
jedoch muss Ihnen bewusst sein, dass aufgrund der biographischen Eigenschaft der Daten eine 
Anonymität Ihrer Person nicht garantiert werden kann. Wenn Sie mit der Tonaufzeichnung des 
Interviews, Verwendung von Zitaten unter Pseudonym und/ oder der Auflistung Ihres Namens in der 
Liste der Danksagungen einverstanden sind, machen Sie dies bitte in der Einverständniserklärung 
kenntlich.  
 
Vielen Dank, dass Sie sich die Zeit nehmen, diese Forschung zu unterstützen. Falls Sie weitere Fragen 
haben oder zu späterem Zeitpunkt Ihre Teilnahme widerrufen wollen, kontaktieren Sie bitte den 





Herr Luke John Davies – daviesl3@aston.ac.uk  
Dr Ed Turner- e.turner@aston.ac.uk  
Dr Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik- j.obradovic-wochnik@aston.ac.uk  
Dr Patrycja Rozbicka- p.rozbicka@aston.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
